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"Toute découverte, qu’elle soit philosophique, scientifique ou autre ne peut
être considérée que comme un stade dans l’Histoire de l’homme et non comme
une découverte de la vérité. L’homme de la Terre a encore besoin de certaines
croyances, de certaines théories, même si celles-ci les plongent dans l’erreur pour
quelque temps. Une erreur correspond à un degré dans la quête de la vérité."
Daniel Meurois et Anne Givaudan
À la mémoire de Nuage et Griffon
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Conditioning and reinforcement learning
We will first introduce how a very influential reinforcement learning algorithm al-
lows us to understand many aspects of animal behavior and neural activity. At the
turn of the twentieth century, a new approach called ’behaviorism’ tried to emulate
physics by explaining animal behavior in terms of mechanics that could be easily
measured. At first behaviorism fortified the old Cartesian wall between humans and
animals: humans were thinking organisms who shape their environment; animals
were mindless brutes whose behavior is conditioned by the environment. Then Bur-
rhus Skinner tried to tear down this wall by getting rid of the mind. He claimed that
the human learning process is no different from conditioning in animals, and that it
could be described mechanically without resorting to nebulous terms like ’thought’
or ’consciousness’ (Fouts and Mills, 1997).
1.1.1 The notion of reward
Before the 1950s, the prevailing view held that the basic motivations, such as pain,
pleasure and so on, probably involved excitation or activity of the whole brain. In
1953, Olds and Miller implemented by accident an electrode in a nerve pathway
from the rhinencephalon. They observed the implemented rat learned to return to
the portion of its environment where it had been given the electrical stimulation
(Olds, 1956).
This demonstration of a learned place preference suggested that these stimula-
tions were rewarding. They thus placed the animals in a box in which they could
stimulate themselves by pressing the lever. The rats were then self-stimulating about
once every five seconds. When they turned off the current (so that the animal’s
pressing of the lever could no longer stimulate the brain), the animals kept pressing
it only a few times before going to sleep (Olds and Milner, 1954).
Olds (1956) found that the strongest reward, or pleasure, came from stimulating
the hypothalamus and certain mid-brain nuclei, hence describing the reward system
for the first time. Later these brain areas were identified as receiving dopamine from
the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra (Schultz, Dayan, and Montague,
1997). We will later see why this neurotransmitter is important for reinforcement
learning.
A pleasant stimulus is familiarly called a reward. But it should be noted that
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Figure 1.1: When the rat presses on the treadle, it triggers an electric stimulus to
its brain, creating a self-stimulation circuit. Some of the animals have been seen to
stimulate themselves for 24 hours without rest, and as often as 5,000 times an hour.
(Figure reproduced from Olds, 1956.)
actual reward lies in active processes of the brain that reacts to a stimulus rather
than the stimulus itself, as this experiment showed. A reward is actually a composite
process containing several psychological components:
• Liking, which is the actual pleasure component or hedonic impact of a reward,
• Wanting, i.e., the motivation for reward, which makes the animal approach
reward and avoid punishment,
• Learning, i.e., the associations, representations, and predictions about future
rewards based on past experiences.
These different aspects are mediated by partly dissociable brain substrates. Within
each reward component, there are further subdivisions and levels, including both
conscious and non-conscious processing (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008).
We have seen that the learning and wanting components of reward were present
in the rats’ electrical self-stimulation. But the challenge in the liking aspect is that
it is very difficult to access such subjective ’pleasure’ states in experimental work,
particularly in animals. In humans, one can simply ask participants to verbally re-
port or rate their subjective pleasure (O’Doherty, 2014). Humans implemented with
’pleasure’ electrodes often displayed the same wanting behavior as the rats (Heath,
1972; Portenoy et al., 1986). But there was no clear evidence that electrodes caused
real pleasure. A patient described “erotic sensations often intermixed with an un-
dercurrent of anxiety. She also noted extreme thirst, drinking copiously during the
session, and alternating generalized hot and cold sensations” (Portenoy et al., 1986).
Punishment is usually defined as the opposite of reward. A debate in cogni-
tive neuroscience concerns whether the same brain areas, namely the ventral stria-
tum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, represent reward as well as punishment
(Bartra, McGuire, and Kable, 2013) or whether aversive value encoding and learning
are organized in an opponent system, namely the insula and the dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (Garrison, Erdeniz, and Done, 2013). What is clear is that humans and
2
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Computational models. We fitted the behavioural data with
model-free reinforcement-learning models (see Methods)34. The
tested models included a standard Q-learning (thereafter referred
to as ABSOLUTE), adapted to account for learning from
counterfactual feedback, which has been most frequently used
with this kind of task and we therefore consider as the reference
model (hypothesis zero)3,6,27,28,33. We also considered a modified
version of the ABSOLUTE model, which, similarly to other
theories assumes that choice context (or state) values are
separately learnt and represented35,36. The crucial feature of
this model (thereafter referred to as RELATIVE) is that the
context value sets the reference point to which an outcome should
be compared before updating the option value; option values are
therefore no longer encoded in an absolute, but in a relative scale
(Fig. 3). The context value (V(s)) is defined as a ‘random-policy’
state value, aimed at capturing the overall expected value of a
given pair of options, independent from subjects’ choice
propensity. Note that the RELATIVE model shares a
crucial feature (that is, relative option value encoding) with
previous computational formulations, such as actor–critic and
advantage learning models, that inspired its conception (see
Supplementary Note 2 for additional model comparison
including these preceding models and a discussion of their
differences)37,38.
Bayesian model selection. For each model, we estimated the free
parameters by likelihood maximization (to calculate the Akaike
Information Criterion, AIC, and the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion, BIC) and by Laplace approximation of the model evi-
dence (to calculate the exceedance probability; Tables 2 and 3).
After post hoc analyses we found that the RELATIVE model
better accounted for the data, both at fixed and random effect
analysis (compared with the ABSOLUTE LL: T¼ 4.1, Po0.001).
This was also true when accounting (penalizing) for the different
number of free parameters (AIC: T¼ 3.4, Po0.001; BIC: T¼ 2.1,
Po0.05)39. We also calculated the exceedance probability (XP) of
the model based on an approximate posterior probability of the
model, and we consistently found that our model significantly
outperformed the others (XP¼ 1.0)40. Thus, context-dependent
value encoding (RELATIVE) provided better account of learning
test choices, even after correcting for its higher degrees of
freedom (note that this conclusion was not affected by using
different learning rates for the reward and the punishment
contexts).
Relative value encoding explains instrumental performance.
To characterize the effect of context-dependent over absolute
value learning, we generated for each trial t the probability of
choosing the best option according to the models, given the
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Figure 2 | Behavioural results and model simulations. (a) Correct choice rate during the learning test. (b) Choice rate in the post-learning test. G75 and
G25: options associated with 75% and 25% per cent of winning 0.5h, respectively; L75 and L25: options associated with 75% and 25% per cent of losing
0.5h, respectively. EV: absolute expected value (Probability(outcome)"Magnitude(outcome)) in a single trial. The values þ 37.5b and $ 37.5b
correspond G75 and the L75 options, respectively. In a and b coloured bars represent the actual data and black (RELATIVE) and white (ABSOLUTE) dots
represent the model simulated data. (c) Reward minus punishment correct choice rate during the learning test. (d) G25 minus L25 choice rate during the
post learning test. *Po0.05 one sample t-test; NS, not significant (N¼ 28). Error bars represent s.e.m.
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Figure 1.2: In each context (monetary gains or losses), options were associated with
different outcome probabilities, so that the subjects’ task was to learn which option
was associated with either the highest reward, or the lowest punishment probability.
Healthy subjects learnt similarly from reward and punishment. (Figure reproduced
from Palminteri et al., 2012; Palminteri et al., 2015.)
animals are able to learn equally well by seeking rewards and by avoiding punish-
ments (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Palminteri et al., 2015).
1.1.2 Classical and instrumental conditioning
Here we are mainly interested in the learning aspect of reward. Learning about
stimuli or actions solely on the basis of the rewards or punishments associated with
them is called associative learning or conditioning or reinforceme t l arning. Co -
ditioning is traditionally separated into classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning, and
BEFORE	CONDITIONING:
DURING	CONDITIONING:
AFTER	CONDITIONING:
Figure 1.3: Before conditioning, the dog displays an ’unconditioned response’:
he salivates when food is put in his mouth. After repeatedly hearing a
whistle before the arrival of food, the dog now salivates as soon as he
heard the whistle, displaying a ’conditioned response’. (Figure adapted from
www.savingstudentsmoney.org/psychimg.)
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instrumental (or operant) conditioning. In Pavlovian conditioning, the rewards or
punishments are delivered independently of any actions taken by the animal. Ev-
eryone knows Ivan Petrovich Pavlov was making dogs salivate with a bell, although
not a lot of people understand why his discoveries were crucial for psychology.
Pavlov was originally interested in the physiology of digestion. Dogs are salivat-
ing as soon as food is put into their mouth (as we also do). Pavlov called this reflex
’unconditioned response’, as it is an automatic behavior that cannot be learned or
changed. He discovered that an arbitrary signal, that could be a whistle, the vanilla
smell or the view of a rotating object, can also cause salivation, if this arbitrary sig-
nal was repeatedly perceived just before the arrival of food. He called this learned
behavior a ’conditioned response’. His results revealed that the most basic form of
learning can be studied experimentally (Frith, 2013).
On the contrary, in instrumental conditioning, the actions of the animal deter-
mine what reinforcement is provided. As this PhD thesis focus on the link between
control (i.e. how your actions can shape your environment) and reinforcement learn-
ing, instrumental conditioning is of particular interest for us.
By the time Pavlov was studying dogs, Edward Thorndike was putting a hungry
cat into what he called ’puzzle box’, i.e., a box that could be opened if the animal
pressed a lever or pulled a loop. He observed that cats were indeed able to learn
to go out of the cage, but he wanted to understand how. He saw that cats could
not learn by observation (i.e., by seeing another cat get out of the puzzle box), but
only by trial-and-error (Frith, 2013). Thorndike called this associative learning the
’law of effect’, stating that “responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular
situation become more likely to occur again in that situation, and responses that
produce a discomforting effect become less likely to occur again in that situation”
(Thorndike, 1911).
Figure 1.4: Thorndike placed cats in a puzzle box that could be opened if the
cat pressed a lever. Thorndike noted that with each successive trial, it took
the cat less and less time to escape on average. (Figure reproduced from com-
mons.wikimedia.org.)
Skinner later generalized the use of boxes in which some actions are linked re-
wards or punishments, called ’Skinner boxes’. The self-stimulation box that we de-
scribed earlier is a particular kind of Skinner box (Olds, 1956).
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1.1.3 The TD(0) algorithm
The first evidence that animal learning can be described by a reinforcement learning
algorithm came from a Pavlovian conditioning experiment. After conditioning, an
animal’s behavior indicates that the conditioned stimulus induces a prediction about
the likely time and magnitude of the reward. Schultz, Dayan, and Montague (1997)
deduced that no further learning should thus take place when the reward can be
entirely predicted by the conditioned stimulus.
They recorded the activity of single dopamine neurons in alert monkeys while
they were presented with stimuli and rewards. The majority of dopamine neurons
(55 to 80%) are known to respond with short, phasic activations when animals touch
a small morsel of apple or receive a small quantity of fruit juice to the mouth. Sur-
prisingly, after repeated pairings of visual and auditory stimuli followed by reward,
dopamine neurons change the time of their phasic activation from just after the time
of reward delivery to the time of stimulus onset. In trials where the reward was
not following the conditioned stimulus, dopamine neurons are depressed markedly
below their basal firing rate exactly at the time that the reward should have been
delivered.
Information Encoded in
Dopaminergic Activity
Dopamine neurons of the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) and substantia nigra have long
been identified with the processing of re-
warding stimuli. These neurons send their
axons to brain structures involved in moti-
vation and goal-directed behavior, for ex-
ample, the striatum, nucleus accumbens,
and frontal cortex. Multiple lines of evi-
dence support the idea that these neurons
construct and distribute information about
rewarding events.
First, drugs like amphetamine and co-
caine exert their addictive actions in part by
prolonging the influence of dopamine on
target neurons (14). Second, neural path-
ways associated with dopamine neurons are
among the best targets for lectrical self-
stimulation. In these experiments, rats pr ss
bars to excite neurons at the site of an im-
planted electrode (15). The rats often
choose these apparently rewarding stimuli
over food and sex. Third, animals treated
with dopamine receptor blockers learn less
rapidly to press a bar for a reward pellet (16).
All the above results generally implicate
midbrain dopaminergic activity in reward-
dependent learning. More precise informa-
tion about the role played by midbrain d -
paminergic activity derives from experiments
in which activity of single dopamine neurons
is recorded in alert monkeys while they per-
form behavioral acts and receive rewards.
In these latter experiments (17), dopa-
mine neurons respond with short, phasic
activations when monkeys are presented
with various appetitive stimuli. For exam-
ple, dopamine neurons are activated when
animals touch a small morsel of apple or
receive a small quantity of fruit juice to the
mouth as liquid reward (Fig. 1). These pha-
sic activations do not, however, discrimi-
nate between these different types of re-
warding stimuli. Aversive stimuli like air
puffs to the hand or drops of saline to the
mouth do not cause these same transient
activations. Dopamine neurons are also ac-
tivated by novel stimuli that elicit orienting
reactions; however, for most stimuli, this
activation lasts for only a few presentations.
The responses of these neurons are relative-
ly homogeneous—different neurons re-
spond in the same manne and different
appetitive stimuli elicit similar neuronal r -
sponses. All responses occur in the majority
of dopamine neurons (55 to 80%).
Surprisingly, after repeated pairings of
visual and auditory cues followed by reward,
dopamine neurons change the time of their
phasic activation from just after the time of
reward delivery to the time of cue onset. In
one task, a naı̈ve monkey is required to
touch a lever after the appearance of a small
light. Before training and in the initial
phases of training, most dopamine neurons
show a short burst of impulses after reward
delivery (Fig. 1, top). After several days of
training, the animal learns to reach for the
lever as soon as the light is illuminated, and
this behavioral change correlates with two
remarkable changes in the dopamine neu-
ron output: (i) the primary reward no longer
elicits a phasic response; and (ii) the onset
of the (predictive) light now causes a phasic
activation in dopamine cell output (Fig. 1,
middle). The changes in dopaminergic ac-
tivity strongly resemble the transfer of an
animal’s appetitive behavioral reaction
from the US to the CS.
In trials where the reward is not deliv-
ered at the appropriate time after the onset
of the light, dopamine neurons are de-
pressed markedly below their basal firing
rate exactly at the time that the reward
should have occurred (Fig. 1, bottom). This
well-timed decrease in spike output shows
that the expected time of reward delivery
based on the occurrence of the light is also
encoded in the fluctuations in dopaminer-
gic activity (18). In contrast, very few do-
pamine neurons respond to stimuli that pre-
dict aversive outcomes.
The language used in the foregoing de-
scription already incorporates the idea that
dopaminergic activity encodes expectations
about external stimuli or reward. This inter-
pretation of these data provides a link to an
established body of computational theory (6,
7). From this perspective, one sees that dopa-
mine n urons do not simply report the occur-
rence of appetitive events. Rather, their out-
puts appear to code for a deviation or error
between the actual reward received and pre-
dictions of the time and magnitude of reward.
These neuro s are activated only if the time
of the reward is uncertain, that is, unpredicted
by any preceding cues. Dopamine neurons are
therefore excellent feature detectors of the
“goodness” of environmental events relative
to learned predictions about those events.
They emit a positive signal (increased spike
production) if an appetitive event is better
than predicted, no signal (no change in spike
production) if an appetitive event occurs as
predicted, and a negative signal (decreased
spike production) if an appetitive event is
worse than predicted (Fig. 1).
Computational Theory and Model
The TD algorithm (6, 7) is particularly well
suited to understanding the functional role
played by the dopamine signal in terms of
the information it constructs and broadcasts
(8, 10, 12). This work has used fluctuations
in dopamine activity in dual roles (i) as a
supervisory signal for synaptic weight
changes (8, 10, 12) and (ii) as a signal to
influence directly and indirectly the choice
of behavioral actions in humans and bees
(9–11). Temporal difference methods have
been used in a wide spectrum of engineering
applications that seek to solve prediction
Reward predicted
Reward occurs
No prediction
Reward occurs
Reward predicted
No reward occurs
(No CS)
(No R)CS
-1 0 1 2 s
CS
R
R
Do dopamine neurons report an error 
in the prediction of reward?
Fig. 1. Changes in dopamine neurons’
output code for an error in the prediction of
appetitive events. (Top) Before learning, a
drop of appetitive fruit juice occurs in the
absence of prediction—hence a positive
error in the prediction of reward. The do-
pamine neuron is activated by this unpre-
dicted occurrence of juice. (Middle) After
learning, the conditioned stimulus predicts
reward, and the reward occurs according
to the prediction—hence no error in the
prediction of reward. The dopamine neu-
ron is activated by the reward-predicting
stimulus but fails to be activated by the
predicted reward (right). (Bottom) After
learning, the conditioned stimulus predicts
a reward, but the reward fails to occur be-
cause of a mistake in the behavioral re-
sponse of the monkey. The activity of the
dopamine neuron is depressed exactly at
the time when the reward would have oc-
curred. The depression occurs more than
1 s after the conditioned stimulus without
any intervening stimuli, revealing an inter-
nal representation of the time of the pre-
dicted reward. Neuronal activity is aligned
on the electronic pulse that drives the solenoid valve delivering the reward liquid (top) or the onset of the
conditioned visual stimulus (middle and bottom). Each panel shows the peri-event time histogram and
raster of impulses from the same neuron. Horizontal distances of dots correspond to real-time intervals.
Each line of dots shows one trial. Original sequence of trials is plotted from top to bottom. CS,
conditioned, reward-predicting stimulus; R, primary reward.
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Figure 1.5: Dopamine s a reward rro pr diction. Each pa el shows the peri-
event time histogram (top) and raster of impulses (bottom) from the same monkey
dopaminergic neuron (each line of dots shows one trial). Original sequence of tri-
als is plotted from top to bottom. CS: conditioned, reward-predicting stimulus. R:
primary reward. (Figure reproduced from Schultz, Dayan, and Montague, 1997.)
Dopamine outputs appeared to code for a deviation or error between the actual
reward received and predictions of the time and magnitude of reward. The authors
then paralleled this with the Temporal Difference error variable in the TD(0) algo-
rithm, from the reinforcement learning framework:
5
INTRODUCTION
δ(t) = R(t)−V(t) (1.1)
where R(t) is the reward received on time t, and V(t) the expected future reward
associated with that stimuli or action on time t. The TD error δ(t) is used to improve
the estimates of V(t):
V(t + 1) = V(t) + α× δ(t) (1.2)
where α is a learning rate parameter.
Reward prediction in both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning tasks was
later shown to rely on similar neural basis, namely the ventral striatum which re-
ceives the projections of dopaminergic neurons (O’Doherty et al., 2004). Therefore
the TD(0) algorithm was used to explain instrumental, as well as Pavlovian, condi-
tioning. Furthermore Pessiglione et al. (2006) investigated the effects of drugs en-
hancing or reducing dopaminergic function. They found that the magnitude of re-
ward prediction error expressed in the striatum was indeed modified by dopamine
treatments, and that participants treated with the dopamine enhancer better learned
than participants treated with the dopamine blocker.
The reinforcement learning model was also used to explain two event-related po-
tentials (ERPs) classically found in EEG measures: the error-related negativity (ERN)
occurring after an erroneous response, and the feedback-related negativity (FRN) oc-
curring after a negative feedback. Holroyd and Coles (2002) found these two types
of ERPs to be generated when a negative prediction error signal is conveyed to the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) via the mesencephalic dopamine system. The ACC
appears to monitor errors, in order to then engage regulatory processes in the lateral
prefrontal cortex to improve performance (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).
controllers acting semi-independently and in parallel, each trying
to exert their influence over the motor system. More specifically,
we consider that the motor controllers correspond to the various
neural command structures that project to the anterior cingulate
motor cortex. For example, one controller might correspond to the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, another to the orbitofrontal cortex,
and still others to the basal ganglia and the amygdala. We suggest
that each controller might approach solving high-level motor-
control problems in its own way. For example, whereas one
controller may impel the motor system to search for immediate
reinforcement, another controller might inhibit the motor system in
favor of delayed reinforcement, and still another might direct the
motor system to avoid pain at all costs. Other controllers might
guide motor output when guessing, or when making decisions
under uncertainty, or even when navigating delicate social
encounters.
We propose that the anterior cingulate cortex, at the confluence
of all this information, decides which motor commands are actu-
ally issued to the motor system. In this view, the anterior cingulate
cortex acts as a motor control filter, enabling any one of the motor
controllers to take command of the motor system. Ignorant as to
which controller is best suited to address the task at hand, the
anterior cingulate cortex must learn which controller should be
delegated motor authority. We assume that the anterior cingulate
cortex is trained to recognize the appropriate controller, with
reinforcement learning signals conveyed to it via the mesence-
phalic dopamine system. We further assume that some of the
motor controllers may themselves use those same reinforcement
learning signals to identify the appropriate response strategy re-
quired of them. (This architecture is conceptually similar to the
mixture-of-experts network of Jacobs, Jordan, & Barto, 1991; and
to the goal decomposition approaches of Whitehead, Karlsson, &
Tenenberg, 1993; and Kalmar, Szepesvari, & Lorincz, 1998).
In keeping with previous simulations, we assume that the rein-
forcement learning signal conveyed by the mesencephalic dopa-
mine system is specifically a TD error. In one account of the neural
Figure 1. A schematic of the model. The corresponding neural substrate is given in parentheses below each
component label. See text for details. ERN ! error-related negativity; TD ! temporal difference error.
685HUMAN ERROR PROCESSING
Figure 1.6: The reinforce ent learning theory of error monitoring is linking the tem-
poral difference e ror to the e ror-related negativity. (Figure eproduced from Hol-
royd and Coles, 2002.)
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The remaining mystery in instrumental conditioning was to understand how ac-
tions can be selected on the basis of their corresponding reward prediction. Rein-
forcement learning models can use different action selection rules:
• the ’hardmax’ rule: always choosing the optimal action, i.e. the action associ-
ated with the highest expected reward,
• the ’softmax’ rule: choosing the actions probabilistically on the basis of the ac-
tions’ relative expected reward,
• the ’ε-greedy’ rule: choosing the optimal action most of the time, but occasion-
ally (with probability 1− ε) substituting a random action.
Daw et al. (2006) compared the fit of models embodying these different action
selection strategies. They found their participants’ behavior to be better described
by the softmax rule, with the probability of choosing action i taking the form:
Pi =
eβ×Vi
∑j e
β×Vj (1.3)
This particular reinforcement learning model instantiation (a TD(0) learning rule
to learn the value predictions with a softmax rule for action selection) is now widely
used to explain participants’ choices in conditioning tasks (Gläscher and O’Doherty,
2010).WIREs Cognitive Science Model-based approaches to neuroimaging
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FIGURE 1 | An example of a computational model which can be used in combination with functional magnetic resonance imaging data:
reinforcement learning (RL). The goal of this model is to learn about the expected reward attributable to a set of actions in the world (e.g., A and B),
and to guide action selection so that the action associated with the highest expected reward is favored. This particular RL model instantiation uses a
temporal difference learning rule to learn the value predictions and a softmax rule for action selection. The index variable t denotes within-trial time.
The model has five internal variables: the prediction error (PE) δ, and the estimated value predictions for the two actions VA and VB, along with the
softmax transformed action probabilities PA and PB. These variables are plotted in a trial-by-trial resolution but are modeled at different time points
within a trial when converted to a predictor in a general linear model (Figure 2). The PE δ (weighted by the learning rate α) regulates the size of the
value update on each trial. Softmax action selection is realized by filtering the value difference through a sigmoid function, whose slope is controlled
by the inverse temperature τ . This operation converts the values to action probabilities. This parameter represents the stochasticity of the choices, or
conversely, the reward sensitivity: if τ is small, even large value differences will result in very similar action probabilities and the model’s choices are
virtually random. In contrast, if τ is large, even small value differences in the medium value range can be exaggerated, thus leading to different
choices. The model likelihood is used as a cost function in an optimization procedure to determine the model parameters α and τ so that model’s fit
with the individual choice history is maximal. As an initial visual quality check, the model’s binned action probabilities for one particular action (e.g.,
A) can be plotted against the actual choice probabilities (determined, e.g., as percentage of choices for option A) and the increase across these
different bins can be examined (lower right panel). Deviations of this linear increase from the y = x line can indicate whether the model is severely
over- or underpredicting the actual choices of a subject.
Determining Free Model Parameters
After a computational model of a cognitive process
has been selected, the free model parameters have to be
determined, a step which is crucial for the subsequent
interpretation of the fMRI findings. In principle, there
are several ways for choosing concrete values for
model parameters.
Firstly, these parameter values can be chosen,
such that the predictions of the model provide the best
fit to the observable behavioral data. This provides an
important link to the fMRI analysis because it ensures
that the activation pattern in a particular brain region
is instantiating a computation that is behaviorally
relevant, which therefore confers psychological valid-
ity. In the example of Figure 1, the degree to which
the model with a specific set of parameters explains
the behavioral data is computed by summing across
all trials over the logarithm of action probabilities
derived from the model for the action chosen on that
trial. During the optimization procedure, the free
model parameters α (learning rate) and τ (softmax
temperature) are iteratively adjusted to minimize the
negative model likelihood, which serves as a cost func-
tion. In the RL case, this is equivalent to minimizing
Volume 1, Ju ly /August 2010 © 2010 John Wi ley & Sons, L td. 503
Figure 1.7: A summary of the reinforcement learning model used for human cogni-
tion. (Figure reproduced from Gläscher and O’Doherty, 2010.)
How v r umans and ma y other animals spo taneously expl re their environ-
me ts, ev n when they are not under direct pressure for finding extrinsic rew ds
like food. Int restingly, curiosity-dr ven learning enables organi ms to mak dis-
coveries to solve complex problems with r r or deceptive rewar s (Oudeyer, 2018).
Colas, Sigaud, and Oudeyer (2018) have recently added a Goal Exploration Process,
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which benefit from more focus on exploration, within a standard deep reinforce-
ment learning algorithm. The addition of an explorative early phase improved the
standard algorithm in challenging environments.
1.1.4 Computational optimality
In 1979, Sutton and Barto developed the idea of a ’hedonistic’ learning system that
wants something, that adapts its behavior in order to maximize a special signal from
its environment. Reinforcement learning is now one of the most active areas in ma-
chine learning, with different subfields such as dynamic programming, temporal-
difference learning, and function approximation (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Machine learning studies the class of algorithms provided with a set of data and
designed to ’learn-by-examples’. A typical distinction is made between supervised
learning, in which data are assigned to their corresponding target, and unsupervised
learning, in which the algorithm is simply provided with an unlabelled set of data.
Reinforcement learning is often said to be minimally supervised because agents are
not told explicitly what actions to take in particular situations, but must work this
out themselves on the basis of the reinforcement they receive (Dayan and Abbott,
2001).
Formally, the goal of reinforcement learning is to learn of a behavioral strategy
(a policy) which maximizes the long term sum of rewards (delayed reward) by a
direct interaction (trial-and-error) with an unknown and uncertain environment. Fi-
nite Markov Decision Processes are a classical formalization of sequential decision
making, where actions influence not just immediate rewards, but also subsequent
situations, or states.
The learner and decision maker is called the agent. The thing it interacts with,
comprising everything outside the agent, is called the environment. These interact at
each of a sequence of discrete time steps: t = 0, 1, 2... At each time step t, the agent
preceives some representation of the environment’s state St ∈ S, where S is the set of
possible states, and on that basis the agent selects an action At ∈ A(st), where A(st)
is the set of actions available in state St. One time step later, in part as a consequence
of its action, the agent receives a numerical reward, Rt+1 ∈ R ⊂ R, and finds itself
in a new state, St+1 (Sutton and Barto, 2017).
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Figure 3.1: The agent–environment interaction in a Markov decision process.
its action, the agent receives a numerical reward , Rt+1 2 R ⇢ R, and finds itself in a new state, St+1.4
The MDP and agent together thereby give rise to a sequence or trajectory that begins like this:
S0, A0, R1, S1, A1, R2, S2, A2, R3, . . . (3.1)
In a finite MDP, the sets of states, actions, and rewards (S, A, and R) all have a finite number of
elements. In this case, the random variables Rt and St have well defined discrete probability distribu-
tions dependent only on the preceding state and action. That is, for particular values of these random
variables, s0 2 S and r 2 R, there is a probability of those values occurring at time t, given particular
values of the preceding state and action:
p(s0, r |s, a) .= Pr{St =s0, Rt =r | St 1 =s, At 1 =a}, (3.2)
for all s0, s 2 S, r 2 R, and a 2 A(s). The dot over the equals sign in this equation reminds us that it
is a definition (in this case of the function p) rather than a fact that follows from previous definitions.
The function p : S⇥R⇥ S⇥A! [0, 1] is an ordinary deterministic function of four arguments. The ‘|’
in the middle of it comes from the notation for conditional probability, but here it just reminds us that
p specifies a probability distribution for each choice of s and a, that is, that
X
s02S
X
r2R
p(s0, r |s, a) = 1, for all s 2 S, a 2 A(s). (3.3)
The probabilities given by the four-argument function p completely characterize the dynamics of a
finite MDP. From it, one can compute anything else one might want to know about the environment,
such as the state-transition probabilities (which we denote, with a slight abuse of notation, as a three-
argument function p : S⇥ S⇥A! [0, 1]),
p(s0 |s, a) .= Pr{St =s0 | St 1 =s, At 1 =a} =
X
r2R
p(s0, r |s, a). (3.4)
We can also compute the expected rewards for state–action pairs as a two-argument function r : S⇥A!
R:
r(s, a)
.
= E[Rt | St 1 =s, At 1 =a] =
X
r2R
r
X
s02S
p(s0, r |s, a), (3.5)
or the expected rewards for state–action–next-state triples as a three-argument function r : S⇥A⇥S!
R,
r(s, a, s0)
.
= E[Rt | St 1 =s, At 1 =a, St = s0] =
X
r2R
r
p(s0, r |s, a)
p(s0 |s, a) . (3.6)
it simply as A.
4We use Rt+1 instead of Rt to denote the reward due to At because it emphasizes that the next reward and next
state, Rt+1 and St+1, are jointly determined. Unfortunately, both conventions are widely used in the literature.
Figure 1.8: The agent-environment interaction in a Markov decision process. (Figure
reproduced from Sutton and Barto, 2017.)
The use of a rewa d signal to formalize the idea of a goal is one of t e most dis-
tinctive features of reinforcement learning. According to the discounting approach,
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the agent tries to select actions so that the sum of the discounted rewards it receives
over the future is maximized. In particular, it chooses At to maximize the expected
discounted return:
Gt =
∞
∑
k=0
γkRt+k+1 (1.4)
where γ is a parameter, called the discount rate (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1).
Almost all reinforcement learning algorithms involve estimating value functions,
that estimate how good it is for the agent to be in a given state, with respect to par-
ticular ways of acting, called policies. Formally the state-value function for policy π,
denoted vπ(s), is the expected return when starting in s and following π thereafter:
vπ(s) = Eπ[Gt|St = s] (1.5)
If the agent is following policy π at time t, then π(a|s) is the probability that
At = a if St = s. The Bellman equation for vπ expresses a relationship between the
value of a state and the value of its successor states:
vπ(s) = ∑
a
π(a|s)∑
s′,r
p(s′, r|s, a)[r + γvπ(s′)] (1.6)
for all s ∈ S.
The optimal policy to follow is defined as having the optimal state-value func-
tion, denoted v∗:
v∗(s) = max
π
vπ(s) (1.7)
for all s ∈ S.
Interestingly the TD(0) algorithm has been shown to slowly converge to the op-
timal solution, given some conditions as a Markovian environment and an action
selection rule allowing for some exploration (as the softmax or the ε-greedy rules).
We have seen how the reinforcement learning framework can explain learning
by associations driven purely from reward and punishment. Now we will further
develop why the notion of control is important to take into account in reinforcement
learning.
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1.2 Conditioning and instrumental control
Here we will review how control and reinforcement learning are two interdependent
concepts, and how manipulating instrumental control in conditioning experiments
have led to rich discoveries.
1.2.1 Superstitious behaviour
According to the reinforcement learning theory, learning will take place as long as
an action and a subsequent reward are contingent, and not necessarily when the
action is actually causing the reward. Skinner (1948) therefore hypothesized that
conditioning protocols could create superstitious behavior, if rewards were to be
given in a random manner. Eight hungry pigeons were put in an experimental cage
with a food hopper. Food was given to the pigeons at regular intervals, with no
reference whatsoever to the bird’s behavior. After a brief delay, six pigeons exhibited
a clear and repetitive behavior between the food arrivals: turning counter-clock wise
two or three times, pecking or brushing movements towards the floor, hopping from
right to left, etc.
Skinner interpreted the results as such: “The experiment might be said to demon-
strate a sort of superstition. The bird behaves as if there were a causal relation be-
tween its behavior and the presentation of food, although such a relation is lacking.
There are many analogies in human behavior.” (Skinner, 1948).
 
 
Fig. 1. 'Reconditioning' of a superstitious response after extinction. The response of 
hopping from right to left had been thoroughly extinguished just before the record 
was taken. The arrows indicate the automatic presentation of food at one-min. 
intervals without reference to the pigeon's behavior. 
 
In this case it was possible to record the 'extinction' of the response 
when the clock was turned off and the magazine was no longer 
presented at any time. The bird continued to respond with its 
characteristic side to side hop. More than l0,000 responses were 
recorded before 'extinction' had reached the point at which few if any 
responses were made during a 10 or 15 min interval. When the clock 
was again started, the periodic presentation of the magazine (still 
without any connection whatsoever with the bird's behavior) brought 
out a typical curve for reconditioning after periodic reinforcement, 
shown in Fig. 1. The record had been essentially horizontal for 20 min. 
prior to the beginning of this curve. The first reinforcement had some 
slight effect and the second a greater effect. There is a smooth 
positive acceleration in rate as the bird returns to the rate of 
responding which prevailed when it was reinforced every min.  
 5
Figure 1.9: The response of hopping from right to left have been observed and me-
chanically recorded in a pigeon placed in a cage with re ards given at regular inter-
vals. The arrows indicate the automatic presentation of food at one-minut int rvals
without reference to the pigeon’s behavior. The bird does not respond immediately
after eating, but when 10 or 15 or even 20 seconds have elapsed, it begins to resp nd
rapidly and continues until the reinforcement is received. (Figure reproduced from
Skinner, 1948.)
Superstitious, magical, and pseudoscientific thinking refer to ungrounded be-
liefs that are not supported by current evidence (Lindema and Svedholm, 2012).
Such beliefs are indeed widespread in people: two in five Europeans are supersti-
tious (European Commission, 2010) and three-quarters of the American population
believes in the authenticity of one or more paranormal processes (Moore, 2005). In-
terestingly, reinforcement learning can be used to explain complex behaviors such
as superstitious actions.
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1.2.2 Learned helplessness
Reinforcement learning is often of little help to understand moods or emotions (but
see Eldar and Niv, 2015 for a counter-example). Resignation is a typical marker of
depression and is highly correlated to neuroticism, a fundamental personality trait
characterizing a persisting tendency to experience negative emotions (Jeronimus et
al., 2016). Seligman, an American psychologist, identified resignation as a mood
that can be learnt, instead of being a fixed individual trait. The theory of ’learned
helplessness’ postulates that, as humans are naturally prone to avoid suffering, res-
ignation has to be learnt by repeatedly experiencing negative events, over which we
have no control.
This hypothesis was exposed in a seminal study conditioning dogs with electrical
shocks. Seligman and Maier (1967) used three groups of dogs. The first was a control
group, placed in a hammock without any treatment. The second group was exposed
to electrical shocks that could be suppressed when the dogs pressed a panel with
their nose, and the dogs indeed were able learn this association. The third group
was also exposed to electrical shocks, but without the possibility to alleviate them.
Group 3 dogs were yoked to Group 2 dogs, so that both groups would receive the
same average duration of shock.
The next day the animals were installed in a different environment, a shuttlebox
escape, from which they could escape by jumping a partition. When again exposed
to electrical shocks, 90% of the dogs in both Groups 1 and 2 learned to escape by
crossing the barrier, while two third of the Group 3 dogs laid down passively during
the shocks, failing to escape the shuttlebox.
Figure 1.10: After receiving controllable or uncontrollable electrical shocks, the dogs
in Seligman and Maier (1967)’s experiment were placed in a compartment from
which they could easily escape. When again exposed to electrical shocks, animals
having received controllable shocks easily found the solution to escape (as in the fig-
ure) while dogs previously subjected to uncontrollable pain laid motionless. (Figure
replicated from Swenson’s online lecture.)
Although this phenomenon was already known at the time (e.g. Overmier and
Leaf, 1965), it was mainly interpreted as an interference effect (Adams and Lewis,
1962): animals were thought to fail escaping the shuttlebox because they had learnt
in the first part of the experiment some behavior that interfered with the escaping
behavior necessary in the second part. Seligman was the first to postulate and prove
that this lack of initiative subsequent to uncontrollable shocks comes from the lack of
control experienced. In a crucial experiment, any possible interfering behavior was
prevented by immobilizing Group 3 dogs with curare while exposing them to un-
controllable shocks. Later, when placed in the compartments where electrical shocks
11
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were given, Group 3 dogs were again immobile, although they could not have de-
veloped an interfering behavior from their previous shock exposure (Overmier and
Seligman, 1967).
Another interpretation was proposed to explain the helplessness behavior ob-
served. From a behaviorist point of view, animals only learn an association between
a specific response and an event, and they are unable to learn that they lack control
over events. Thus it was claimed that in Seligman and Maier (1967)’s experiment,
when the animals first receive unescapable shocks in the hammock, shock offset
was occasionally paired with not moving. This could reinforce the association of not
moving with shock offset, explaining the absence of movement when animals were
later placed in the escapable shuttlebox. As Skinner (1992) has shown, non-existent
action-outcome relationships can indeed be conditioned in a situation of lack of con-
trol.
But Maier (1970) refuted this behaviorist-compatible interpretation of learned
helplessness by testing a variant of the original task in which Group 2 dogs could
suppress shock by holding still, and not by pressing a lever. Similarly to their pre-
vious results, they found that dogs subsequently succeeded to learn to escape the
shuttlebox by jumping the partition. These results grounded the theory of learned
helplessness: experiencing uncontrollable negative events leads to a general help-
lessness state of mind. This experiment crucially showed that beyond learning pure
response-outcome associations, animals are able to learn a general lack of control.
That finding, among other results, constituted the beginning of a cognitive theory of
animal behavior.
Almost exactly at the same time as Seligman and Maier (1967), the same paradigm
was used on rats, but this time to study the physiological effects of escapable and un-
escapable electrical shocks (Weiss, 1968). Triplets of rats were placed into a restrain-
ing and escape-avoidance cage. One rat was randomly assigned to the Nonshock
group, and its tail electrode was disconnected to the electric generator. One rat was
assigned to the Avoidance group and the electrical shocks received could be termi-
nated when the animal touched the copper plate in front of him with its nose. The
rat assigned to the Yoked group received the same electrical shocks as the Avoidance
rat, and the touch plate in front of it was not connected to the electrical shock relay.
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The fear tests (latency to drink) indi-
cated that as a result of being able to avoid
or escape shock, Avoidance Ss were less
afraid in the stress situation than Yoked
Ss. Since drinking was measured in the
lower compartment, Avoidance Ss were
found to be less afraid in the location
where they received at least as many
shocks as. Yoked Ss. It can be suggested
that the difference in fear between Avoid-
ance and Yoked Ss led to the difference in
body weight. Evidence that fear and weight
gain were related was seen in the correla-
tion between weight gained following the
initial stress session and amount of feces
excreted during this session, nother meas-
ure of fear which discriminated Avoidance
and Yoked S . Since the pre ent study
controlled for possible differences in the
physical stressor, these r sults establish
that weight loss in rats can be produced
psychogenically, apparently by fear.
It is also apparent that differences in
body weight developed as the result of a
.poststress effect occurring in Ss' home
cages away from the stress situation, since
Avoidance and Yoked Ss lost similar
amounts of weight during the stress ses-
sion. When Peters and Finch (1961) gave
rats a single shock and subsequent exposure
to the stress situation, they suggested that
the weight loss observed at the end of 5
days had occurred outside the stress situa-
tion, although they had not tested this
possibility by measuring the actual weight
loss during stress sessions. The present re-
sults confirm their suggestion that major
stress-induced weight changes occur follow-
ing removal from the stress situation. This
adds changes in body weight to a growing
list of poststress effects, such as have been
found relating to stomach acid (Polish,
Mason, Thach, & Niemeck, 1962) and
body temperature (Goodell, Graham, &
Wolff, 1950).
Church (1964) made the ingenious sug-
gestion in regard to the Mowrer and Viek
(1948) study that Avoidance Ss would
rapidly turn off shock when it became pain-
ful, but that Yoked Ss could experience
pain above this threshold since they could
not terminate shock at that point. Since
conditions of the present studies also dif-
fered from those of Mowrer and Viek in
that virtually all shocks were much above
any S's pain threshold, particularly when
delivered through fixed electrodes, the
argument does not apply to this situation.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, effects of coping be-
havior were examined in a different situa-
tion, and stress was measured in terms of
another indicant, gastrointestinal lesions.
Avoidance Ss, as in Experiment 1, had
control over the occurrence and duration of
shock, but the situation in Experiment 2
was designed to be generally more stressful
with all Ss restrained in a small area
throughout the stress session, and the length
of the session increased to over 20 hr.
Method
Subjects. The Ss were male albino rats similar
to those in Experiment 1.
Apparatus. The principal apparatus consisted of
the three combination restraining and escape-
avoidance cages shown in Figure 1. At the front
of each cage was a copp r plate which S could
touch with its nose or front feet by reaching
through a %-in.-diameter hole, thereby com-
pleting a low current (.1 ^a.) relay circuit. The
cages rested on a large platform supported by
springs which could be gently oscillated by means
of a motor and cam.
Procedure. For each experimental session, one
triplet matched for body weight was drawn from
FIG. 1. Avoidance, Yoked, and Nonshock Ss
(foreground to rear) in the apparatus.
Figure 1.11: An illustration of a triplet of rats used in Weiss (1968)’s protocol. The
lower rat is part of the Avoidance group, the middle rat of the Yoked group and the
upper rat of the Nonshock group. (Figure reproduced from Weiss, 1968.)
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Weiss (1968) found that Yoked rats showed a greater decrease in body weight
and more extensive gastric lesions (also known as stress ulcers) than Avoidance rats.
Thus the physiological effects of stress could be decreased by being able to perform
a response that controlled the electrical shocks, that Weiss called a coping response.
This study shows that exerting control over negative events is an important factor
not only to predict how an animal will react to the next aversive events, but also to
reduce stress and its noxious consequences.
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TABLE 3
GASTROINTESTINAL LESIONS FOR EACH GROUP
IN EXPERIMENT 2
Groupa
Yoked
Avoidance
Nonshock
Percent-
age of 5s
showing
lesions
75
68
31
Mean
number of
lesions13
2.4
1.0
0.7
Mean length
of longest
lesion (in
mm.) among
SB develop-
ing lesions0
3.0
1.7
L2
Mean total
length of
lesions
(in mm.) °
4.5
1.6
0.5
a N = 16 for each group.
b Yoked Ss differed significantly from Avoid-
ance (p < .02) and Nonshock (p < .005) Ss.
c Yoked iSs differed significantly from Avoidance
and Nonshock iSs, both p's < .03, with independ-
ent i!-tests.
d Yoked Ss differed significantly from Avoid-
ance (p < .01) and Nonshock (p < .001) Ss;
Avoidance and Nonshock groups differed signifi-
cantly (p < .05). Zero length was assigned for
Ss showing no lesions.
Tissue prepared histologically was exam-
ined by a pathologist who confirmed the
presence of lesions.
Table 3 presents the results of analysis
of lesions, as determined blindly by the in-
dependent judge. It can be seen that Yoked
Ss developed more extensive lesioning than
Avoidance and Nonshock Ss. Figure 2
shows matched Yoked and Avoidance Ss,
displaying the range of differences.
Results of directly comparing Ss in each
triplet for abnormality are shown in Table
4. Two triplets were not included in this
analysis since the pathology in these cases
was so limited that the judge could not
assign a separate rank to each stomach.
The overall x2 with these cell frequencies
TABLE 4
FREQUENCIES OF STOMACH ABNORMALITY
RANKINGS FOR ALL GROUPS
Abnormality
Group
ranka
1 (least)
2
3 (most)
Yoked
0
1
13
Avoidance
4
9
1
Nonshock
10
4
0
was highly significant (x2 = 40.0, p <
.001). It can be seen that there was a
marked tendency for the Yoked S in each
triplet to be rated most abnormal. The
X2s comparing individual groups showed a
significant difference between Yoked and
Avoidance groups (x2 = 20.7, p < .001)
and Yoked and Nonshock groups (x2 =
24.8, p < .001), while the difference be-
tween Avoidance and Nonshock groups
approached significance (x2 = 5.5, p <
.10).
Measurement of lesions and ratings of
abnormality by E yielded similar results
to those reported above. The correlation
between lesion measurements by the inde-
pendent judge and E was .89.
Disciission
Results of Experiment 2 showed that
Yoked Ss developed more severe gastro-
intestinal lesions than either Avoidance or
Nonsh ck Ss and confirmed findings of the
a Two triplets, in which pathology was so
limited that the judge could not assign separate
ranks, were not included.
FIG. 2. The glandular portion of stomachs for
matched Avoidance and Yoked Ss, illustrating
the range of differences in length of lesions as
determined by the judge. (Top pair show a large
positive difference—i.e., Yoked S with more
lesioned tissue than its matched Avoidance S—a
moderate positive difference is presented below
this; Ss at bottom show the largest negative
difference which was found, the Avoidance S
having two narrow longitudinal lesions in the
fold at the upper right.)
Figure 1.12: Photographs of the stomachs of one Yoked example rat and one Avoid-
ance example rat from Weiss (1968)’s study. An independent judge, blind to the
experimental condition, identified a lesion as a clearly visible defect or break in the
mucosa, which was often accompanied by hemorrhage. She found more extensive
gastric lesioning in the Yoked than in the Avoidance group. (Figure reproduced from
Weiss, 1968.)
Learned helplessness was found to be characterized by a constellation of behav-
ioral changes, that go well beyond a reduced escaping behavior or an increase in
stress markers. Uncontrollable stressors also tended to reduce swimming when the
animal was placed in water; reduce aggression and socia dom ance; produce neo-
phobia, exaggerated fear and fear conditioning; reduce social interaction; produce
opioid analgesia; reduce learning of instrumental responses for appetitive rewards;
increase rewarding effects of opiates, and so on (see Maier and Watkins, 1998 for a
review).
We have s en that instrumental control through av idance options can produce
substantial reductions in stress. But conditions were also found which produced
more pathology in animals able to perform a coping response than in helpless an-
imals. Weiss (1971) put rats in a situation in which they had to make a bar press
response to avoid shock – but successful avoidance was signaled by an aversive
blast of loud noise. In effect, the rats had to choose between two negative outcomes:
shock versus noise, and they developed ulcers comparable to those of the helpless
rats exposed to inescapable shock. Difficult decisions (as choosing the lesser of two
evils) thus instigate costly inner processes.
Although learned helplessness is sometimes called ’behavioral depression’ (Weiss
et al., 1981), it should be noted that consequences of exposure to uncontrollable stres-
sors are as similar to depressive symptoms as to those of extreme anxiety. Moreover,
learned helplessness was found to be sensitive to both anti-depressants and anxi-
olytics (Maier and Watkins, 2005). This is perhaps not surprising since the devel-
opment of both depression and anxiety may be influenced by stress, particularly
uncontrollable stress. But caution should be used when extrapolating the learned
helplessness literature to explain the development of psychiatric diseases as major
depressive disorder.
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1.2.3 The notion of instrumental contingency
The intuitive notion of helplessness entails the belief that no action that one does will
matter, and therefore can be defined as a perceived lack of control. Maier and Selig-
man (1976) defined the notion of controllability in an early review of their work.
They called p(RF|R) the conditional probability of an outcome or reinforcer RF
following a response R (at p(RF|R) = 1, every response produces a reinforcer; at
p(RF|R) = 0, a response never produces a reinforcer). Important events can some-
times occur when no specific response has been made, and they called p(RF|R) the
conditional probability of a reinforcer RF following an absence of response R.
They defined that a response stands in a relation of control to a reinforcer if and
only if:
p(RF|R) 6= p(RF|R) (1.8)
And conversely a reinforcer was said to be uncontrollable if p(RF|R) = p(RF|R)
for all possible responses R.LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
One conditional probability, however, is
an inadequate description of the relations be-
tween response and outcomes about which
an organism may learn. Important events
can sometimes occur when no specific re-
sponse has been made, and it would be a
woefully maladaptive organism that was in-
sensitive to such a contingency. Rather
than representing environmental contingen-
cies as occurring along a single dimension,
we think instrumental training can be better
described using a two-dimensional space, as
shown in Figure 1. The .ar-axis />(RF/R)
represents the traditional dimension, the
conditional probability of an outcome follow-
ing a response. Orthogonal to the condi-
tional probability of an outcome, given a
response, is the conditional probability of an
outcome occurring in the absence of that re-
sponse />(RF/R). This dimension is repre-
sented along the y-axis. We assume that
organisms are sensitive to variations along
both dimensions conjointly, and the empiri-
cal meaning of this assumption is that sys-
tematic changes in behavior should occur
with systematic changes along both dimen-
sions. There is considerable convergence of
opinion and evidence among learning theo-
rists today that organisms can indeed learn
about the contingencies within this instru-
mental training space, including the crucial
45° line (e.g., Catania, 1971; Church, 1969;;
Gibbon, Berryman, & Thompson, 1974;
Maier, Seligman, & Solomon, 1969; Res-
corla, 1967, 1968; Seligman, Maier, & Solo-
mon, 1971; Wagner, 1969; Weiss, 1968).
Thus an organism may learn the extent to
which food occurs when it does not make a
specific response along with learning the
extent to which food occurs when it does
make a specific response.
Consider a few examples. In Figure 1,
Point a (1.0,0) is a case of continuous re-
inforcement : The subject is always rein-
forced for response R, and is never rein-
forced if it fails to make R. Point b (0,1.0)
is a case in which the subject is never rein-
forced for making the designated R, and is
always reinforced for refraining from R (dif-
ferential reinforcement of other behavior).
Consider Point c (.5,.2): Here the subject
p (RF/R)
.40 -
.20 -
(.00
FIGURE 1. The response-reinforced contingency
space. p( RF/R) = conditional probability of an
outcome following a response, />(RF/R) = condi-
tional probability of an outcome occurring in the
absence of that response.
is reinforced 50% of the times that it makes
R, but even if it fails to make R, it is rein-
forced 20% of the time.
The traditional training procedures ar-
rayed along the #-axis have been thoroughly
explored by many experimenters (e.g., Fer-
ster & Skinner, 1957; Honig, 1966). The
points in the training space which do not
fall along the #-axis have not, however, been
systematically investigated. Consider the
points that lie along the 45° line (x, y,
where x = y). Whether or not the subject
responds, the density of reinforcement is the
same. The conditional probability of an
outcome, given a specific response, does not
differ from the conditional probability of re-
inforcement in the absence of that response.
The outcome is independent of responding.
The concepts of controllability and uncon-
trollability are defined within this instru-
mental training space. Any time there is
something the subject can do or refrain
from doing that changes what it gets, it has
control. Specifically, a response R stands in
a relation of control to a reinforcer RF if
and only if
/» (RF/R) ^# (RF/R). (1)
Furthermore, when a response will not
change what the subject gets, the response
Figur 1.13: An outcome is defined as uncontrollable when the probability of the
outcome r reinforcer RF following a r sponse R is the same as the probability of
the outcome RF following the absence of response R. (Figure reproduced from Maier
and Seligman, 1976.)
Indepen ently from Maier and Seligman (1976), Hammond (1980) also defined
instrumental contingency as the difference between probabilities of a reward R in
presenc or absence of an action A:
∆p = p(R|A)− p(R|A) (1.9)
If there is a causal action-reward relationship, the reward is said be ’contingent’
with the action.
1.2.4 Instrum ntal contingency and behavior
In contrast with Skinner (1948)’s results, Hammond (1980) was the first to demon-
strate that animals are sensitive to the causal relation between response and reward.
Hungry rats were trained to press a lever under a schedule in which the first press
14
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in each one-second period is followed the delivery of a food pellet with a fixed prob-
ability. The causal relationship between lever pressing and food delivery was then
degraded by increasing the probability that a food pellet will be delivered at the end
of any second in which the animal does not press the lever. When the two proba-
bilities of reward in presence and absence of lever pressing were set equal, pressing
had no effect on the likelihood of the reward.
The important feature of this causal manipulation is that the contingency was
degraded without altering the probability that a response was paired with a reward.
Still, enhancing the probability of a reward in the absence of the response depressed
the rats’ instrumental performance.
LYNN J. HAMMOND
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Fig. 1. Responses per hour for sessions of Experiment I. The top graph represents the mean response rate for
all ten rats, the two lower graphs depict the two subjects which showed the most and the least effect of the shifted
contingency.
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Figure 1.14: The mean response rate for ten rats accross different experimental ses-
sions. The numbers above indicate the probability of a reward in the presence and
absence of a response, thus .05-0 indicates an instrumental contingency, while .05-.05
indicates no contingency. (Figure reproduced from Hammond, 1980.)
Human participants were also found to be sensitive to the implemented contin-
gency. Liljeholm et al. (2011) manipulated both the probability of a reward given an
action p(R|A), and given no action p(R|A). They found that the participants’ mean
response rate was lower when contingency was degraded similarly to the rats’ be-
havior in Hammond (1980)’s experiment.
Figure 1.15: Mean presses per second in human participants across blocks sorted
in descending order by objective contingency. (Figure reproduced from Liljeholm
et al., 2011.)
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Interestingly, Maier and Seligman (2016) drew a distinction between objective
and subjective helplessness in a recent review. An animal is objectively helpless with
respect to an outcome if this outcome is uncontrollable by any possible response.
But being subjectively helpless is another matter. The animal must ’detect’ the lack
of contingency as defined above and so must have expected that in the future the
shock would be independent of its responses. Thus by experiencing an objective un-
controllability, an animal can develop a subjective helplessness. In the next section,
we will see how the perception of control can differ from the actual control in human
explicit reports.
16
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1.3 The perception of control
We will now review psychological studies on humans investigating the effects of
control perception (and not control itself) on explicit reports and behavior.
1.3.1 The locus of control
The locus of control refers to people disposition to believe their fate either to be in
their own hands or to be the consequence of external factors beyond their personal
control. In an influential article, Rotter has hypothesized that the perceived locus
of control would greatly influence how people will learn from reinforcements: “A
person who is looking for an unusual brand of tobacco and is finally able to find it
will return to the same place where he was reinforced before when he needs tobacco
again. However, an individual who needs money and finds a five dollar bill in the
street is not likely to return to that spot to look for a five dollar bill when he needs
money.” (Rotter, 1966).
An experiment was undertaken comparing verbal expectancies for future rein-
forcement under conditions of chance and skill learning. Phares (1957) used color
matching as an ambiguous task and instructed half of the subjects that the task was
so difficult as to be a matter of luck and the other half of his subjects that success
was a matter of skill and that previous research had found some people to be very
good at the task. For both conditions, a fixed order of partial reinforcement (right
or wrong) was used. To measure the participants’ expectancy, they were asked the
number of chips they would bet on their probability of being correct on the succeed-
ing trial. As Rotter has hypothesized, the increments and decrements of expectancy
following respectively success and failure, were found to be significantly greater un-
der skill instructions than under chance instructions.
Rotter developed and validated a questionnaire, the Internal-External Locus of
Control Scale (I-E scale), to assess people’s locus of control. Individuals who be-
lieve personal outcomes are contingent largely on their own behavior and attributes
are said to have internal locus of control. On the other hand, people with external
locus of control feel predominantly governed by other powerful individuals, insti-
tutions, luck, chance and so on. Rotter (1966) found that the scores on the locus of
control questionnaire could explain individual differences in learning or not from
reinforcers.
12 Jct.iax B. Rottkh 
T A B L E 1—Continued 
It m Hiserial item correlations 200 M 200 K 400 M + F 
15.a. I n my case getting what I want has l i t t le or nothing 
to do wi th luck. 
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by 
— flipping a coin. .369 .209 .288 
16.a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was 
""" lucky enough to be in the right place first. .295 .318 .307 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon 
ability, hick has little or nothing to do with it. 
17.a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are 
~~ the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor 
control. .313 .107 .357 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs 
the people can c ntrol world events. 
18.a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their 
~ lives ar  controlled by accidental happenings. .258 .362 .310 
b. There really is no such thing as "luck." 
19.a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. (Filler) 
b. I t is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
20.a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes 
" you. .255 .307 .271 
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a 
person you are. 
21.a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are 
~~ b lanced by the good on . .108 .197 .152 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, 
ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
22.a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corrup-
tion. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the 
— things politicians do in office. .226 .224 .227 
23.a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at 
~ the grades they give. .275 .248 .255 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study 
and the grades I get. 
24.a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves 
what they should do. (Filler) 
b. A good leader makes i t clear to everybody what their 
jobs are. 
25.a. Many times I feel that I have l i t t le influence over 
— the things that happen to me. .521 .440 .480 
b. I t is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck 
plays an important role in my l i fe. 
26.a. People are lonely because they don't t r y to be fr iendly. 
b. There's not much use in t ry ing too hard to please 
~ people, if they like you, they like you. .179 .227 .195 
27.a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. (Fil ler) 
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
28.a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over 
™ the direction my life is taking. .331 .149 .238 
29.a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians 
_ behave the way they do. .004 .211 .109 
b. I n the long run the people are responsible for bad gov-
ernment on a national as well as on a local level. 
Note.—Score is number of underlined items. 
Figure 1.16: Examples a ong the 29 items in the Internal-External Locus of Control
Scale. The final score is given by the number of underlined items (item number 26
is a ‘filler’, as it is not related to locus of control). (Figure reproduced from Rotter,
1966.)
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The I-E scale developed by Rotter has remained the most popular tool for mea-
suring locus of control (Twenge, Zhang, and Im, 2004). A quantitative meta-analysis
found an internal locus of control to predict many favorable work outcomes, such
as positive task and social experiences, and greater job motivation (Ng, Sorensen,
and Eby, 2006). Locus of control is an important part of a trait termed core self-
evaluation, the other parts being self-esteem, self-efficacy, and emotional stability.
Core self-evaluation was shown to be the best predictor for job performance and
work and life satisfaction (Judge, 2009).
There is a general trend for paranormal beliefs to be associated with an external
locus of control (Dag, 1999; Tobacyk, Nagot, and Miller, 1988). As a group, paranor-
mal believers are inclined to feel specially vulnerable to external forces beyond their
control (Irwin and Watt, 2007). This correlation suggests an interesting relationship
between locus of control and the development of superstitious beliefs.
1.3.2 Illusions of control
In a seminal field study involving 631 adults, Langer (1975) showed that people tend
to overestimate the probability of a positive outcome, and that this overestimation
was based on factors that cannot rationally play a causal role in obtaining the out-
come. For example, she found that response familiarity, or practice, on a chance
task resulted in greater confidence in winning than when there was no practice. In-
creased confidence also resulted when the apparatus was controlled by the subject
rather than the experimenter, even though in both instances the subject determined
the response that would be made.
There are many naturalistic situations in which people fail to accurately judge a
lack of contingency. Henslin (1967) studied dice playing and noted that dice players
clearly behave as if they were controlling the outcome of the toss. They would throw
the dice carefully and softly if they wanted low numbers, and to throw it hard for
high numbers. They also believe that effort and concentration will pay off.
Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo (2011) investigated the effect of behavior on the il-
lusion of control. Although they implemented no contingency between the partici-
pants behavior (a key pressing) and the outcome (a fictive patient recovering from
a disease), subsequent judgements of contingency were positive, suggesting they
developed an illusion of control.
Crucially, active participants (the participants that pressed the key the more of-
ten) were more prone to develop the illusion of control than those who responded
less often. Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo (2011) suggested that this correlation could
emerge from a cognitive dissonance phenomenon: the more participants have re-
sponded, the more prone they are to judge that their effort was not in vain.
In another experiment, Langer and Roth (1975) asked participants to guess the
result of 30 coin toss. When feedback were manipulated to give participants an
early, fairly consistent pattern of successes (although there was always in total 15
wins and 15 losses), participants predicted significantly more successes on future
trials than those experiencing a random outcome sequence. In another experiment,
the perception that one is causing a successful outcome was enhanced merely by the
increased frequency of that outcome (Jenkins and Ward, 1965).
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p , .05. In addition, there was some interindivi-
dual variability, as can be concluded from Figure
2. Indeed, the minimum value of the actual contin-
gency in our sample was –.76 (high negative
contingency) while the maximum value was .45
(moderate positive contingency), despite the fact
that all participants were exposed to an identical
sequence of uncontrollable outcomes.1 If the
observed variance in the judgements of contingency
reflected differences in the actual contingencies
received by participants, then we should find that
the contingency values to which participants are
actually exposed increase with the P(R). The ana-
lyses showed that, indeed, as P(R) went up, so did
the actually experienced contingency, b ¼ .54,
t(81) ¼ 5.83, p , .001 (see Figure 2).
Then a multiple regression analysis, with P(R)
and actual contingency as factors, was conducted
on the judgements. The extent to which the
actual contingency values could predict the
judgements, while controlling for the P(R) effect,
was checked, yielding a nonsignificant result,
b ¼ .07, t(80) ¼ 0.59, p ¼ .56. In contrast, the
effect of P(R) on judgements remained significant
even when controlling for the effect of the actual
contingency, b ¼ .33, t(80) ¼ 2.64, p , .01.
Thus, the effect of P(R) on judgements that we
found and reported cannot be explained by the
differential exposure to contingencies during the
training phase.
The actual contingency values were calculated
at the end of the training phase, which means
that they are overall values. One could argue,
then, that participants may not have based their
judgements on the overall actual contingency
values, but on the actual contingency values experi-
enced only during the first part of training, or
perhaps only during the last part of it, showing
either a primacy or a recency bias. This possibility
was tested by means of two simple linear
regressions. Neither the contingency presented
during the first 10 trials of the training phase
(M ¼ –.06; SEM ¼ .05), b ¼ –.04, t(81) ¼
0.39, p ¼ .70, nor the contingency presented
during the last 10 trials of the training phase
(M ¼ .03; SEM ¼ .05), b ¼ –.03, t(81) ¼ 0.32,
p ¼ .75, was able to predict the subsequent judge-
ments of contingency. Note that the probability of
the outcome, P(O), was exactly .80 in these two
blocks of the training phase. This is a high P(O)
condition that warrants a fair comparison with
the previous analyses on the whole learning
phase (in which the probability of the outcome
was also high, .76).
Taken together, our analyses show no evidence
that participant’s ratings about the efficacy of the
medicine were based on the actual contingency
Figure 1. Judgements as a function of probability of responding,
P(R), in Experiment 1.
Figure 2. Variability in actual contingency in Experiment 1. P(R)
¼ probability of responding.
1Note that only P(R) and actual contingency were allowed to vary from one participant to another: The P(O) was identical for
every participant (38 out of 50 trials were preprogrammed as outcome present), and, therefore, the P(O) cannot be on the basis of
variability in the actual contingency.
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Figure 1.17: Contingency judgements as a function of probability of responding,
P(R). (Figure reproduced from Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2011.)
The illusion of control can thus be partly explained by a human bias to more
attribute to oneself success than failure. Such link between perceived control and
positive outcomes could explain why depressed individuals – who think less of en
of success – are not as likely as others to over-perceive control of successful outcomes
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979).
1.3.3 An analytical perception of c trol
Illusions of control appear to be common in natural settings. But we also saw that
humans and animals can be sensitive to instrumental co tingency of their actions
(Hammond, 1980; Liljeholm et al., 2011). Indeed, when humans are instructed before
the beginning of the experiment to behave scientifically and to assess the response-
outcome relationship, most studies found participants’ judgments to be strong linear
functions of the programmed contingencies (Chatlosh, Neunaber, and Wasserman,
1985; Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber, 1983).
PERCEPTION OF CAUSAL RELATIONS 413 
full problem set, regardless of th  outcome probability or the sex of the 
subject, the probability of a recorded response was higher in the Tap 
task 0, = .31) than in the Press task 0, = .25), HI, 68) = 4.34, p = 
.041. Neither the probability of the outcome nor the sex of the subject 
influenced the probability of telegraph key responding. 
C ntingency rating . Figure 2 shows subjects’ scaled ratings (divided 
by 100) in the Tap and Press conditions at each of the five levels of 
response-outcome contingency. These five-point functions were con- 
structed from the nine individual problems, the data from which are 
shown in Table 2. 
Across both tasks and both sexes of subject, ratings rose as a function 
of increases in the response-outcome contingency. The linear trend of 
the reliable main effect of response-outcome contingency was significant, 
F(1, 68) = 358.82, p < .OOl . In addition, the overall cont ngency-rating 
function had a reliable cubic component, F(1, 68) = 9.07, p = .004, 
confirming its inverted S shape. The absence of a reliable quadratic 
component plus the high symmetry of the contingency-rating functions 
about zero suggest hat negative contingencies were r ted in much the 
same way as positive contingencies. 
The linear trend of the reliable contingency x task interaction was 
also significant, F(1, 68) = 9.02, p = .004; this confirms the steeper 
contingency-rating function from the Tap task than from the Press task 
depicted in Fig. 2. Indeed, ratings supported under the Tap task were 
very close to those expected if there were isomorphism between subjects’ 
/ 
PTAP 
RESPONSE-OUTCOME CONTINGENCY 
FIG. 2. Scaled contingency ratings (divided by 100) for Group Tap and Group Press 
of Experiment 1 at each of the five levels of response-outcome contingency. 
Figure 1.18: Scaled contingency ratings between a telegraph key operation and the
illumination of a brief light, for each of the five levels of response-outcome contin-
gency implemented. The ‘Tap’ group of participants was asked to produce a brief
response by simply taping on the telegraph key, while the ‘Press’ group was asked
to produce a continuous response by pressing the key for a variable length of time.
(Figure reproduced from Wasserman, Chatlosh, and Neunaber, 1983.)
In another study using a free-operant contingency, participants could again press
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a key on a computer keyboard, which was associated with an outcome on the com-
puter screen (Shanks and Dickinson, 1991) . But interestingly, participants in one
group were asked to judge the effectiveness of the action in causing the outcome,
while those in a second group were asked to maximize their points score under a
payoff schedule. They observed low and constant proportions of responses as well
as accurate judgments in the group instructed to assess control, and higher propor-
tions of response in the group instructed to maximize outcomes, although they used
a response cost to prevent the tendency to over-respond in the latter. They hypothe-
sized that the natural performance strategy for maximizing reinforcement probably
differs from the one to identify contingencies.
Trying to prove their hypothesis, Matute (1996) exposed participants to uncon-
trollable outcomes (as the termination of an aversive noise or a more neutral event
as a beep). Half of the subjects was instructed to obtain the outcome (this condition
was called ’naturalistic’), while the other half was instructed to respond on 50% of
the trials and to assess their control over the outcome (corresponding to an ’analytic’
condition). Subjects in the naturalistic condition tended to respond at almost every
opportunity and developed a strong illusion of control. This illusion may simply
be a collateral effect of a high tendency to respond, preventing them from learning
that the outcome would have occurred with the same probability if they had not re-
sponded. By contrast, subjects in the analytic condition made accurate judgments of
control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
Helena Matute 
ible was the judgment of control. After the last trial, all subjects 
in wered a question regarding th  egree of control that they 
lad perceived (see appendix). The scale for responding ranged 
iom - 100 to + 100. Positive numbers indicated a positive con- 
.ingency, negative numbers indicated a negative contingency, 
ind 0 indicated a perception of response-outcome indepen- 
jence. 
RESULTS 
High p(R) and illusion of control developed in the naturalis- 
tic conditions whethe  subjects were trying to obtain termina- 
tion of the noise or  repetition of the beep. In contrast, subjects 
investigating their degree of control (analytic groups) main- 
tained their p(R) at a point close to .5 and accurately reported 
response-outcome independence. 
Fig. 1. Mean probability of responding (p[R]; top panel) and 
mean judgment of control (bottom panel) for the four experi- 
mental conditions. Judgments were assessed using a scale that 
ranged from - 100 to + 100, with positive and negative numbers 
representing perception of positive and negative contingency, 
respectively, and 0 indicating an accurate perception of re- 
sponse-outcome independence. 
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The p(R) data are depicted in the top panel of Figure 1. A 2 
[outcome) x 2 (i structi s) analysis of variance on subjects’ 
d R )  yielded a main effect for instructions, F(1, 28) = 23.23, p 
< -01 ; a marginally significant effect for outcome, F( I ,  28) = 
3.31, p = .08; and no interaction. This result confirms that p(R) 
is affected more by the instructed goals of the subject than by 
the objective properties of the outcome (at least with the mild 
outcomes used in this experiment). Both the noise termination 
and the beep repetition seemed to function as reinforcers or  as 
neutral events depending..on whether subjects had been in- 
structed to obtain the outcome or to assess control over it. 
Planned comparisons showed that for both outcome conditions, 
subjects receiving naturalistic instructions were more active 
than subjects receiving analytic instructions, F(I, 28) = 6.62, p 
< .OS, for the escape condition and F( 1,28) = 17.6, p < . O f ,  for 
the beep condition. 
The judgmental data are depicted in the bottom panel of 
Figure 1. A 2 (outcome) X 2 (instructions) analysis of variance 
on subjects’ judgments yielded a main effect for instructions, 
F( I ,  28) = 9.29, p < .01, and no other main effect or interaction 
(ps > 30).  Planned comparisons confirmed that for both out- 
come conditions, subjects in the naturalistic condition reported 
higher judgments of control (i.e,, illusion) than subjects in the 
analytic condition (who reported an accurate judgment of re- 
sponse-outcome independence), F( I ,  28) = 4.22, p < -05, for 
the escape condition and F(I,28) = 5.08, p < .05, for the beep 
condition. 
Finally, subjects’ p(R)s and judgments of control were found 
to be positively correlated, r = .70, p C -001. In  general. sub- 
jects responding at high rates reported the highest positive judg- 
ments of control, and subjects responding in about 50% of the 
trials accurately detected response-outcome independence. 
DISCUSSION 
This single factorial experiment replicated both (a) experi- 
ments showing that humans can detect response-outcome inde- 
pendence accurately (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wasser- 
man, 1990) and (b) experiments showing that humans develop 
superstition and illusion of control (e.g., Langer, 1975; Matute, 
1993, 1995; Wright, 1962) by simply varying the goal-setting 
instructions. The subjects’ p(R), which followed from natural- 
istic versus analytic instructions, appeared to be a critical de- 
terminant of whether subjects detected response-outcome inde- 
pendence. Thus, the different judgments obtained by different 
research traditions appear to reflect different (analytic vs. nat- 
uralistic) research orientations that imply different goals and 
strategies on the part of the subject. 
Subjects maintained their p(R)  at a point close to .5 and 
made accurate judgments of response-outcome independence 
when their goal was to find out how much contrcl over the 
outcome was possible (analytic conditions). In contrast, sub- 
jects who were trying to maximize the outcome (naturalistic 
conditions) tended to a very high p(R). and many of them did 
not even test for p(O1noR). Consequently, the outcome most 
frequently occurred in the presence (rather than absence) of 
responding. When this happens, responses apparently are per- 
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Figure 1.19: Mean probability of responding (p(R); top panel) and mean judgment
of control (bottom panel) in naturalistic and a alytic co ditions. A judgement of 0
indicates an accurate percepti n of r sponse-outcome independence. Escap repre-
sents the aversive noise condition, and beep the neutral stimuli condition. (Figure
reproduced from Matute, 1996.)
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1.3.4 Learning biases can explain illusions of control
We will now see how a computational perspective in sequential learning tasks can
explain the emergence of illusions of control .
In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects have been observed to readily alter their
behavioral strategy in response to recent trends of stimulus statistics, even when
such trends are spurious. Interestingly, this behavioral trend can be reproduced by
an optimal Bayesian model under assumptions of statistical non-stationarity, while
the same model under assumptions of stationarity would correctly infer an absence
of control in a random environment (Yu and Cohen, 2009; Zhang, Huang, and Yu,
2014) . The participants’ internal assumptions were then ‘reverse-engineered’: a
random environment was perceived as actually changing about once every four tri-
als (Yu and Cohen, 2009), although large inter-individual differences were found
(Zhang, Huang, and Yu, 2014).
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Figure 2: Bayesian inference assuming fixed and changing Bernoulli parameters. (a) Graphical
model for the FBM. γ ∈ [0, 1], xt ∈ {0, 1}. The numbers in circles show example values for the
variables. (b) Graphical model for the DBM. γt = αδ(γt −γt−1) + (1−α)p0(γt), where we as-
sume the prior p0 to be a Beta distribution. The numbers in circles show examples values for the
variables. (c) Grayscale shows the evolution of posterior probability mass over γ for FBM (darker
color indicate concentration of mass), given the sequence of truly random (P (xt) = .5) binary
data (blue dots). The mean of the distribution, in cyan, is also the predicted stimulus probability:
P (xt = 1|xt−1) = ⟨γ|xt−1⟩. (d) Evolution of posterior probability mass for the DBM (grayscale)
and predictive probability P (xt = 1|xt−1) (cyan); they perpetually fluctuate with transient runs of
repetitions or alternations.
about the task over the time course of the experiment is the appropriate value of γ. We call this the
Fixed Belief Model (FBM). Bayes’ Rule tells us how to compute the posterior:
p(γ|xt) ∝ P (xt|γ)p(γ) = γrt+a+1(1 − γ)t−rt+b+1
where rt denotes the number of repetitions observed so far (up to t), xt is the set of binary
observations (x1, . . . , xt), and the prior distribution p(γ) is assumed to be a beta distribution:
p(γ) = p0(γ) = Beta(a, b). The predicted probability of seeing a repetition on the next trial is
the mean of this posterior distribution: P (xt+1 =1|xt) =
!
γp(γ|xt)dγ = ⟨γ|xt⟩.
A more complex internal model that subjects may entertain is that the relative frequency of repeti-
tion (versus alternation) can undergo discrete changes at unsignaled times during the experimental
session, such that repetitions are more prominent at times, and alternation more prominent at other
times. We call this the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), in which γt has a Markovian dependence
on γt−1, so that with probability α, γt = γt−1, and probability 1 − α, γt is redrawn from a fixed
distribution p0(γt) (same Beta distribution as for the prior). The observation xt is still assumed to
be drawn from a Bernoulli process with rate parameter γt. Stimulus predictive probability is now
the mean of the iterative prior, P (xt =1|xt−1) = ⟨γt|xt−1⟩, where
p(γt = γ|xt−1) = αp(γt−1 = γ|xt−1) + (1 − α)p0(γt = γ)
p(γt|xt) ∝ P (xt|γt)p(γt|xt−1)
Figures 2a;b illustrate the two graphical models. Figures 2c;d demonstrate how the two models re-
spond differently to the exact same sequence of truly random binary observations (γ = .5). While
inference in FBM leads to less variable and more accurate estimate of the underlying bias as the
number of samples increases, inference in DBM is perpetually driven by local transients. Relat-
ing back to the experimental data, we plot the probability of not observing the current stimulus for
each type of 5-stimulus sequences in Figure 1 for (b) FBM and (c) DBM, since RT is known to
lengthen with reduced stimulus expectancy. Comparing the first half of a simulated experimental
session (red) with the second half (blue), matched to the number of trials for each subject, we see
that sequential effects significantly diminish in the FBM, but persist in the DBM. A re-analysis
of the experimental data (Figure 1d) shows that sequential effects also persist in human behavior,
confirming that Bayesian prediction based on a (Markovian) changeable world can account for be-
havioral data, while that based on a fixed world cannot. In Figure 1d, the green dashed line shows
that a linear transformation of the DBM sequential effect (from Figure 1c) is quite a good fit of the
behavioral data. It is also worth noting that in the behavioral data there is a slight over all preference
(shorter RT) for repetition trials. This is easily captured by the DBM by assuming p0(γt) to be
skewed toward repetitions (see Figure 1c inset). The same skewed prior cannot produce a bias in the
FBM, however, because the prior only figures into Bayesian inference once at the outset, and is very
quickly overwhelmed by the accumulating observations.
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observations (x1, . . . , xt), and the prior distribution p(γ) is assumed to be a beta distribution:
p(γ) = p0(γ) = Beta(a, b). The predicted probability of seeing a repetition on the next trial is
the mean of this posterior distribution: P (xt+1 =1|xt) =
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γp(γ|xt)dγ = ⟨γ|xt⟩.
A more complex internal model that subjects may entertain is that the relative frequency of repeti-
tion (versus alternation) can undergo discrete changes at unsignaled times during the experimental
session, such that repetitions are more prominent at times, and alternation more prominent at other
times. We call this the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), in which γt has a Markovian dependence
on γt−1, so that with probability α, γt = γt−1, and probability 1 − α, γt is redrawn from a fixed
distribution p0(γt) (same Beta distribution as for the prior). The observation xt is still assumed to
be drawn from a Bernoulli process with rate parameter γt. Stimulus predictive probability is now
the mean of the iterative prior, P (xt =1|xt−1) = ⟨γt|xt−1⟩, where
p(γt = γ|xt−1) = αp(γt−1 = γ|xt−1) + (1 − α)p0(γt = γ)
p(γt|xt) ∝ P (xt|γt)p(γt|xt−1)
Figures 2a;b illustrate the two graphical models. Figures 2c;d demonstrate how the two models re-
spond differently to the exact same sequence of truly random binary observations (γ = .5). While
inference in FBM leads to less variable and more accurate estimate of the underlying bias as the
number of samples increases, inference in DBM is perpetually driven by local transients. Relat-
ing back to the experimental data, we plot the probability of not observing the current stimulus for
each type of 5-stimulus sequences in Figure 1 for (b) FBM and (c) DBM, since RT is known to
lengthen with reduced stimulus expectancy. Comparing the first half of a simulated experimental
session (red) with the second half (blue), matched to the number of trials for each subject, we see
that sequential effects significantly diminish in the FBM, but persist in the DBM. A re-analysis
of the experimental data (Figure 1d) shows that sequential effects also persist in human behavior,
confirming that Bayesian prediction based on a (Markovian) changeable world can account for be-
havioral data, while that based on a fixed world cannot. In Figure 1d, the green dashed line shows
that a linear transformation of the DBM sequential effect (from Figure 1c) is quite a good fit of the
behavioral data. It is also worth noting that in the behavioral data there is a slight over all preference
(shorter RT) for repetition trials. This is easily captured by the DBM by assuming p0(γt) to be
skewed toward repetitions (see Figure 1c inset). The same skewed prior cannot produce a bias in the
FBM, however, because the prior only figures into Bayesian inference once at the outset, and is very
quickly overwhelmed by the accumulating observations.
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Figure 1.20: Graphical models of two Bayesian models assuming fixed and changing
Bernoulli parameters (top panels). The two models made different inferences when
observing the exact sa e sequence of truly random binary observations (γ = .5,
bo tom panels). (Figur reproduced fro Yu and Cohen, 2009.)
Yu and Cohen (2009) conclude that it is very difficult to discriminate a truly ran-
domized sequence, which by chance would contain runs of repetitions and alterna-
tions, from one that has changing biases for repetitions and alternations over time.
Bialek (2005) also found plausible models allowing for changing biases to lead to sur-
prisingly high probabilities of misidentifying random sequences as biased. There-
fore if people assum they live in a changing environment, this belief will create an
illusion of control, even in a random environment.
Recently, Nassar et al. (2010) have used a nov l task to characterize how human
subjects adapt their behavior in a changing task. T y found th t most subjects be-
haved as if they substantially overestimated the implemented volatility, suggesting
that people tend to assume their environ ent is more changing than it really is. This
misperception of volatility can be the source of people frequent illusions of control.
Lefebvre et al. (2017) have simulated the TD(0) algorithm that we previously de-
scribed, in a task with a null i strumen al contingency (as the reward probabilities
were symmetric: 25% and 25% for both possible actions). This model and their par-
ticipants were found to display transient preferred responses, as the Yu and Cohen
(2009) Bayesian model with an ass mption for olatility did.
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Furthermore, some of Lefebvre et al. (2017) participants were better explained
by a TD(0) model with different learning rates associated with positive and negative
outcomes. These participants displayed a pronounced preference for one option (al-
though both options were equally rewarding), as did the model with a higher posi-
tive than negative learning rate. Therefore, illusions of control can also be strength-
ened by an asymmetric update of positive vs. negative outcomes.
In the format provided by the authors and unedited.
  
 
Behavioral and neural characterization of optimistic reinforcement learning 
Germain  Lefebvre, Maël  Lebreton, Florent Meyniel, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Stefano Palminteri 
Supplementary Notes and Figures 
Preferred response rate as a behavioral measure of optimistic behavior  
As previously defined in the main text, the preferred response rate is the rat  of the choices directed 
toward the most frequently chosen option by subjects in symmetric reward probability conditions (i.e. 
25/25% and 75/75%). The preferred choice rate is therefore by definition greater than 0.5. In these 
conditions there is no contingency-based reason to prefer one option to the other. This is particularly true 
in low-rewarding environment (25/25% condition), where neither option is satisfying in terms of outcome, 
compared to the average task outcome. We showed previously that the preferred response rate allows to 
behaviorally differentiating optimistic from unbiased subj cts.  
 
 
Figure S1:  typical “optimistic” and “unbiased” subjects in the 25/25% condition. 
(A) and (B) RW± (optimistic) typical subject. (A) Plot represents behavioral choices (represented by black dots) of a typical RW± 
subject (i.e. whose behavior is best fitted by the RW± model) in the 25/25% condition, together with RW and RW± models 
predictions (represented respectively by gray and red lines). (B) Plot represents Q-values (of the two options) differential evolution in 
each model for a typical RW± subject. (C) and (D) RW (unbiased) typical subject. (C) Plot represents behavioral choices 
(represented by black dots) of a typical RW subject (whose behavior is best fitted by the RW model) in the 25/25% condition, 
together with RW and RW± models predictions (represented respectively by gray and red lines). (D) Plot represents the evolution of 
Q-values (of the two options) differential in each model for a typical RW subject.  
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Figure 1.21: Behavioral choices and model simulations of a typical RW± participant
(whose behavior is best fitted by a model with different positive and negative learn-
ing rates, left panel) and RW participant (whose behavior is best fitted by a m del
with a unique learning rates, right panel). (Figure reproduced from Lefebvre et al.,
2017.)
A model has also been developed to explain transient, instead of global, illu-
sions of control, as people often take previous outcomes into account when making
predictions about random events. The prediction that the next outcome will be dif-
ferent fro the previous one is often referred to as expectation of negative recency
(for example whe roulette players bet on r d after the wh el has just land d o
black). Scheibehenne and Studer (2014) analyses on a student sample revealed that
prediction strategies varied across participants. Importantly, the different expecta-
tion patterns could be accounted for by a drif model that considers how often the
same event has previously occurred in a row.
This section focused on the different biases arising when asking participants to
report their perception of outcome control, and we have seen how computational
models with certain assumptions can explain them. In the next section, we will
focus on the perception of action control, often called sense of agency or subjective
control.
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1.4 The sense of agency
Sense of agency can be defined as the feeling that we control our actions, and through
them effects in the outside world (Haggard and Chambon, 2012). Other researchers
prefer to talk about the experience of conscious will (Wegner, 2003), following Hume’s
proposition to define will as a feeling (Hume, 1739).
1.4.1 The free will controversy
A crucial question is when does conscious will appear in the events surrounding
actions? Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) have asked participants to move their right
index finger at some arbitrary time in the following few seconds. Continuous record-
ings were made of electrical potential at several scalp electrodes while the actual
time at which the finger moved was precisely measured by electromyography. Brain
electrical activity was found to start increasing about 800 milliseconds before the vol-
untary finger movement, in the left and right precentral and the midparietal regions.
This activity was called the readiness potential. It appeared that a general bilateral
readiness for voluntary action later resolved into a more localized activation of the
area responsible for the specific action, peaking 50 ms before the action unfolds.
Then the following question is when exactly in this sequence the person experi-
ence conscious will. Libet (1985) also asked participants to move their finger sponta-
neously, but this time while they were watching a clock. A spot of light was revolv-
ing each 2.56 seconds in a clockwise path around the circumference of the screen.
The participant’s task was simply to report for each finger movement where the dot
was on the clock when he experienced “conscious awareness of wanting to perform
a given self-initiated movement”. The conscious willing of finger movement oc-
curred at a significant interval after the onset of the readiness potential, but also at
a significant interval before the actual finger movement (and also before the actual
awareness of the movement).
for all groups. This value was the same even when subjects reported having pre-
planned roughly when to act! If we correct W for the –50 msec. error in the subjects’
reports of timings of the skin stimuli, we have an average corrected W of about –150
msec. Clearly, the brain process (RP) to prepare for this voluntary act began about
400 msec. before the appearance of the conscious will to act (W). This relationship
was true for every group of 40 trials and in every one of the nine subjects studied. It
should also be noted that the actual difference in times is probably greater than the
400 msec; the actual initiating process in the brain probably starts before our recorded
RP, in an unknown area that then activates the supplementary motor area in the cere-
bral cortex. The supplementary motor area is located in the midline near the vertex
and is thought to be the source of our recorded RP.
Any Role for Conscious Will?
The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously,
well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is there, then, any role for
conscious will in the performance of a voluntary act? (see Libet, 1985). To answer
this it must be recognized that conscious will (W) does appear about 150 msec. before
the muscle is activated, even though it follows onset of the RP. An interval of 150
msec. would allow enough time in which the conscious function might affect the final
outcome of the volitional process. (Actually, only 100 msec. is available for any such
effect. The final 50 msec. before the muscle is activated is the time for the primary
motor cortex to activate the spinal motor nerve cells. During this time the act goes to
completion with no possibility of stopping it by the rest of the cerebral cortex.)
Potentially available to the conscious function is the possibility of stopping or
vetoing the final progress of the volitional process, so that no actual muscle action
ensues. Conscious-will could thus affect the outcome of the volitional process even
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Figure 3
Diagram of sequence of events, cerebral and subjective, that precede a fully self-initiated voluntary
act. Relative to 0 time, detected in the electromyogram (EMG) of the suddenly activated muscle, the
readiness potential (RP)(an indicator of related cerebral neuronal activities) begins first, at about
–1050 ms. when some pre-planning is reported (RP I) or about –550 ms. with spontaneous acts
lacking immediate pre planning (RP II). Subjective awareness of the wish to move (W) appears at
about –200 ms., some 350 ms. after onset even of RP II; however, W does appear well before the act
(EMG). Subjective timings reported for awareness of the randomly delivered S (skin) stimulus
average about –50 ms. relative to actual delivery time. (From Libet, 1989.)
Figure 1.22: The readiness potential (RP) begins first, at about -1050 ms wh n some
pre-planning is reported (RP I), or about -550 ms with spontaneous acts lacking im-
mediate pre-planning (RP II). Subjective awareness of the wish to move (W) appears
at about - s, some 350 ms after o set even of RP II. (Figure reproduc d from
Libet, 1999.)
Libet (1999) concludes that “the volitional process is therefore initiated uncon-
sciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the
act. Free will is therefore not excluded.” But this finding is of course contrary to each
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individual own feeling to consciously initiate voluntary acts.
1.4.2 Conscious will as an illusion
Most of the time in everyday life, we feel we are doing things willfully when we
actually do them, and feel we are not doing something when in truth we have not
done it. However, some cases remind us that action and the feeling of doing are not
inevitably intertwined. The processes of mind that produce the experience of will
may be quite distinct from the processes of mind that produce the action itself.
One can think of hypnosis, whose profound effect is the feeling that your actions
are happening to you rather than that you are doing them (Lynn, Rhue, and Weekes,
1990). Wegner (2002) also uses the example of table-turning to show that an action
can be done without the feeling of having done it. In table turning, a group of people
gather around a light table and wait for it to move. Often it would move, sometimes
even circling the room or rocking from side to side. Investigations by scientists such
as Michael Faraday (using force measurement devices between hands and tables)
revealed that the source of the table movement was indeed the participants (Faraday,
1853).
Wegner and Wheatley (1999) were inspired by an ordinary household Ouija board
to experimentally test whether people will think they have caused actions when a
thought relevant to the action is primed just before the action – whether they ac-
tually performed the action or not. People in one experiment were presented with
thoughts (e.g. a tape-recorded mention of the word swan) relevant to their action
(moving an onscreen cursor to select a picture of a swan).
The movement that participants performed was not in fact their own, as they
shared the computer mouse with an experimental confederate who gently forced
the action without the participants’ knowledge. Nevertheless, when the relevant
thought was provided either 1 s or 5 s before the action, participants reported feeling
that they acted intentionally in making the movement. On trials when thoughts of
the swan were prompted 30 s before the forced action or 1 s afterwards, no inflated
experience of will was found (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999).
Figure 1.23: On the left, the experimental Ouija board used in the experiment. On the
right, the mean percentage of intentionality rated for forced stops on objects primed
at different moments before and after the stop. (Figure reproduced from Wegner and
Wheatley, 1999.)
This experiment and others have led Wegner (2003) to propose the following
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theory. The experience of conscious will arise when the person infers an apparent
causal path from thought to action (purple arrow). The actual causal paths (green
arrows) are not present in the person consciousness. The thought of doing the action,
as well as the actual implementation of the action, are caused by unconscious mental
events, and these unconscious mental events might be linked to each other directly
or through yet other mental or brain processes. Conscious will is experienced as a
result of what is apparent, not what is real.
some 350–400 ms. So, although the conscious intention
preceded the finger movement, it occurred well after
whatever brain events were signaled by the RP. This
finding suggests that the experience of consciously
willing an action begins after brain events that set the
action into motion [6,7]. The brain creates both the
thought and the action, leaving the person to infer that
the thought is causing the action.
Clinical evidence
Anomalies pointing to a system that fabricates an
experience of will can also be found in clinical cases.
Patients with brain damage resulting in ‘alien hand
syndrome’, for example, report that one of their hands
functions with a mind of its own, often performing
elaborate and seemingly voluntary actions without the
patient’s experience of willful control. One patient
described the experience as a feeling that ‘someone from
the moon’ was controlling her hand [8]. Schizophrenia
accompanied by auditory hallucinations also produces
anomalistic will – in this case, an experience of ‘hearing
voices’ that occurs when patients attribute their own
thoughts and inner voice to others [9–14]. Thoughts that
come to mind without prior anticipation are not experi-
enced as willed, and their insistent recurrence can lead
patients to ascribe them to outside agents.
Automatisms
Will is also experienced independently of action in a
menagerie of cases known as automatisms [15–19].
Practices such as automatic writing, table turning,
Ouija-board spelling, dowsing, pendulum divining, chan-
neling, and the like were the major psychological basis of
the Spiritualist fad of the late 19th century, as these
various contrivances gave rise to experiences of unwilled
action that were then attributed to spirits or other
supernatural agents. In the case of table turning, for
instance, a group of people gathered around a light table
and waited for it to move (Fig. 2). Often it would – after a
significant wait – sometimes even circling the room or
rocking from side to side. Yet the participants often
reported no experience of willing the action and instead
expressed amazement at the table’s animation. Although
spirit agency was the popular explanation, investigations
by scientists such as Michael Faraday (using force
measurement devices between hands and tables) revealed
that the source of the table movement was indeed the
participants [20,21]. The experience of will in such cases
was entirely misleading about the causal basis of the
action.
Apparent mental causation
If the experience of conscious will is not a direct report
Fig. 1. The experience of conscious will arises when the person infers an apparent causal path from thought to action (purple arrow). The actual causal paths (green) are
not present in the person’s consciousness. The thought is caused by unconscious mental events, and the action is caused by unconscious mental events, and these uncon-
scious mental events might also be linked to each other directly or through yet other mental or brain processes. Conscious will is experienced as a result of what is appar-
ent, not what is real. Modified with permission from Ref. [22].
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Figure 1.24: A m chanism to xplain illusory gency. (Figure reprodu d f om Weg-
ner, 2003.)
1.4.3 The importance of believing in free will
Although Weg er (2002) has postulated that our sense of control is a ure illusion,
we strongly feel we are in control of our life, and this sense of control is an important
part of human psychology (the hypothesis that humans need to feel in co trol will be
developed in the general discussion ). What would happen if people came to believe
that they cannot exert free will, i.e., that their behavior is the inexorable product of a
causal chain s t into moti n without their own volition?
Believing that outcomes are based on an inborn trait, ra h r than effort, influ-
ence behavior. For instance, Muell r and Dweck (1998) obs rved 10-year-old il-
dren who were told that they had been successful on an initial task either as the
result of their intelligence or through their hard work. In a second round, all the
children encountered a task that was well beyond their performance level, at which
they all failed. When the children were given yet a third task, those who thought
their earlier success was due to their intelligence put forth less effort and reported
lower enjoyment than those who thought their initial success was due to their own
effort. When asked, children praised for intelligence described it as a fixed trait,
while children praised for hard work believed it to be subject to improvement.
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In two seminal experiments, Vohs and Schooler (2008) have studied whether be-
lieving that human behavior is predetermined would encourage cheating. Partici-
pants would read either a text that encouraged a belief in determinism (i.e., that por-
trayed behavior as the consequence of environmental and genetic factors), a neutral
text, or a text endorsing free will. They found that weakening free-will beliefs re-
liably increased cheating: participants who read deterministic statements were less
likely to actively prevent the answer to an arithmetic problem from appearing on the
computer screen, and overpaid themselves when allowed to take money for each
correct answer on a difficult cognitive test.
correctly (i.e., when participants were not in the self-scoring,
self-payment situation). In the baseline experimenter-scored
condition, participants simply completed the cognitive prob-
lems, which the experimenter scored; participants then received
$1 for each correct answer. We did not ask participants in this
condition to complete the FWD scale so as not to activate the
concept of free will. In the determinism experimenter-scored
condition, we gave participants the determinism statements and
then the logic problems. The experimenter scored the problems
and paid participants $1 for each correct answer. This com-
parison condition allowed us to assess whether reading the
scientific-sounding determinism statements had the incidental
effect of aiding in solving the logic problems.
Thus, there were three comparison conditions we could use to
examine the effects of the determinism and free-will manip-
ulations on cheating: a neutral condition, in which participants
were allowed to cheat but were not exposed to statements that
might change their beliefs about free will; a baseline experi-
menter-scored condition, in which participants’ true scores on
the cognitive task were calculated without any manipulation;
and a determinism experimenter-scored condition, in which
participants read deterministic statements but were not allowed
to cheat, so that their true scores on the problem set were known.
Results
Scores on the FWD Scale
Participants in the free-will, determinism, and neutral condi-
tions completed the FWD scale so that we could check whether
the manipulations in the statement-reading task had been ef-
fective. Scores on the FreeWill subscale differed as a function of
condition, F(2, 70) 5 17.03, p < .01. A planned contrast re-
vealed that participants in the free-will condition reported
stronger beliefs in free will (M 5 23.09, SD 5 6.42) than did
participants in the neutral condition (M 5 20.04, SD 5 3.76),
t(70)5 12.54, p < .01. A second planned contrast showed that
participants in the determinism condition reported weaker be-
liefs in free will (M5 15.56, SD5 2.79) than did participants in
the neutral condition, t(70) 5 3.52, p < .01.
Themanipulations also affected endorsement of statements on
the Scientific Causation subscale, F(2, 70) 5 5.85, p < .01.
Specific contrasts showed that participants in the determinism
condition had higher scores (M5 23.14, SD5 2.69) than those
in the neutral and free-will conditions (neutral: M 5 20.40,
SD5 3.40; free will:M5 20.78, SD5 3.21), t(70)5 2.98, p<
.01. Scores on the Fate and Chance subscales were unaffected
by the manipulations, Fs < 0.2, ps > .30.
Assessment of Cheating Behavior
In three conditions, participants paid themselves after scoring
(and shredding) their own answer sheets, whereas in two addi-
tional conditions, the experimenter paid participants according
to their actual performance. Hence, to assess cheating behav-
ior, we compared payments in the self-paid, cheating-possible
groups with payments in the experimenter-scored groups. Recall
that we did not have participants’ answer sheets in the three self-
paid conditions; therefore, we divided the number of $1 coins
taken by each group by the number of group members to arrive at
an average self-payment. These group averages, along with the
known payments in the baseline experimenter-scored and de-
terminism experimenter-scored conditions, were subjected to an
analysis of variance, which showed a significant effect of condi-
tion, F(4, 114) 5 5.68, p < .01. Planned contrasts revealed that
participants who had read the determinism statements and who
were allowed to pay themselves for correct answers walked away
with more money than the others, t(114)5 4.48, p< .01 (see Fig.
1). None of the other groups differed from each other, ts < 1.
Did Changing Beliefs About Free Will Change Cheating
Behavior?
To test our hypothesis that discouraging a belief in free will
would lead to cheating, we first calculated the correlation be-
tween scores on the Free Will subscale and average payments.
As expected, we found a strong negative relationship, r(71) 5
!.47,1 indicating that the more participants endorsed state-
ments of free will, the less they paid themselves (on average) for
the self-scored cognitive test.
Next, we performed a mediation analysis to assess our pre-
diction that free-will beliefs determine cheating. In anANCOVA
in which Free Will scores and condition were entered as pre-
dictors of cheating, the effect of condition failed to predict
cheating behavior, F< 1, whereas the effect of free-will beliefs
remained significant, t(67) 5 10.72, p < .01.
Ancillary Measure: Mood
To ensure that the statements did not inadvertently alter par-
ticipants’ moods, we assessed positive and negative emotions
Fig. 1. Mean amount of money, in dollars, that participants received in
the five conditions in Experiment 2. Participants in the free-will, neutral,
and determinism conditions paid themselves $1 for each answer they
claimed to have solved. Participants in the two experimenter-scored
conditions were paid according to the true number of solutions. Error
bars show standard errors.
1Note that there were fewer degrees of freedom for this analysis than for the
main analysis because participants in the baseline experimenter-scored and
determinism experimenter-scored conditions did not complete the FWD scale.
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Figure 1.25: Me n amou t of money, in dollar , that participants received in five
different conditions. Participants in the free-will, neutral, and determinism condi-
tions paid themselves $1 for each answer they claimed to have solved. Participants
in the two experimenter-scored conditions were paid according to the true number
of solutions. (Figure reproduced from Vohs and Schooler, 2008).
Subsequent work has shown that incre sing disbelief in fr e will contributes to
increases in agression and decreases in helpful, prosocial behavior (Baumeister, Ma-
sicampo, and DeWall, 2009). A possibility is that the belief that forces outside the
self determine behavior drain the motivation to r sist the temptation to cheat, in-
ducing a “why bother?” mentality (Vohs and Schooler, 2008). Or perhaps, denying
free will simply provides the ultimate excuse to behave as one likes. Sartre (1956)
indeed said: “We are lways ready to tak refuge in a b lief in determinism if this
freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse.”
1.4.4 The intentional binding paradigm
As we have seen, explicit judgements of control or agency can be contaminated by
a need for excuses, and conf unding effects on explic t agency judgements there-
fore seem inevitable. The intentional binding paradigm offers an implicit measure
related to sense of agency, which may be less subject to cognitive biases.
In the first article to report e intentional binding effect, H ggard, Clark, and
Kalogeras (2002) used the Libet clock method to study the perceived time of actions
and their co sequent effects. In baseline conditions, participants either made vol-
untary actions or listened to the occurrence of an auditory tone (in the absence of
action) while they atched a rotating clock hand on a computer screen. They were
asked to report the position of the clock hand when they moved or when the tone
occurred. In operant conditions, participants made a voluntary key press on every
trial, but this time it was followed 250 ms later by an auditory tone.
The authors found that, in operant conditions, the perceived time of their actions
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was later than in baseline conditions and the perceived time of the tone was earlier
than in baseline conditions. Critically, in an identical set of conditions involving
involuntary movements induced via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over
the primary motor cortex, the binding effect was reversed such that the interval
between action and effect actually increased in ‘operant’ conditions compared to
baseline conditions. The authors speculated that a specific cognitive function of the
central nervous system is to bind together critical sensorimotor events that surround
voluntary action, and that this function may be crucial for the normal experience of
agency.
Figure 1.26: Voluntary actions produce binding effects, as awareness of voluntary
action shifts later toward a consequent tone, whereas awareness of the tone shifts
forward toward the voluntary action that evokes it (left). Neutral events such as
sham TMS produce minimal perceptual shifts (middle). Involuntary TMS-induced
movements do not sustain binding, but produce repulsion effects in the opposite
direction (right). (Figure reproduced from Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras, 2002).
Since this first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating
array of studies has accumulated. More than a decade later, there is compelling evi-
dence supporting a link between intentional binding and sense of agency, although
the exact nature of that relationship is yet to be fully understood (Moore and Obhi,
2012).
We have seen that explicit reports of agency or control have shed doubt on the
existence of free will, and can be interpreted as a reconstruction of reality. The in-
tentional binding paradigm is thus an important tool to have access to the sense of
agency from behavioral measures only.
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1.5 The gap between behavior and consciousness
We have seen that there can be a gap between being in control and perceiving to be
in control, and that explicit reports can be contaminated by different cognitive pro-
cesses. Here we will demonstrate that in a variety of learning and decision-making
tasks, a general gap has been documented between behavior and explicit reports.
1.5.1 Unconscious conditioning
Conditional responding during simple Pavlovian conditioning is often characterized
as a form of implicit memory. The first proof that humans can be unconsciously
conditioned came from Morris, Öhman, and Dolan (1998). They measured neural
activity in volunteer subjects who were presented with an angry face associated with
a burst of white noise. The subjects’ awareness of the angry face was sometimes
prevented by backward masking with a neutral face. Throughout the experiment,
the subjects were required to indicate, by pressing a button, any occurrence of either
angry face. Their responses revealed an inability to detect the masked angry faces.
Nevertheless, they found a similar significant response in the region of the amygdala
to the presentation of the masked and unmasked conditioned faces.
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Chatsworth, CA) and cloned using the pCR-Script kit (Stratagene). A mini-
mum of 8 clones from each culture were sequenced on an automated sequencer
(LI-COR, Lincoln, NE). Sequences were aligned manually with other marine
cyanobacterial sequences available in the Ribosomal Database Project28 using
the Genetic Data Environment29. The sequence for MIT9303 obtained pre-
viously from a PCR product17 is contained within the sequence we report here.
A total of 1,094 unambiguously aligned and determined nucleotides were used
in the analyses. Phylogenetic analyses used PAUPp (version 4.0d47, provided by
D. Swofford). For both distance and maximum likelihood analyses the model of
nucleotide substitution used was the Hasegawa Kishino Yana 1985 model.
Nucleotide frequencies and the transition transversion ratio were estimated
from the data.
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10. DeLong, E. F., Wu, K. Y., Prèzelin, B. B. & Jovine, R. V. M. High abundance of Archaea in Antarctic
marine picoplankton. Nature 371, 695–697 (1994).
11. Ward, D., Weller, M. R. & Bateson, M. M. 16S rRNA sequences reveal numerous uncultured
microorganisms in a natural community. Nature 345, 63–65 (1990).
12. Amann, R., Snaidr, J., Wagner, M., Ludwig, W. & Schleifer, K.-H. In situ visualization of high genetic
diversity in a natural microbial community. J. Bacteriol. 178, 3496–3500 (1996).
13. Veldhuis, M. J. W. & Kraay, G. W. Cell abundance and fluorescence of picoplankton in relation to
growth irradiance and nitrogen availability in the Red Sea. Neth. J. Sea. Res. 31, 135–145 (1993).
14. Partensky, F., Blanchot, J., Lantoine, F., Neveaux, J. & Marie, D. Vertical structure of picophyto-
plankton at different trophic sites of the subtropical northeastern Atlantic Ocean. Deep Sea Res. 43,
1191–1213 (1996).
15. Toledo, G. & Palenik, B. Synechococcus diversity in the California Current as seen by RNA polymerase
(rpoC1) gene sequences of isolated strains. Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 63, 4298–4303 (1997).
16. Shimada, A., Maruyama, T. & Miyachi, S. Vertical distributions and photosynthetic action spectra of
two oceanic picophytoplankters, Prochlorococcus marinus and Synechococcus sp. Mar. Biol. 127, 15–23
(1996).
17. Urbach, E., Scanlan, D. J., Distel, D. L., Waterbury, J. B. & Chisholm, S. W. Rapid diversification of
marine picophytoplankton with dissimilar light-harvesting structures inferred from sequences of
Prochlorococcus and Synechococcus (Cyanobacteria). J. Mol. Evol. 46, 188–201 (1998).
18. Partensky, F., Hoepffner, N., Li, W. K. W., Ulloa, O. & Vaulot, D. Photoacclimation of Prochlorococcus
sp. (Prochlorophyta) strains isolated from the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. Plant
Physiol. 101, 285–296 (1993).
19. Scanlan, D. J., Hess, W. R., Partensky, F., Newman, J. & Vaulot, D. High degree of genetic variation in
Prochlorococcus (Prochlorophyta) revealed by RFLP analysis. Eur. J. Phycol. 31, 1–9 (1996).
20. Moore, L. R. & Chisholm, S. W. Photophysiology of the marine cyanobacterium Prochlorococcus:
ecotypic differences among cultured isolates. Limnol. Oceanogr. (submitted).
21. Waterbury, J. B., Watson, S. W., Valois, F. W. & Franks, D. G. Biological and ecological characterization
of the marine unicellular cyanobacterium Synechococcus. Can. Bull. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 214, 71–120
(1986).
22. Olson, R. J., Chisholm, S. W., Zettler, E. R. & Armbrust, E. V. Analysis of Synechococcus pigment types
in the sea using single and dual beam flow cytometry. Deep Sea Res. 35, 425–440 (1988).
23. Gallagher, J. C. Population genetics of Skeletonema costatum (Bacillariophyceae) in Narrangansett Bay.
J. Phycol. 16, 464–474 (1980).
24. Gallagher, J. C. Physiological variation and electrophoretic banding patterns of genetically different
seasonal populations of Skeletonema costatum (Bacillariophyceae). J. Phycol. 18, 148–162 (1982).
25. Platt, T., Gallegos, C. L. & Harrison, W. G. Photoinhibition of photosynthesis in natural assemblages
of marine phytoplankton. J. Mar. Res. 38, 687–701 (1980).
26. Jeffrey, S. W. & Humphrey, G. F. New spectrophotometric equations for determining chlorophyll a, b,
c1 and c2 in higher plants, algae, and natural phytoplankton. Biochem. Physiol. Pflanz. 168, 191–194
(1975).
27. Ausubel, F. M. et al. Short Protocols in Molecular Biology (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1992).
28. Maidak, B. L. et al. The RDP (Ribosomal Database Project). Nucleic Acids Res. 25, 109–111 (1997).
29. Smith, S. W., Overbeek, R., Woese, C. R. & Gilbert, W. The genetic data environment: an expandable
GUI for multiple sequence analysis. CABIOS 10, 671–675 (1994).
Acknowledgements. We thank M. Sogin for access to an automated DNA sequencer and helpful
discussion; A. Shimada for the use of unpublished sequences of Prochlorococcus GP2 and SB; R. Olson
and E. Zettler for cell sorting at sea; H. Hsu for technical assistance; and C. Cavanaugh, H. Sosik and S.
Sathyendranath for helpful consultation. This work was supported by the US National Science
Foundation and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to S.W.C. (e-mail: chisholm@mit.edu).
Sequences have been deposited in GenBank under accession numbers AF053396, MIT9302; AF053397,
MIT9303; AF053398, MIT9312; and AF053399, MIT9313.
Consciousandunconscious
emotional learning
in thehumanamygdala
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If subjects are shown an angry face as a target visual stimulus for
less than forty milliseconds and are then immediately shown an
expressionless mask, these subjects report seeing the mask but not
the target. However, an aversively conditioned masked target can
elicit an emotional response from subjects without being con-
sciously perceived1,2. Here we study the mechanism of this uncon-
sciously m diated emotional lea ni g. We m asured neural
activity in volunteer subjects who were presented with two
angry faces, one of which, through previous classical condition-
ing, was associated with a burst of white noise. In half of the trials,
the subjects’ awareness of the angry faces was prevented by
backward masking with neutral face. A significant neural
resp nse was elicited in the right, but not left, amygdala to
masked presentations of the conditioned angry face. Unmasked
presentations of the same face produced enhanced neural activity
Figure 1 Stimulus parameters and experimental design. In the scanning window,
pairs of target and masking faces were shown in four separate conditions,
determined by the combination of masking and conditioning of the angry face.
Mc, masked conditioned (the CS+ angry face was the target and the neutral face
was the mask); nc, non-maskedconditioned (a neutral face was the target and the
CS+ face was the mask); mu, masked unconditioned (the CS− face was the target
and the neutral face the mask); nu, non-masked unconditioned (the neutral face
was the target and the CS− face the mask). Face 1, angry face paired with noise
(CS+); face 2, angry face not paired with noise (CS−); faces 3 and 4, neutral faces.
In all conditions, the target face wasdisplayed for 30msand immediately followed
by the mask for 45ms.
Figure 1.27: The sequence of stimuli used for unconscious Pavlovian conditioning.
(Figure reproduced from Morris, Öhman, and Dolan, 1998).
In another study, participants were also exposed to a fear conditioning proce-
dure in which one tone predicted a loud white noise, whereas a second tone was
presented alone. The first tone was presented just above or below the perceptual
threshold in the different trials. They again found a differential skin conductance re-
sponse between the two tones, that was present on both perceived and unperceived
trials (Knight, Nguyen, and Bandettini, 2003).
Unconscious learning was then demonstrated in instrumental conditioning, show-
ing that unperceived cues could also bias decision making. Pessiglione et al. (2008)
used a masking procedure on visual cues, so that participants could not build con-
scious representations of cue-outcome associations. These unperceived cues were
paired with monetary outcomes (+£1, £0 or -£1), depending on whether participants
chose the ‘Go’ or ‘NoGo’ response. Participants did choose the ‘Go’ response more
frequently following reward predictive cues relative to punishment predictive cues.
The uncovered cues were subsequently rated by the participants, and ratings were
significantly higher for reward compared to punishment cues, although none of the
cues was reported as previously seen.
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To assess visual awareness, we successively displayed two
masked cues on a computer screen and asked subjects whether
they perceived a difference or not. We reasoned that if subjects
are unable to correctly perceive any difference between the
masked cues, then they are also unable to build conscious rep-
resentations of cue-outcome associations. The procedure has
the advantage of not showing the cues unmasked, so that, by
the end of the experiment, subjects had no idea what the cues
look like.
The perceptual discrimination task was performed outside the
scanner at the beginning of the experiment, in order to adapt du-
ration of cue display to each individual, and in the scanner at the
end of the experiment, to check for any effect of learning or
change in visual conditions. For all subjects, cue duration was
set at either 33 or 50 ms and was kept fixed through the entire
experiment. In every individual, correct guessing on the final as-
sessment did not differ from chance (p > 0.05, chi-square test).
At group level, average percentage of correct responses for
the 20 subjects was 48% ± 3%, which again was not different
from chance (p > 0.5, two-tailed paired t test). Average d0 was
0.08 ± 0.20, showing that, even when correcting for response
bias, signal detection was not different from zero (p > 0.5, two-
tailed paired t test). Thus, subjects remained unable to discrim-
inate between the different masked cues, from the beginning
to the end of conditioning sessions.
We employed the same masking procedure in the subliminal
conditioning task, in which cues were paired with monetary out-
comes (Figure 1). From these outcomes (!£1, £0, +£1), subjects
had to learn when to take the risky response (either ‘‘Go’’ or
‘‘NoGo,’’ depending on subjects). Subjects were also told that,
for the risky response, the outcome would depend on the cue
hidden behind the masking image (see instructions in Supple-
mental Data available online). As they would not see the cues,
we encouraged them to follow their intuition, taking the risky
response if they had a feeling they were in a winning trial and
choosing a safe response if they felt it was a losing trial. Note
that if subjects always made the same response, or if they
performed at chance, their final payoff would be zero.
As a dependent variable to assess for conditioning effects, we
used monetary payoff, which corresponds to the area below the
reward and above the punishment learning curves (Figure 2A).
Overall subjects won money in this task, on average £7.5 ± £1.8
(p < 0.001, one-tailed paired t test), indicating that the risky re-
sponse was more frequently chosen following reward predictive
relative to punishment predictive cues. Both reward and punish-
ment conditions also differed significantly from the neutral condi-
tion (p < 0.05, one-tailed paired t test). There was no significant
difference (p > 0.5, two-tailed paired t test) between the reward
and punishment condition: on average subjects won £24.3 ±
£1.9 and avoid losing £23.2 ± £2.1. Learning curves showed
that responses improved symmetrically for rewards and punish-
ments, ending with 63% ± 5% of correct responses on average.
Surprisingly, this plateau was reached at around the halfway
point of the learning session. The effects of subliminal condition-
ing were subsequently assessed with a preference judgment
task, in which cues were uncovered and rated by the subjects
from the most to least liked (Figure 2B). Ratings were significantly
higher for reward compared to punishment cues (p < 0.01, one-
tailed paired t test), consistent with subjects having learned the
affective values of subliminal cues, such that these values were
able to bias their preferences. When uncovering the cues, sub-
jects were also asked to signal any cue that they may have
seen during conditioning sessions; none was reported as previ-
ously seen.
Figure 1. Subliminal Conditioning Task
Successive screenshots displayed during a given
trial are shown from left to right, with durations in
milliseconds. After seeing a masked contextual
cue flashed on a computer screen, subjects
choose to press or not press a response button
and subsequently observe the outcome. In this
example, ‘‘Go’’ appears on the screen because
the subject has pressed the button, following
the cue associated with a rewarding outcome
(winning £1).
Figure 2. Behavioral Data
(A) Learning curves. Colors indicate cues for which
button presses are rewarded (green), neutral
(blue), or punished (red). Diamonds represent,
across trials, percentages of subjects that pressed
the button. Left: continuous lines join the dia-
monds to illustrate actual choices made by
subjects. Right: continuous lines represent the
probabilities of button press estimated by an
optimized Q-learning model.
(B) Preferences. After the conditioning phase,
cues were unmasked and subjects rated them,
from the most (3) to the least liked (1). The graph
shows the average rating for reward (green), neu-
tral (blue), and punishment (red) cues. Bars are ±
intersubjects standard errors of the mean.
Neuron
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Figure 1.28: The sequence of stimuli used for unconscious instrumental condition-
ing. (Figure reproduced from Pessiglione et al., 2008).
1.5.2 Implicit sequence learning
Another form of unconscious learning is implicit sequence learning. The semi-
nal stu y of Nisse and Bullemer (1987) used a simple paradigm: p rticipants re-
sponde to a stimulus (an asterisk) occurring at one of four locations with a key
located directly below each position. Following a 500 ms response-to-stimulus in-
terval, the next stimulus occurred. The basic design was thus a four-choice, com-
patible response mapping, serial re ction task. Although not inform d of it, som
participants were responding to an asterisk moving in a regular, repeating pattern
of positions, while others responded to a random order of locations. Subjects in the
repeating sequence condition had faster reaction times and made fewer errors than
those respon i g to rand information, although they were not consciously aware
of a seq ence. NISSEN AND BULLEMER 
BLOCK 
FIG. 1. Mean of median reaction time in milliseconds in each block of Experiment 1. 
Filled circles: repeating sequence; x ‘s: random sequence. Bars represent standard errors. 
from the repeating condition (F(1,154) = 210.45, p < .OOl) and random 
condition (F(1,154) = 10.54, p < .005) 
The accuracy data from these two conditions are shown in Table 1. 
Although accuracy was high throughout, it increased with practice, par- 
ticularly from Block I to Block 2, in the repeating condition but not in the 
random condition. A two-way analysis of variance of the accuracy data 
revealed a main effect of block (F(7,154) = 9.01, p < .OOl) and an inter- 
action between group and block (F(7,154) = 4.90, p < .OOl). According 
to the results of trend analyses, there was a significant linear trend in the 
repeating condition (F(l,l54) = 52.98, p < .OOl) but not in the random 
condition. r 
The latency data show that the two conditions yield different perfor- 
TABLE 1 
Percentage Correct in Experiment I 
Block of trials 
Group I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Repeating 91 96 97 98 98 98 98 98 
Random 94 96 96 95 94 96 97 9.5 
1 A criterion significance level of .OS was used in all analyses reported in this article. 
Figure 1.29: The sequence learning phenomenon. (Figure reproduced from Nissen
and Bullemer, 1987).
In another study, eight pairs of objects were presented, in which one object in
each pair was always correct. Two patients with larg medial temporal lobe lesions
showed slow and gradual increase of performance in this task, while controls had a
perfect scor after three days of testing. Crucially these patients were unable to recall
or recognize word lists, stories and diagrams (Bayley, Frascino, and Squire, 2005).
A study even showed that implicit, automatic learning may be attenuated by ex-
plicit memory processes under certain circumstances (Fletcher et al., 2004). Explicit
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knowledge is thus often not seen as an inherent part of learning sequenced infor-
mation. Rather, awareness may arise from the interaction of the sequence learning
systems with other cognitive systems that then produce conscious knowledge of the
sequence (Clegg, DiGirolamo, and Keele, 1998).
Explicit reports can be seen as a pure artificial reconstruction of the real learning
process. But this statement actually oversimplifies the interaction between behav-
ior and consciousness. Unconscious instrumental conditioning is known to produce
a much smaller performance than conscious instrumental conditioning (Pessiglione
et al., 2008). There are also cases in which we actually know more than what our
behavior shows. For example, a recent study on mice has shown that task acqui-
sition may be diverging from task expression. The authors analyzed a conditioned
response and found a classical and progressive learning curve that is the hallmark
of instrumental conditioning. But when testing mice preferences in a different con-
text, they found a all-or-nothing behavior, showing that mice can indeed perform
one-shot learning (Kuchibhotla and al., 2018).
A series of experiments have then directly explored the relationship between
performance on a cognitive task and the explicit or reportable knowledge associated
with that performance. There was no evidence for a positive association between
task performance and associated verbalizable knowledge. It seems that subjects are
not able to access specific task-related information in a form that will allow them to
answer post-task verbal questions. It is possible that whatever is learned during task
performance is not verbalizable (Berry and Broadbent, 1984). We can thus envision
behavior and conscious reports as two (mostly) independent proxys for cognition.
1.5.3 Feeling free vs. being free to choose
Being free is often described as the possibility of choosing between different things,
rather than being forced into an option. But paradoxically when people are faced to
a complex choice with multiple options leading to various consequences, they can
feel blocked or frustrated rather than free.
In a series of six experiments, Lau, Hiemisch, and Baumeister (2015) studied
what factors influenced the feeling of freedom. One experiment compared students
having to choose between three, six or nine housing advertisements. The more op-
tions the students needed to analyze, the less free they felt. In another experiment,
participants had to choose between two job applicants. In one case both applicants
were badly fitted for the job, while in another case both were equally competent.
Participants felt freer when choosing between two equally good than two equally
bad options. Therefore the feeling of choice freedom do not arise from a situation in
which a choice can be made between multiple options equally attractive, but rather
is due to positive outcomes emerging from or expected from the choice.
Lau, Hiemisch, and Baumeister (2015) concluded that the feeling of freedom es-
sentially differ from what is theoretically seen as freedom. These results can be seen
as a consequence of a general well-known phenomenon: choice overload. The choice
overload hypothesis states that an increase in the number of options to choose from
may lead to adverse consequences such as a decrease in the motivation to choose or
the satisfaction with the finally chosen option (see Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and
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(.83 and .81). Following the outcome of each game, one item asked how much responsibility the participant held for the
game outcome, on a 0–100% scale.
7.2. Results
7.2.1. Manipulation checks
Confirming that participants understood the outcome and cared about it, positive affect was substantially higher after
winning than after losing, after decision 1: F(1,73) = 115.1, p < .001, g2 = .61, after decision 2: F(1,73) = 44.1, p < .001,
g2 = .38. Participants also reported significantly more surprise after losing than winning, after decision 1: F(1,73) = 10.5,
p = .002, g2 = .12, after decision 2: F(1,73) = 5.6, p = .021, g2 = .07. Thus, participants generally expected to win and were emo-
tionally involved in the simulation (see Table 3).
7.2.2. Subjective freedom and uncertainty
To test our prediction we used 2 ! 2 mixed ANOVAs incorporating a repeated measures factor (feeling in decision 1 ver-
sus feeling in decision 2) and a between factor (outcome of decision 1: win versus defeat). Concerning uncertainty, we found
a significant interaction between the repeated measure and the outcome, F(1,73) = 13.23, p = .001, g2p = .15. Uncertainty
increased in decision 2 for participants experiencing a defeat after decision 1, while it decreased for participants who had
won (see Table 3). For subjective freedom, we found a highly significant interaction between measurement and outcome,
F(1,73) = 24.06, p < .001, g2p = .25. Hence, in decision 2 the participant’s subjective freedom increased after a win, while it
decreased after a defeat (see Fig. 2).
7.2.3. Choice behavior
We analyzed choice-behavior in decision 2 by coding whether the participants retained their formation or swapped play-
ers. In the group of participants experiencing a win after decision 1, 46% made no change, 26% swapped one player and 28%
swapped both players (i.e., rounded values). Of the participants with a defeat only 6% made no change, 30% swapped one
player and 64% swapped both players. We therefore observed a significant difference in the changes the participants made
to their original choice (v2(2) = 16.99, p < .001). In order to see if the changes in choice-behavior were directly associated
Table 3
Means and standard deviations, M (SD), for all measures in Experiment 6.
Measurement
point
Within decision
1 before defeat
Within
decision 1
before win
Within
decision 2
after defeat
Within
decision 2
after win
After
decision 1
defeat
After
decision 1
win
After
decision 2
defeat
After
decision 2
win
Experience of
freedom
4.63 (0.84) 4.30 (1.21) 3.78 (1.27) 4.62 (1.07) / / / /
Uncertainty 3.40 (2.26) 4.09 (2.46) 4.17 (2.29) 3.22 (2.11) / / / /
Positive affect / / / / 3.39 (1.83) 7.43 (1.41) 3.67 (2.57) 7.09 (1.74)
Surprise / / / / 6.17 (1.94) 4.59 (2.25) 6.00 (2.65) 4.56 (2.55)
Responsibility / / / / 56.39 (26.12) 68.05 (23.98) 47.89 (30.9) 63.49 (26.58)
Note: This asymmetric table contains the descriptive statistics of the four relevant measurement points: within decision 1, directly after decision 1, within
decision 2 and directly after decision 2. Please note that we have differentiated the measurement points in reference to the manipulated outcomes (i.e.,
‘within decision 2 after defeat’ = value in decision 2 after decision 1 yielded a negative outcome; ‘after decision 1 win’ = value after recognizing a positive
outcome of decision 1).
Fig. 2. Means and standard error bars for experience of freedom within decision 1 and within decision 2 in Experiment 6.
42 S. Lau et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 30–46
Figure 1.30: Mean experience of freedom for two successive decisions, after a posi-
tive or negative outcome occurred after the first choice. The expectancy of obtaining
a good result without much effort was a key determinant of the feeling of freedom.
(Figure reproduced from Lau, Hiemisch, and Baumeister, 2015).
Todd, 2010 for a review).
In a seminal series of economic experiments, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) revealed
the possible negative consequences due to having too much choice. They offered
participants a choice between an array of either 6 or 30 chocolates. Participants who
chose from the 30 options experienced the choice as more enjoyable but also as more
difficult and frustrating. Most intriguingly, though, participants facing the large as-
sortment reported less satisfaction with the chocolates they finally chose than those
selecting from the small assortment. This challenges the implicit assumption that
the more choice, the better. The reduced feeling of freedom when facing multiple
options may thus be an additional consequence of the choice overload phenomenon.
additionally asked to rate how free their choices felt, subjective reports in this objective context were consistent with the
operational definitions of free and instructed choice, and BOLD contrasts replicated previous studies. This part of our results
is broadly consistent with the classical view of voluntary action, and confirms a relation between internal generation of ac-
tion and the experience of volition (Krieghoff et al., 2011).
We next compared this pattern of BOLD activations with those obtained in a subjective context where participants se-
lected actions according to the combination of a numerical stimulus stem and a completion rule (‘‘look random’’). The com-
pletion rule aimed at providing each participant with a situation in which they could experience an ecologically valid graded
sense of voluntariness.
We assumed that participants might use completion rules to conform to the required ‘‘random appearance’’ of sequences.
The precise completion rule (e.g., repetition avoidance, (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994) could vary across participants according
to their conceptions of randomness.
Although the completion rule was not considered to be critical in the context of this experiment, we also investigated
participants’ number choices, and voluntariness ratings. As an initial approach, we measured the number of exclusion trials
(those in which the number chosen was not included in the presented stem). Participants indeed tended to base their num-
ber choice on an exclusion strategy. Crucially however, the mean voluntariness ratings did not differ between exclusion trials
and inclusion trials, suggesting that participants based their voluntariness ratings on other factors, and that the BOLD con-
trast between choices subjectively rated as free vs. instructed cannot be simply explained by exclusion-related activity.
Also, and as it was mentioned above, stems with large stimulus spaces (i.e., no number repetitions) did not allow partic-
ipants to use an exclusion rule, but were at the same time rated most consistently as free. Therefore, the ability to use an
exclusion rule (i.e., simply choose the number that is not included in the stem) is unlikely to be the core of feeling free.
However, the actual rules used for ‘‘random’’ generation are not relevant for our analysis, and the requirement to generate
random numbers served merely to provide a plausible response space within which some responses might seem more free
than others. We considered this subjective experience, independently of the precise completion rule adopted, and of the par-
ticular response given. We contrasted trials associated with higher subjective ratings to those with lower subjective ratings
of voluntariness.
The neural correlates of the subjective feeling of freedom were quite different from the neural correlates of free choice as
classically operationalized. Our ROI analysis revealed that in five of the ROIs identified (ACC, bilateral IPL, left DLPFC and left
PMC), BOLD activity in the objective context was higher for free trials as compared with instructed trials. In stark opposition,
in the subjective context BOLD activity showed a trend to be lower for free trials in these five ROIs. Only one area, the pre-
cuneus, showed the same pattern of BOLD activity in the objective and subjective contexts. Univariate increases in precuneus
BOLD activity are not typically associated with voluntary action. Instead, the precuneus has been linked to self-referential
Fig. 5. Subjective free > subjective instructed in whole brain (blue) and objective free > objective forced (green). Panels (A–C) show coronal, sagittal and
axial planes respectively. Blue: Postcentral region showing increased BOLD signal for the contrast free > instructed in the median split data from the
subjective context. BOLD signal peaked at MNI coordinates (x = 4 y = !21 z = 49) and (x = 0 y = !28 z = 53). Results from this contrast in the subjective
context are non-overlapping with those from the same contrast in the classical context (green). BOLD activations were corrected for multiple comparisons
by means of a Monte Carlo simulation (p < .001, minimum cluster size: 25 voxels).
1280 E. Filevich et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1271–1284
Figure 1.31: The non-overlapping neural correlates of subjective and objective free-
dom of choice. In blue: the subjective free > ubjective instructed contrast; in green:
the objective free > objective instructed contrast, both in whole brain. (Figure repro-
uced from Filevich et al., 2013).
Another study have looked at the difference between being free and feeling
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free from a neuroimaging perspective. A typical method for studying free choice
was used: contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives (see
Krieghoff et al., 2011 for a review). Filevich et al. (2013) introduced a novel task in
which participants had to complete a number sequence with the instruction to make
the whole sequence ’look random’. This way depending on the number sequence
presented and the personal rule participants followed to make a sequence look ran-
dom, the experimenters created situations in which the choice of number would
feel more free or feel more constrained. BOLD responses for conditions subjectively
experienced as free identified a postcentral area, distinct from the areas typically
considered to be involved in free action. Their results suggest that the experience of
free choice may not derive from brain circuits involved in action selection, but from
quite different brain circuits.
Although conscious reports were often used to better characterize control and
agency, they could be a purely reconstructive process, dissociated from the cognitive
processes underlying behavior.
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Research question
Sense of agency or subjective control depends on the ability to learn and make use of
action-outcome contingencies and one of the more classical algorithm to model this
learning originates in the field of reinforcement learning. Our aim in this PhD thesis
was to study the relationship between control, agency and reinforcement learning
processes. As this question is very general, we will focus on three specific problems
arising at the interaction of these cognitive processes.
In a first series of experiments, we will study how participants can compute and
monitor their control over given outcomes in a changing environment. Our aim
was to better understand the computational processes responsible for control per-
ception, and their associated biases. We have seen in the introduction how human
participants can be subjected to illusions of control. We thus hypothesized that a
model whose updates were built on a by-default control assumption would be more
adapted to describe participants’ behavior.
In a second series of experiments conducted in collaboration with University
College London, we used intentional binding as an implicit proxy to measure partic-
ipants’ feeling of agency in a reversal-learning task. Agency and adaptive response
processes have so far been studied almost exclusively separately. Interestingly the
emergence of an error in a learning process was shown to increase one’s vigilance
and cognitive control. We investigated how the implicit feeling of agency is modu-
lated by the error-triggered engagement of cognitive control.
Finally, we investigated whether agency can be the source of some standard se-
quential decision-making biases, like the choice confirmation bias. In a last set of
experiments, the participant could be either an agent or an observer, in a simple
instrumental conditioning task. In the agent condition, the subject freely chose be-
tween two symbols, whereas in the observer condition, the computer preselected
one symbol and the subject was forced to match this choice. Previous experiments
have shown that in free-choice, individuals display a choice-confirmation bias. We
predicted that a lack of agency at the moment of choice would make the bias disap-
pear.
Subjective reports of control often appeared to be a reconstructive narrative, com-
pletely detached from the reality of the task. This is why we will use the tool of
cognitive modeling, rather than verbal reports, in this PhD thesis, to uncover the
cognitive processes underlying participants’ behavior.
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Chapter 3
General method
Cognitive modeling is the central, but not necessarily well known, tool used in this
PhD thesis. We will first describe here this approach. Theoretical analysis and com-
putational modeling are important ways of characterizing what nervous systems do,
determining how they function, and understanding why they operate in particular
ways. Cognitive modeling is based on the belief that methods of mathematics, and
computer science can provide important insight into cognitive science and psychol-
ogy (Dayan and Abbott, 2001).
3.1 Cognitive modeling
These past decades, much efforts have been devoted to a model-based approach in
neuroscience and psychology, and cognitive modeling has grown considerably in
cognitive sciences. The importance of computational models in cognitive sciences
and neurosciences is not surprising; because the core function of the brain is to pro-
cess information in order to guide adaptive behavior, it is particularly useful to for-
mulate cognitive theories in computational terms.
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model outperformed the ‘noisy selection’ model, they simulated the predictions of the two
models in terms of choice variability as a function of sequence length. Crucially, the simulations
of the two models diverged qualitatively on this behavioral dimension (Figure 2B): the ‘noisy
selection’ model predicted a constant choice variability, whereas the ‘noisy inference’ model
predicted a linear increase of choice variability as a function of sequence length. The human
data showed the same linear increase of choice variability as the ‘noisy inference’ model, and
differed statistically from the simulations of the ‘noisy selection’ model.
In the second study, the authors studied whether humans learn subjective values in an absolute
or a context-dependent scale during reinforcement learning (i.e., learning by trial-and-error) [17]
(Figure 2C). To do so they devised two experimental conditions corresponding to different
learning contexts: one in which choice options were associated with monetary gains, and the
other with monetary losses. They compared a standard reinforcement learning model, in which
subjective values are learned on an absolute scale, to a new model in which values are learned
in a context-dependent manner. In this example, note that the ‘contextual’ model included an
additional ‘context value’ parameter compared to the ‘absolute’model. As in the first study, the
authors first assessed the predictive performance of the two models, which provided substan-
tial evidence in favor of the ‘contextual’ model. Crucially, the simulations of the two models
diverged significantly in terms of subjective preference ratings measured after the learning task
(Figure 2D): while the ‘absolute’ model predicted subjective values to grow monotonically with
objective values, the ‘contextual’ model predicted a context-dependent value distortion. The
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Figure 1. The Exponential Increase of Computational Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience and Current Practice in a Representative Sample. (A)
The curves on the left show the relative frequency of PubMed entries for ‘cognitive’ (in red) and ‘cognitive and computational' (in blue) as a function of the year. Their
frequencies are calculated relative to the number of entries of 2014, which are therefore normalized to 1 for both curves. The bars on the left represent the estimated
annual growth of the best-fitting exponential curve. (B) Survey of recent literature in the authors’ database. ‘Computational modeling’ denotes studies reporting a
computational model-based analysis. ‘Relative model comparison’ denotes studies reporting a model selection step that implies relative model comparison criteria,
such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or a similar method. ‘Model simulations’ are studies reporting, at least, the model
simulation of the ‘winning’model according to relative model comparison. ‘Rival simulation’ includes studies reporting the simulation of the ‘winning’ and rival model(s).
Note that the presence of rival model simulation represents no guarantee that any statistical analysis is subsequently performed to quantitatively assess the ‘similarity’ of
themodel simulations to the actual data. Screened studies (n ! 300) were published since 2009 inNature,Science,Nat. Neurosci.,Neuron, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA,
PLOS Biol., and J. Neurosci.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 3
Figure 3.1: The curves n the left show the relative frequency of PubMed entries for
’cognitive’ (in red) nd ’cogni ive and computational’ (in blue) as function of the
year. Their frequencies are calculated relative to the umber of entries of 2014, which
are therefore normalized to 1 for both curves. The bars on the left represent the
estimated annual growth of the best-fitting exponential curve. (Figure reproduced
from Palminteri, Wyart, and Koechlin, 2017.)
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3.1.1 Definition
Donoho et al. (2009) have said that originally, there were two scientific methodolog-
ical branches: deductive (for example, mathematics) and empirical (for example, sta-
tistical data analysis of controlled experiments), but that now, many scientists ac-
cept computation (for example, large-scale simulation) as the third branch. Weisberg
(2007) has rather splited empirical sciences into two main approaches: model-free
approaches directly investigate the natural phenomenon of interest, whereas model-
based approaches investigate abstract (mathematical) representations of the natural
system that are responsible for the empirical phenomenon of interest.
For example, an active area of cognitive modeling is concerned with the question
of how we learn to categorize perceptual objects (Medin and Schaffer, 1978). One
categorization model is called the prototype model. It postulates that the learner
estimates the central tendency from all the examples experienced from within each
category during training. When a new target stimulus is presented, the similarity
of this target to each category prototype is evaluated, and the category with the
most similar prototype is chosen. But according to the exemplar model, the learner
memorizes all the examples that are experienced, and the similarity of a new target
stimulus is computed to each stored example for each category. These two models
differ in terms of the assumptions they make, but they both try to account for a
common set of empirical laws to explain categorization.
Cognitive science is concerned with understanding the processes that the brain,
especially the human brain, uses to accomplish complex tasks, including perceiving,
learning, remembering, thinking, predicting, inference, problem solving, decision
making, planning, and moving around the environment. The goal of a cognitive
model is to scientifically explain one or more of these basic cognitive processes, or
explain how these processes interact (Busemeyer and Diederich, 2010).
Figure 3.2: Cognitive models can be used in a variety of cognitive science fields,
from conditioning to representing social relationships or cognitive maps, or to link
together the different characters in a story. (Adapted from Timothy Berhens slides at
the Cosyne 2018 symposium.)
But what makes these models cognitive models as opposed to some other kind
of models, such as conceptual models, statistical models, or neural models? One
hallmark of cognitive models is that they are described in formal mathematical or
computer languages. Another hallmark is that they are derived from basic principles
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of cognition.
3.1.2 Procedure
Busemeyer and Diederich (2010) have described cognitive modeling as a five-stage
process:
• A conceptual cognitive theory is reformulated into a mathematical or com-
puter language description.
• As the theory is often insufficient to completely specify a full model, additional
ad hoc assumptions need to be made.
• Models almost always contain initially unknown parameters, that need to be
estimated from some of the observed data.
• The models are compared with respect to their ability to explain the empirical
results.
• Finally one usually needs to start all over again, as model development and
testing is actually a never-ending process.
Models always need to be modified or extended to account for newly discovered
experimental findings, or in some cases old models need to be discarded for the
field to start over. Thus, the modeling process produces an evolution of models that
improve and become more powerful over time as the science in a field progresses.
It should be noted that complicated steps in cognitive modeling consist in the
addition of ad hoc assumptions and free parameters needed to create a model. Of
course theorists always try to minimize their number, to keep the model as simple as
possible. One universally recognized heuristic for theory selection is Occam’s law
of parsimony: “plurality is never to be posited without necessity”. This principle
dictates that among equally good explanations of data, the less complex explanation
should be held as true (Palminteri, Wyart, and Koechlin, 2017).
3.1.3 Perspectives
An advantage of cognitive models over conceptual frameworks is that, by using
mathematical or computer languages, cognitive models should guarantee to pro-
duce logically valid predictions (provided no calculation or code errors were made).
This is not true of conclusions based on intuitively based verbal reasoning that can
lead to incorrect conclusions (Busemeyer and Diederich, 2010).
A second important reason for using mathematical or computer models is that
they are capable of making precise quantitative predictions. Most researchers would
reject a model whose predictions are an order of magnitude off the mark, even
though the model makes the correct qualitative or ordinal prediction. One could ar-
gue that generic statistical models or empirical curve-fitting models also use formal
language and are also capable of generating quantitative predictions. The important
difference is that a cognitive model is generalizable: it can be used to derive new
predictions for new relationships that go far beyond the original data.
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It should be kept in mind that it is meaningless to ask if a model can fit the data or
not (Roberts and Pashler, 2000). In fact, all models are deliberately constructed to be
simple representations that only capture the essentials of the cognitive systems. The
statistician George Box famously said: “All models are wrong but some are useful.”
(Box, 1979). Indeed a sufficient amount of data will always prove that a model is not
true, and no model is able to explain the whole variability of any data set. Therefore
cognitive modeling must rely on a comparison between various models.
Thus models are selected on their ability to predict the observed data as a func-
tion of their complexity. But the ability of a candidate model to generate a behavioral
effect of interest is rarely assessed, although it can be an absolute falsification crite-
rion. Palminteri, Wyart, and Koechlin (2017) have argued that the simulation of
candidate models is necessary to falsify models and therefore support the specific
claims about cognitive function made by the vast majority of model-based studies.
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human data showed the same context-dependent value distortion as the ‘contextual’ model,
and differed statistically from the simulations of the ‘absolute’ model.
These two studies illustrate the different levels of interpretation that can be reached from relative
model comparison alone and frommodel falsification through model simulations. In contrast to
relative criteria, the comparison of model simulations to the observed data can lead to the
outright rejection of a candidate model independently of the capacity of any other candidate
model to account for a behavioral effect of interest (i.e., an absolute rejection criterion). In both
studies the authors presented two complementary findings: (i) a standard model is falsified by
its inability to reproduce a behavioral effect of interest, and (ii) a new model is [238_TD$DIFF]proposed based
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Figure 2. Concrete Examples of Model Falsification. (A) Probabilistic inference task: each trial consisted of a sequence of 2–16 stimuli (stim.) drawn from a
generative probability distribution centered on one among two cardinal orientations. (B) Observed (grey dots) andmodel simulated (colored lines) choice variability in the
probabilistic inference task as a function of the sequence length. (C) Reinforcement learning task: each trial consisted of two stimuli associatedwith different probabilities
of winning and losing money. (D) Observed (grey dots) and model simulated (colored bars) post-learning preference as a function of the stimulus value.
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Figure 3.3: Concrete examples of model falsification. Top panels: observed (grey
dots) and mo el simulated (colored lines) choice variability in a probabilistic infer-
ence task as a function of the sequence length. Bottom panels: observed (grey dots)
and model simulated (colored bars) post-learning preference as a function of the
s imulus value. (Figure reproduced from Palminteri, Wyart, and Koechlin, 2017.)
Now that we h ve introdu ed the general framework we will be using in this
PhD thesis, we will present one of the most known and used computational frame-
work: the Bayesian or probabilistic framework. This introduction will be short, as
we have only used Bayesian models in Study I for comparison purposes.
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3.2 Bayesian models
3.2.1 Bayesian probabilities
Bayes theorem is a method of statistical inference that provides a normative way to
update a prior belief with incoming evidence. It was named after Reverend Thomas
Bayes (1702-1761) who was the first to provide an equation that allows new evidence
to update beliefs (Bayes and Price, 1763), then further developed by Pierre-Simon
Laplace who published the modern formulation in 1820 (Laplace, 1820).
A probability can give us a measure of how much one believes in something. For
example, when one is absolutely sure of something (for example that the sun rises
every day), the probability is 1. The use of probability to represent uncertainty is not
an ad hoc choice: Cox (1946) showed that if numerical values are used to represent
degrees of belief, then a simple set of axioms encoding common sense properties of
such beliefs leads uniquely to a set of rules equivalent to the sum and product rules
of probability.
Given some phenomenon A and an observation X relative to A, Bayes theorem
indicates precisely how much we should update our belief of A given the new ob-
servation X:
p(A|X) = p(X|A)p(A)
p(X)
(3.1)
where p(A) is the a priori belief on A, before observing X, p(X|A) is the likelihood
of observing X if A is true, and p(A|X) is the a posteriori belief on A taking into
account the new observation.
The ideal Bayesian observer is an agent that will use new observations in a nor-
mative way. For example, consider the problem of breath cancer. Imagine that 1%
of women who participate in routine screening have breast cancer, and that 80% of
women with breast cancer will get positive mammographies, while 9.6% of women
without breast cancer will also get positive mammographies. Then, according to
Bayes rule, a woman who had a positive mammography in a routine screening ac-
tually has a probability of only 7.8% of having cancer (Yudkowsky, 2003).
Probabilistic approaches have been increasingly ubiquitous, and widely used,
in cognition. Helmholtz (1856) was among the first to propose that the perceptual
system executes an “unconscious inference” from sensory stimulations to hypothe-
size about the environment, but strong experimental evidence in support of this no-
tion has emerged only recently. From knowledge-bases, to perception, to language
and motor control, there has been widespread application of sophisticated prob-
abilistic methods in computational modeling (Chater and Oaksford, 2008). These
experiments have shown that human behavior is highly consistent with probabilis-
tic reasoning in the sensory (Knill and Richards, 1996) and the motor (Körding and
Wolpert, 2004) domain.
For example to quantitatively investigate cue combination, Ernst and Banks (2002)
studied how human subjects estimated the width of an object by looking at it and
touching it. One could imagine people used the average of the visual and tactile
estimates. But Bayes rule would predict that each cue should contribute to the final
estimate in proportion to its reliability (or inverse variance). This model behaved
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very similarly to humans in the task: visual dominance occurred when the variance
associated with visual estimation is lower than that associated with tactile estima-
tion.
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Figure 3.4: Bayesian integration of tactile and visual informations. (Figure repro-
duced from Ernst and Banks, 2002.)
3.2.2 Bayesian inference
A fundamental notion in Bayesian modeling is the distinction between observed and
latent variables. In a Bayesian model, the latent variable distributions are updated
based on the values of the observed variables. For example, let us consider a single
Gaussian random variable x, whose variance σ2 is known, and we have to infer the
mean µ given a set of N observations. The posterior distribution is given by:
p(µ|x1, ..., xN) ∝ p(x1, ..., xN |µ)p(µ) (3.2)
If we chose the prior p(µ) to be Gaussian, it will b conjugate, as the posterior dis-
tribution will also be Gaussian. Conjugate priors are often used, as they greatly
simplify Bayesian analysis (Gelman et al., 2013).
The mean of the distribution over µ is a parameter controlling a prior, and so it
can be viewed as a hyperparameter. Because the value of this hyperparameter may
itself be unknown, we can again treat it from a Bayesian perspective by introducing
a prior α over the hyperparameter, sometimes called a hyperprior, which is again
given by a Gaussian distribution. This construction can be extended in principle to
any level, and is an illustration of a hierarchical Bayesian model (Bishop, 2006).
xn𝜇
N
𝛼
𝛽 𝜎2
Figure 3.5: The graphical model of a Bayesian hierarchical model. Random vari-
ables are represented by empty nodes, and deterministic parameters by smaller solid
nodes. The arrows express probabilistic relationship between the nodes. The box la-
belled N is a plate, representing N nodes of which only a single example xn is shown
explicitly.
Bayesian models have been used in human decision-making, to compute a peo-
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ple’s beliefs about the hidden state of the world from observed actions and rewards.
In fact, the TD(0) learning rule we presented in the introduction can be seen as a
simplified case of the Kalman filter, a Bayesian model that also uses a Temporal Dif-
ference learning rule but has additional machinery that determines the learning rate
parameter α on a trial-by-trial basis (Behrens et al., 2007).
One key issue in psychology is how to change one’s beliefs about the world, and
more specifically the amount of influence that unexpected outcomes should have on
existing beliefs. The strength of a Bayesian model is that it can distinguish outcomes
that are unexpected because of a fundamental change in the environment, from out-
comes that are unexpected because of persistent environmental stochasticity. Nassar
et al. (2010) have shown that human participants can recognize change points from
unexpectedly large prediction errors. This suggests that the brain uses straightfor-
ward updating rules that take into account both recent outcomes and prior expecta-
tions about higher-order environmental structure.
As we said, Bayesian models allow for a hierarchy in the inferences performed,
and this has been used to model cognitive processes. To ensure optimal decision-
making, the hidden states and their changes should be probabilistically inferred, but
also the rate at which the hidden states will change. Using a hierarchical Bayesian
model, Behrens et al. (2007) have showed that human subjects not only adapt their
responses when changes occur, but also assess volatility in an optimal manner.
subjects often picked the less likely color if it was associated with a
higher reward.
First, subjects underwent 120 trials where the probability of a
blue outcome was 75%: a stable environment. In the second phase
(170 trials), reward probabilities switched between 80% blue and 80%
green every 30 or 40 trials: a volatile environment. Throughout the
experiment, rewards for correct blue responses (fb) were selected
randomly between 0 and 100, and rewards for correct green responses
were set to (100 – fb).
Bayesian learner
Optimal behavior requires subjects to estimate
the probability of reward on each color and to
compute the expected value as reward prob-
ability ! reward size. The subject was
informed about reward size at the start of
each trial and told that there was no pattern to
its trial-by-trial changes so that it is neither
necessary nor possible to estimate reward size.
The optimal agent is the one that makes the
most efficient use of historical information to
track reward probabilities (a graphical
description of the probability-tracking pro-
blem can be seen in Fig. 1b; see Supplemen-
tary Information online for an algebraic
description). The reward probability, r, varies
between trials, controlled by the volatility, v;
changes in this parameter reflect changes from
stable to volatile environments. Changes in
volatility itself are controlled by the parameter
k. The estimate of k represents the distrust in
the constancy of the volatility. Data, y, is
observed as a succession of trial outcomes.
This Bayesian learner updates its estimates of
parameters r, v and k when it gets a new piece
of information at the outcome of each trial.
Crucially, the update equation relies only on
parameter estimates from the preceding trial,
and the latest trial outcome to determine
decision and learning on the next trial (Sup-
plementary Information). The agent does
not have to retain memories of recent out-
comes. Although the update equations can
only be formally expressed in probabilistic
terms, it is useful to describe their behavior
in terms of effective learning rates. Coarsely,
the learning rate is dictated by the uncertainty
or variance in the estimate of reward rate.
This, in turn, reflects how unpredictable recent outcomes have been.
A history of surprising outcomes will increase estimated volatility and
uncertainty, and therefore learning rate. Figure 2a–c shows the Bayesian
learner’s estimates of r, v and k at three time points while encountering
the reward schedule in Figure 2d. When the volatility is low, the
estimated reward rate changes little with each observation.
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Figure 2 Behavior of Bayesian learner and human subjects. (a) Marginal posterior distributions on
tracking variables at three stages in the experiment. Left, the distribution on reward probability and
volatility. Right, the distribution on volatility and control parameter, k. After 120 trials, the Bayesian
learner was confident that the reward probability was 0.75, the system was stable, and that this stability
was unlikely to change. (b) After a further 15 trials in which the reward probability changed to 0.2, the
Bayesian learner was uncertain about the state of the environment. Left, high probability in two regions,
either reflecting that the environment was unchanged, or that the environment was changing and that the
new reward rate was low. (c) After a further 25 trials of low reward rate, the learner had recovered
confidence, but still believed the stability might change (right), ensuring that it would react faster to any
future change in reward rate. (d) Experiment I, the reward schedule and the Bayesian parameter
estimates for the stable-first experiment are shown. Left, the dashed line shows true reward probabilities
and the solid line shows the Bayesian-estimated reward rate. Right, estimate of volatility through the
course of the same experiment. Note that when volatility is low, the estimated reward rate in (left)
changes little with each trial. (e) Human behavior. Average learning rates during the stable and volatile
phases of each experiment (stable-first and volatile-first, respectively). Red and black bars show the
mean and s.e.m. values for the human subjects. Dots show the behavior of the Bayesian learner.
Figure 1 Probability-tracking task. (a) Experimental procedure. Subjects
carried out a one-armed bandit task, choosing between blue and green on the
basis of both the past success and the reward associated with each color
(yellow numbers). Subjects attempted to move the red bar toward the silver
bar for d10 or toward the gold bar for d20. The bar moves a distance
proportional to the chosen reward only if the chosen color was correct. In this
instance, the subject chose green, but the correct choice was blue so the red
bar remained stationary. (b) Graphical description of the probability-tracking
problem. Arrows indicate the direction of influence. At each trial i, data yi is
observed (blue or green is correct), which is governed by probability ri. This
probability can change between trials, governed by the volatility, vi, which can
itself change (as the environment moves between volatile and stable periods)
and is governed by control parameter k. The goal of the Bayesian learner is to
track these parameters through the course of the experiment, given only the
observed data, y.
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subjects often picked the less likely color if it was associated with a
higher reward.
First, subjects underwent 120 trials where the probability of a
blue outcome was 75%: a stable environment. In the second phase
(170 trials), reward probabilities switched between 80% blue and 80%
green every 30 or 40 trials: a volatile environment. Throughout the
experiment, rewards for correct blue responses (fb) were selected
randomly between 0 and 100, and rewards for correct green responses
were set to (100 – fb).
Bayesian learner
Optimal behavior requires subjects to estimate
the probability of reward on each color and to
compute the expected value as reward prob-
ability ! reward size. The subject was
informed about reward size at the start of
each trial and told that there was no pattern to
its trial-by-trial changes so that it is neither
necessary nor possible to estimate reward size.
The optimal agent is the one that makes the
most efficient use of historical information to
track reward probabilities (a graphical
description of the probability-tracking pro-
blem can be seen in Fig. 1b; see Supplemen-
tary Information online for an algebraic
description). The reward probability, r, varies
between trials, controlled by the volatility, v;
changes in this parameter reflect changes from
stable to volatile environments. Changes in
volatility itself are controlled by the parameter
k. The estimate of k represents the distrust in
the constancy of the volatility. Data, y, is
observed as a succession of trial outcomes.
This Bayesian learner updates its estimates of
parameters r, v and k when it gets a new piece
of information at the outcome of each trial.
Crucially, the update equation relies only on
parameter estimates from the preceding trial,
and the latest trial outcome to determine
decision and learning on the next trial (Sup-
plementary Information). The agent does
not have to retain memories of recent out-
comes. Although the update equations can
only be formally expressed in probabilistic
terms, it is useful to describe their behavior
in terms of effective learning rates. Coarsely,
the learning rate is dictated by the uncertainty
or variance in the estimate of reward rate.
This, in turn, reflects how unpredi tabl recent outcomes have be n.
A history of surprising outcomes will increase estimated volatility and
uncertainty, and therefore learning rate. Figure 2a–c shows the Bayesian
learner’s estimates of r, v and k at three time points while encountering
the reward schedule in Figure 2d. When the volatility is low, the
estimat d reward rate changes little with each observation.
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Figure 2 Behavior of Bayesian learner and human subjects. (a) Marginal posterior distributions on
tracking variables at three stages in the experiment. Left, the distribution on reward probability and
volatility. Right, the distribution on volatility and control parameter, k. After 120 trials, the Bayesian
learner was confident that the reward probability was 0.75, the system was stable, and that this stability
was unlikely to change. (b) After a further 15 trials in which the reward probability changed to 0.2, the
Bayesi n learner was uncertain about the state of the environment. Left, high probability in two regions,
either reflecting that the environment was unchanged, or that the environment was changing and that the
new reward rate was low. (c) After a further 25 trials of low reward rate, the learner had recovered
confidence, but still believed the stability might change (right), ensuring that it would react faster to any
future change in reward rate. (d) Experiment I, the reward schedule and the Bayesian parameter
estimates for the stable-first experiment are shown. Left, the dashed line shows true reward probabilities
and the solid line shows the Bayesian-estimated reward rate. Right, estimate of volatility through the
course of the same experiment. Note that when volatility is low, the estimated reward rate in (left)
changes little with each trial. (e) Human behavior. Average learning rates during the stable and volatile
phases of each experiment (stable-first and volatile-first, respectively). Red and black bars show the
mean and s.e.m. values for the human subjects. Dots show the behavior of the Bayesian learner.
Figure 1 Probability-tracking task. (a) Experimental procedure. Subjects
carried out a one-armed bandit task, choosing between blue and green on the
basis of both the past success and the reward associated with each color
(yellow numbers). Subjects attempted to mov the red bar toward e silve
bar for d10 or toward the gold bar for d20. The bar moves a distance
proportional to the chosen reward only if the chosen color was correct. In this
instance, the subject chos green, but the correc choice wa blue so t e red
bar remained stationary. (b) Graphical description of the probability-tracking
problem. Arrows indicate the direction of influence. At each trial i, data yi is
observed (blue or green is correct), which is governed by probability ri. This
probability can change between trials, governed by the volatility, vi, which can
itself change (as the environment moves between volatile and stable periods)
and is governed by control parameter k. The goal of the Bayesian learner is to
track these parameters through the course of the experi ent, given only the
observed data, y.
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Figure 3.6: Left panel: graphical description of the probability-tracking problem. At
each trial i, data yi is observed, which is governed by probability ri. This probability
can change between trials, governed by the volatility, vi, which can itself change
and is governed by control parameter k. The goal of the Bayesian learner is to track
these parameters through the course of the experiment, given only the observed
data. Right panel: the dashed lines show the implemented reward probabilities and
volatilities, and the solid lines their Bayesian estimates. (Figure reproduced from
Behrens et al., 2007.)
More generally, it is known that cognitive processes can be hierarchically orga-
nized in the brain. For xample, cognitive control was shown to involve at least
three nested levels of processing, implemented in distinct frontal regions (Koechlin,
Ody, and K uneiher, 2003). Another study investigating the architecture of reason-
ing processes in the prefrontal cortex, have shown that different regions are involved
in making probabilistic inferences about the ongoing and the alternative behavioral
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strategies (Donoso, Collins, and Koechlin, 2014).
3.2.3 Perspectives
Most studies in neuroscience have focused on problems with a small number of
variables, all following simple distributions, for which an optimal solution can be
easily derived. Examples include integration of two conditionally independent cues,
visual search with simple, independent stimuli, and temporal integration of sensory
evidence for binary decision-making in a stationary environment. For these tasks,
humans and animals often exhibit near-optimal behavior, in the sense that they take
into account the uncertainty associated with all signals and combine these signals
according to their reliability (Pouget et al., 2013).
Real-life problems, however, are almost always far too complicated to allow for
optimal behavior. Optimal behavior requires both full knowledge of the generative
model and the ability to perform exact inference, neither of which are possible for
most problems of interest.
Given the difficulty of real-world problems, one might imagine that, when con-
fronted with them, the brain no longer relies on a probabilistic approach, but uses
instead a set of heuristics (Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research Group, 1999). There
are a variety of approximate approaches to hard inference problems. However,
whether organisms continue to be probabilistic on hard problems or, alternatively,
whether organisms abandon the probabilistic approach altogether when the prob-
lems become especially difficult can only be answered experimentally.
The recent advances of cognitive modeling allows us to now predict human
learning and decision-making in fine-grained details. Our goal in this PhD thesis
is to gain insight on the interaction of control, agency and reinforcement learning,
by using model comparison and parameter optimization.
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Chapter 4
Study I
4.1 Introduction
We live in a constantly changing world. To adopt a flexible behavior, adapted to new
situations, we need to monitor actions bearing consequences in the outside world,
and select the most appropriate one. This requires being able to attribute a causal
relationship between our actions and external events.
This first series of 3 experiments were built on a modified reversal-learning pro-
cedure, in which there was some uncertainty about the identity of the causal agent.
To maximize their performance subjects had to continuously monitor their causal
influence over the task environment, by discriminating changes that were caused by
their own actions from changes that were not.
Our aim was to better understand the computational processes responsible for
control perception, and their associated biases.
4.2 Our draft in preparation for Psychological Review
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1Institut Jean Nicod, ENS-EHESS-CNRS, Département d’Etudes Cognitives, PSL University, Paris, France
2Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives Computationnelles, INSERM-ENS, Département d’Etudes Cognitives, PSL University, Paris,
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M ost people envision themselves as oper-ant agents, endowed with the capacity tobring about changes in the outside world.
This ability to monitor one’s own causal power has
long been suggested to rest upon a specific model
of causal inference, i.e., a model of how our actions
causally relate to their consequences. What this
model is, and how it may explain departures from
optimal inference, e.g., illusory control and self-
attribution biases, is still conjecture. To address
this question, we designed a series of novel experi-
ments requiring participants to continuously mon-
itor their causal influence over the task environ-
ment, through discriminating changes that were
caused by their own actions from changes that
were not. Comparing different models of choice,
we found that participants’ behaviour was best ex-
plained by a model deriving the consequences of
the forgone action from the current action taken,
and assuming relative divergence between both.
Importantly, this model agrees with the intuitive
way of construing causal power as “difference-
making”: causally efficacious actions are actions
that make a difference to the world. We suggest
that this model outperformed all competitors be-
cause it closely mirrors people’s belief in their
causal power, a belief that is well suited to learn-
ing action-outcome associations in controllable en-
vironments. We speculate that this belief may be
part of the reason why reflecting upon one’s own
causal power fundamentally differs from reason-
ing about external causes.
Keywords
instrumental control; reinforcement learning; Bayesian
inference; counterfactual emulation; reference-point
dependence
Introduction
Inferring causality, i.e., relating changes in one vari-
able to the causal power of another, is a general, ro-
bust, and seemingly built-in, ability of the mammalian
brain (Premack, 2007). The ability to draw causal
inferences is critical for a wide range of behaviours
and functions, from learning and planning to flexibly
adapting actions and attitudes to external contingen-
cies (Gopnik, Schulz, and Schulz, 2007). Importantly,
such ability may come in two different types, with dis-
tinct behavioural advantages, depending on the locus
of the cause itself. Thus, if the ability to draw relations
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between external variables is paramount for adaptation
and survival, it is even more so when it comes to reckon
oneself (e.g., one’s own choice or action) as the cause
of a change in the world.
The ability to envision oneself as an operant agent,
endowed with the capacity to bring about changes
in the external environment, is classically referred to
as “sense of agency” (Haggard and Chambon, 2012).
Sense of agency builds on the biologically motivated
belief that our actions are causal in nature: they have
the power to make things happen, and hence can be
implemented as efficient means for pursuing desirable
outcomes. A wealth of literature in social and cognitive
psychology points toward this representation of one’s
own causal power as something that is part of our nat-
ural endowment (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner, 2010),
develops early (Helwig, 2006) and is somewhat irre-
pressible (Ryan and Deci, 2006). These observations
are corroborated by numerous studies showing that
people readily experience control over objectively un-
controllable events (Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2011)
or are subjected to illusion of control even when no true
control exists (Langer, 1975), and even though assum-
ing control does not afford any behavioural advantage
or is in fact detrimental to performance (Chambon and
Haggard, 2012). The belief in one’s own causal power
also comes with some advantages: higher levels of in-
strumental control are associated with greater general
health (Bobak et al., 2000), fewer depressive symp-
toms (Rubenstein, Alloy, and Abramson, 2016), and
higher self-esteem (Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995).
Conversely, lowered sense of causation makes individ-
uals more vulnerable to external, and potentially dam-
aging, influence (Burger, 2016), and abnormal sense
of agency, such as a loss of control over one’s actions
and thoughts, is long recognized as a key symptom of
mental disorders (Schneider, 1959).
Questions have been raised about the function of
this belief in one’s causal power. The simple fact of
exercising control (i.e., of making things happen in-
tentionally) has been suggested to be inherently re-
warding (Karsh and Eitam, 2015; see also Zimbardo
and Miller, 1958), as reflected by activity in a corti-
costriatal brain network that overlaps with the neural
circuitry involved in reward and motivation processing
(e.g., Tricomi, Delgado, and Fiez, 2004; O’Doherty et
al., 2004; Bjork and Hommer, 2007). Incidentally, the
belief in one’s causal power goes with an inherent need,
so-called “need for control”, whereby opportunities to
exercise control are preferred over situations with no
control, even when exercising control affords no im-
provement in outcome reward (e.g., Leotti, Iyengar,
and Ochsner, 2010; Sharot, De Martino, and Dolan,
2009; Sharot, Shiner, and Dolan, 2010; Suzuki, 1999;
Cockburn, Collins, and Frank, 2014; Bown, Read, and
Summers, 2003). Exercising control could serve as
one of the primary means by which people foster be-
lief in their causal power. Thus, individuals with little
experience acting as an effective agent show impaired
ability to detect action-outcome contingencies, and
hence little belief in their ability to produce desired
outcomes (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner, 2010; Maier
and Seligman, 2016; Mineka and Hendersen, 1985)1.
A belief in one’s causal power echoes the well-
documented need in humans and animals alike to en-
gage in activities simply to experience “competence”,
that is, a sense of influencing their environment (White,
1959; see also Karsh and Eitam, 2015). Children spon-
taneously engage in playful exploratory behaviours
where the only drive is to effect “changes” in the envi-
ronment (e.g., putting a finger in a candle, knocking
something off a table). Likewise, rats would readily
cross an electrified grid (Nissen, 1930) and monkeys
perform costly discrimination problems (Butler, 1953)
simply for the privilege of exploring and/or interact-
ing with new territory2. A persistent inclination to
interact with the environment has been suggested to
foster action over inaction, which may prove valuable
in situations where acting does not satisfy any short-
term need. A bias toward action over inaction would
thus promote learning of new contingencies by favour-
ing the acquisition of incidental associations between
actions and action-contingent events. Once learned,
these new associations could be then intentionally used
for pursuing desirable outcomes, i.e. for achieving goal-
directed behaviours (Elsner and Hommel, 2001; see
also Berlyne, 1950; Berlyne, 1966)3.
In addition to acquiring new action-outcome con-
tingencies, a belief in one’s own causal efficiency may
prompt the agent to probe the latent structure of the en-
vironment for causal variables. Making decisions based
on knowledge of causal variables, rather than based on
local changes in the environment only, allows for better
anticipating changes in external contingencies and, ul-
timately, for driving changes in the environment rather
than being merely driven by environmental changes
1The need to be and feel in control is so strong that individuals
do whatever they can to re-establish control when it disappears or is
taken away (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981). Reestablish-
ment of lost agency can take different forms, from illusory pattern
perception to erroneous identification of causal relationship between
random or unrelated stimuli. Thus, people experiencing a loss of
control are more likely to see images in noise, to form illusory corre-
lations, to perceive conspiracies or to develop superstitions (Whitson
and Galinsky, 2008). Such erroneous causal attributions would help
restore feelings of control in helplessness individuals by returning the
world to a predictable state where “being in control” is the default
(Pittman and Pittman, 1980).
2An irrepressible tendency for playful and exploratory behaviours
parallels Hendrick’s “instinct to master”, whose aim is merely “plea-
sure in exercising a function successfully, regardless of its sensual
value”. This “primary pleasure” would arise when efficient action en-
ables the individual to control and alter his environment (Hendrick,
1943). Interestingly, such exploratory behaviours have been found
to be more frequent in younger animals, in which action-outcomes
relationships have been less experienced (Siwak, Tapp, and Milgram,
2001).
3In a similar vein, it has been suggested that some of our causal
beliefs – e.g., control and self-efficacy beliefs – would have evolved
to foster the discovery of unpredicted sensory events for which our
actions are responsible, hence to reinforce and prioritize those actions
that lead to control over the environment (Karsh and Eitam, 2015;
Redgrave and Gurney, 2006).
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(Koechlin, 2014). Human cognition would be sponta-
neously framed in such a mode where “being a causal
agent” is the default, and self-efficacy beliefs, cogni-
tive instantiations of this default mode (Haggard and
Chambon, 2012).
Collectively, the pervasiveness of this default belief in
one’s causal power (Haggard and Chambon, 2012), the
behavioural advantages it affords (Shapiro, Schwartz,
and Astin, 1996), and the various functions it under-
lies (Leotti, Iyengar, and Ochsner, 2010), provide some
clues on how human agents calculate and oversee their
causal influence on the external world. A belief in the
causal effectiveness of one’s action is likely to rest upon
a specific model of causal inference, i.e., a model of
how actions causally relate to their consequences. The
general aim of this paper is to uncover what this model
is. Crucially, this model should be able to explain how
people learn and update their causal influence on a
trial-by-trial basis, and make appropriate decisions –
such as adjusting behavioural strategies to contingency
changes – based on reliable causal estimates. In addi-
tion to accounting for the robustness of our everyday
inferences, this model should also be simple enough to
account for the ease with which human agents calcu-
late action-outcome contingencies – this model should
be algorithmically simple. We speculate that simplic-
ity is required to explain how control beliefs can be
sustained as a default backdrop to our normal men-
tal life (Chambon and Haggard, 2013). Finally, this
model should be endowed with properties that ulti-
mately account for spontaneous illusions of control, i.e.,
for why people readily credit themselves for unrelated
events, or perceive control where there is none and act
superstitiously in the belief that they are objectively
controlling uncontrollable outcomes.
How people track the causal effectiveness of their
actions has been a central aim of many empirical in-
vestigations, from animal learning to action cognition
and personality psychology, through the prism of dis-
tinct but related, and often complementary, notions –
e.g., intentional causation (Heider, 1958), perceived
behavioural control (Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder,
1982), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1989), credit assign-
ment (Sutton and Barto, 1998), controllability (Har-
ris, 1996), instrumental learning (Dickinson, 2001),
agency (Haggard and Chambon, 2012). Despite the
great variety of disciplines concerned, three dominant
approaches to instrumental causation can be distin-
guished, upon which relationships between action and
outcome are either:
• retrospectively inferred (associative approach),
• explicitly calculated (generative approach),
• simply emulated (counterfactual approach)4.
4Here we draw upon a classical distinction between associa-
tive and generative approaches to causation, according to which
causes are “associated” with effects by retrospection or actively “gen-
erate” their effects through an operant mechanism (e.g., Cheng,
1997). Strictly speaking, however, associative models in the form
Importantly, each of these approaches draws upon
different strategies, with different costs and benefits.
Hence, they can be distinguished on several grounds:
their efficiency, allowing for slow or quick adaption to
contingency changes; their cost, which makes them
likely or unlikely to be implemented by resource-
bounded agents; and their vulnerability to illusions of
control and self-attribution biases. In the next section,
we describe typical instances of these three approaches
(associative, generative, and counterfactual models),
with their respective strengths and weaknesses. Then
we turn to formal instantiations of each of these ap-
proaches, which we test and compare across in a se-
ries of modified probabilistic reversal-learning tasks.
We then motivate the development of a computational
model from the reinforcement-learning framework – al-
lowing choices to be made online with minimal compu-
tational expense –, which we further extend to handle
the emulation of unseen (i.e., counterfactual) action-
outcome contingencies.
Associative models: causation is about maximiz-
ing the expected value of action
One of the dominant views on causation, the associa-
tive approach, traces its roots to David Hume (1748).
This approach is motivated by the fact that causation
is ultimately unobservable, and yet causal relations
must be inferred from sensory inputs in some way (see
Cheng, 1997; Walsh and Sloman, 2011; Illari, Russo,
and Williamson, 2011). According to Hume, three
empirical criteria only must be met for characterizing
causation: the cause must precede the outcome, the
outcome must regularly follow the cause, and both
must be spatially and temporally contiguous. Impor-
tantly, Hume’s definition of causation does not rely on
any reference to the mechanism or process connect-
ing events together. Causal relationships are assumed,
rather than directly perceived or known, by noticing
constant conjunctions between two events, and by ret-
rospectively presuming that a connection underpins
their conjunction (Hume, 1748). Ultimately, the asso-
ciative approach holds that causality is anything but
a belief, rooted in our own biological habits – a pure
mental construct rather than an objective property of
things.
of reinforcement-learning (RL) algorithms do also possess a genera-
tive model of the world (i.e., an explanation for how observations
are generated), whereas counterfactual emulation is a generative
mechanism per se (i.e., a mechanism to decide which among sev-
eral candidate causes has generated the effect). Here, and in what
follows, we take the “generative” term in a broader and more liberal
sense: generative models are those models drawing on an explicit
representation of the generative source (usually in the form of a
probability distribution over action outcomes), which can be used to
make predictions about future outcome states. Because representa-
tion of the generative source is explicit, it is also either complete or
approximating the complete solution (that is, an exhaustive repre-
sentation of all possible action-outcome contingencies). In this sense,
generative models are also often normative, i.e., derived from ratio-
nal principles, and aim at statistical optimality (Gershman, 2015,
“normative statistical perspective”).
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Hume’s associative account of causation has inspired
various models of causal learning, from contingency
models (e.g., Ward and Jenkins, 1965) to the Rescorla
and Wagner (1972)’s discrepancy-based learning rule.
A typical formulation of the associative approach can be
found in studies of instrumental conditioning, whereby
causal action-outcome knowledge is acquired through
repeated experience with event contingencies, i.e.,
with repeated associations between some actions (push-
ing a lever) and motivationally significant events such
as rewards (food delivery) (Dickinson, 2001). In the
context of reinforcement learning (RL), the Rescorla-
Wagner rule formalizes a simple algorithm to account
for the acquisition of associative links between event
representations on a trial-by-trial basis (Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Sutton and Barto, 1998). According to
this rule, association between action and consequence
is learned through experiencing incremental changes
in the strength of their link, and learning continues
until there is no longer discrepancy between the pre-
dicted and the actual consequence of action (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Note that typical RL models do
not make use of predictive knowledge (e.g., “cogni-
tive map”) about operant actions and their association
with relevant outcomes. RL algorithms operate ret-
rospectively on experience with previous rewards, by
reinforcing actions that were successful in the past –
by increasing the propensity to take actions that were
followed by a positive reward prediction error (Figure
1A).
RL algorithms present several advantages that can
be leveraged to model how people learn and represent
their causal power. First, RL algorithms are computa-
tionally simple: they typically require a feed-forward
mapping of action to predicted consequences (Daw and
Dayan, 2014). Their simplicity makes those algorithms
robust and adaptive processes that can learn a vari-
ety of complex tasks even in uncertain environments
(Koechlin, 2016; Gershman, 2015). This simplicity
however comes at the cost of inflexibility. Without
an explicit representation of instrumental contingen-
cies (including a representation of how alternative, un-
chosen actions impact the environment), an RL agent
can only rely on current experience to adjust its be-
havioural strategies. As a consequence, RL agents re-
quire a large amount of experience to learn reliable
predictions (Gershman, Markman, and Otto, 2014),
and hencemay adapt slowly to environments exhibiting
action-outcome relationships that change periodically
(Koechlin, 2016).
Generative models: causation is about maximiz-
ing the dependency between action and effect
Although causal learning exhibits many of the cardi-
nal features of associative processes, there is evidence
that human agents do not assess their causal power by
simply experiencing (even repeated) conjunctions be-
tween what they want, do, and get, as an action effect.
Rather, they actively infer causation based on predic-
tive representations of action-outcome relationships,
i.e., on internal models of the world that explicitly re-
lates alternative actions to future environmental states
(Doya et al., 2002; Daw, Niv, and Dayan, 2005). Draw-
ing upon these internal models, agents do not only
notice that effects “follow” their actions: they explicitly
represent the generative source that links the action to
the effect.
Various models of decision-making have endorsed
this “generative” account of causation, from model-
based RL to hidden Markov and Bayesian learning
models (e.g., Daw, Niv, and Dayan, 2005; Gläscher et
al., 2010; Daw and Dayan, 2014; O’Reilly et al., 2013).
In a nutshell, generative models hinge on the assump-
tion that the observed data are the realization of one or
many hidden variables (the generative source) whose
values can be inferred with some degree of certainty,
i.e. probabilistically. Crucially, generative models of in-
strumental causation assume that people have a more
or less comprehensive representation of these variables,
which can be learned and built up over a history of dis-
crete observable events, or which can be given prior to
observation (e.g., O’Reilly et al., 2013). Importantly,
these predictive representations of action-outcome re-
lationships can be used to represent the outcome from
even unchosen actions, and hence to evaluate the differ-
ent courses of action with respect to the agent’s current
needs and motivational states.
When inferring action-outcome relationships, the ad-
vantages of generative models are multiple. First, their
underlying representations of action-outcome mapping
make these models statistically efficient: they allow for
a potentially optimal use of information derived from
experience. Thus, rather than building on the results
of the sole action taken, an agent with an accurate
estimate of the outcome distribution can potentially
evaluate all alternatives at once (Figure 1B). Second,
causal relations are computed directly, based on their
predictive representations, rather than inferred based
on past experience with local changes in the stimulus.
The generative approach thus allows for more flexibility
in adjusting to abrupt or rapid changes in contingen-
cies, as they readily occur in open-ended environments
(Koechlin, 2016).
Shortcomings of the generative approach concern
both its computational cost and its biological plausibil-
ity. Under Bayesian setting, the generative approach
assumes that the agent can have an exhaustive repre-
sentation of all possible states on which the inference
is drawn. However, in real-life situations, representing
and updating all possible alternatives at once leads to
intractable computational costs. This makes the com-
plete generative solution unlikely to be implemented
by the brain (Eckstein et al., 2004), hence explaining
why people often depart from statistically optimal pre-
dictions made by normative models (e.g., Waldmann
andWalker, 2005; see also Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo,
2011; Gershman, 2015). Interestingly, departures from
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normative predictions often arise in the form of illu-
sions of control, where people behave superstitiously in
the belief that they are controlling uncontrollable out-
comes (Langer, 1975), such as those occurring when
contrasting instrumental vs. observational learning
(Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2005) and naturalistic vs.
analytic contexts (Matute, 1996), or while experienc-
ing imposed vs. chosen gamble outcomes (Kool, Getz,
and Botvinick, 2013). Generative models have diffi-
culty accounting for such illusions while at the same
time failing to address causal problems that human
subjects yet easily solve (Sloman and Lagnado, 2015).
Therefore, questions have been raised about whether
deviations from normativity only capture approxima-
tions of the true generative solution – e.g., due to limits
on the size of working memory or on the quantity of
attentional resources – or whether they ask for a re-
think of how individuals construe their causal power,
i.e., with relatively high efficiency and sustainable com-
putational costs (e.g., Jones and Love, 2011; Markman
and Otto, 2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012).
Counterfactual models: causation is about ac-
tions that make a difference (with respect to their
contingent states)
Associative algorithms describe agents that can adapt
to the causal structure of the world with minimal com-
putational expense, while generative models directly
infer causation by relying on explicit representations of
action-outcome relationships. Hence, associative and
generative models of causation stand as opposite ex-
tremes on a continuum between statistically efficiency
and computational tractability. Importantly, a number
of theoretical and empirical works has suggested that
counterfactual reasoning might sit in the middle of this
continuum.
In the decision-making domain, counterfactual rea-
soning (CF) draws upon representations of what would
have happened had another choice been taken (e.g.,
Boorman, Behrens, and Rushworth, 2011). If a large
psychological literature has chronicled the affective
consequences of counterfactuals, especially regret, on
choice behaviour (Bell, 1982; Coricelli et al., 2005;
Roese, 1997), there is also abundant empirical evi-
dence that people generate counterfactuals, i.e., sim-
ulate alternative possible events and their outcomes,
when they think about causal relations. Thus, when a
change to an event leads to a change in the outcome,
people rate it as more causal than when a change to
the event would not undo the outcome (e.g., Walsh
and Sloman, 2011). Similarly, making a counterfactual
alternative available strongly influences causal judg-
ments, so that the greater the number of counterfactual
alternatives for an event, the more causal this event
is perceived (Spellman and Kincannon, 2001; McCloy
and Byrne, 2002; Byrne, 2005). While CF plays a role
in causal reasoning, it is, however, not equally applied
to all types of situations. People are more prone to
counterfactual thinking for causal relations that are
of behavioural significance to them, such as voluntary
actions (see Roese, 1997, for a review). Thus, indi-
viduals are more likely to generate counterfactuals
when judging causation in situations involving actions
than inactions (“agency effect”, see Byrne, 2002), and
controllable events (e.g., voluntary choices) than un-
controllable events (e.g., an asthma attack) (Girotto,
Legrenzi, and Rizzo, 1991; N’Gbala and Branscombe,
1995). Conversely, decreasing causal power and per-
sonal control diminishes the propensity for counterfac-
tual thinking (Scholl and Sassenberg, 2014). Together,
these results suggest that there is a close relationship
between counterfactual thinking and people’s sense of
causation for actions under their direct control.
Importantly, the CF account defines a cause as some-
thing that makes a difference to another event (i.e., the
outcome would have been different had another ac-
tion been performed), endorsing a very intuitive way
of construing causation as difference-making. In the
counterfactual literature, models of causal reasoning
(e.g., Pearl, 2000) share this idea with modern instan-
tiations of the associative approach, such as recent
accounts based on experienced action-outcome contin-
gency – where contingency is defined as the difference
between conditional probabilities, the so-called “∆P
rule” (e.g., Tanaka, Balleine, and O’Doherty, 2008)
– and more recently with model-based learning algo-
rithms drawing upon the notion of instrumental diver-
gence (i.e., “Jensen-Shannon divergence”). Instrumen-
tal divergence formalizes the causal power of an action
as the difference between probabilities of a given out-
come in the presence vs. absence of this action (Mistry
and Liljeholm, 2016; Liljeholm et al., 2011; Liljeholm
et al., 2013). Interestingly, both counterfactual rea-
soning and instrumental divergence are endowed with
the same prior belief about goal-directed actions. They
assume that goal-directed actions are instrumental in
nature: choosing action A over action B (or choosing
to act vs. not acting) makes a difference in terms of the
outcome. And the greater the action differs with respect
to its contingent states (the factual and counterfactual
outcomes), the more flexible control the subject has
over the environment (Figure 1C).
Importantly, both CF reasoning and instrumental
divergence imply being able to emulate5 the outcome
associated with the unchosen course of action. Un-
der both views, causal actions are those maximizing
the difference between factual and emulated outcomes.
Counterfactual emulation offers several advantages
over both the associative and generative approaches.
For example, CF makes it possible to learn information
from unchosen alternatives without having to incur
the costs that taking the alternative course of action
would have entailed (Boorman, Behrens, and Rush-
worth, 2011; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Buchsbaum et al.,
2012). Counterfactual emulation is also far less costly
than any statistical inference. Unlike generative mod-
els that must learn causation through considering and
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Figure 1: Three decision-making and learning models to account for how human subjects infer and monitor their causal power.
A. Associative model: agents associate action (A) and outcome (O) through experiencing repeated event contingencies,
and reinforce actions that were successful in the past. Agents learn preferences for actions without ever explicitly learning
or reasoning about the (hidden) structure of the environment. B. Generative model: agents infer action-outcome
causal relationships based on an internal “model” of the world (Z; the “generative” source) that explicitly relates actions
(A) to future outcomes (O). Generative models can ideally learn all possible hidden states (octagons in transparency)
relating the action performed with the observed outcome. C. Counterfactual model: agents simulate what would have
happened (Co) had another action (Ca) been taken. Under the counterfactual view, an action has causal power over an
observed outcome if a change in that action (i.e., another action, or no action, is taken) leads a change in the outcome.
Ideally, causal actions are those maximising the difference (∆o) between factual and counterfactual outcomes.
updating at once all possible alternative causes, CF
assumes causation through a simple prior belief based
on difference-making.
5Although the term “simulation” is routinely used to describe the
process of running (mental) alternatives to the current situation, the
specificity of the counterfactual approach is perhaps best captured
by a former distinction between simulation and emulation, as can
be found in computer science (e.g., Guruprasad, Ricci, and Lepreau,
2005). A simulation represents a target?s behaviour by explicitly
modeling its underlying states, usually through a generative model
known to best represent the actual states at play. Importantly, how-
ever, a simulation does not imply to faithfully mimic the outward
behaviour of a target (e.g., a simulation may run faster than real
time). Emulation, conversely, aims to mimic the observable behaviour,
without having to accurately represent its internal states, but with
ultimately being able to substitute for the target being emulated (a
function ? e.g., face recognition ? emulated by a neural network).
Note that emulating an agent, or a function, is useful when one
does not exactly know its internal states, or when representing them
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Overview of the present study
CF studies have provided convincing evidence that peo-
ple generate counterfactuals when reasoning about
causation (Sloman and Lagnado, 2015, for a review)
whereas instrumental divergence provides a learning
rule for how people make choice based on maximized
divergence (Mistry and Liljeholm, 2016). However,
both views have shortcomings. So far CF models of
causal reasoning have only been applied to static en-
vironments and abstract settings – verbal scenarios
or summary descriptions of causal situations –, while
studies drawing upon instrumental divergence criti-
cally lack of an algorithmic insight into how unchosen
situations are emulated, and according to which rule
(e.g., what value should be assigned to the alternative?
how this value can be learned and according to what
dynamics? and what should be its update rule?). In
this paper, we propose to bridge the gap between these
two approaches by building and testing a counterfac-
tual model addressing these issues.
We tested and compared across the performance of
this model (hereafter, CF) against various instantia-
tions of the associative and generative classes (here-
after, RL, BM, BC) in a series of tasks where there was
some uncertainty about the identity of the causal agent
(Figure 2A). The tasks built on a modified reversal-
learning procedure (Rolls, 2000) and modelled a dy-
namic environment where action feedbacks were in-
trinsically noisy and instrumental or environmental
contingencies could change unexpectedly (Figure 2B).
To maximize their performance subjects had to contin-
uously monitor their causal influence over the task envi-
ronment, by discriminating changes that were caused
by their own actions from changes that were not. In turn,
discriminating self- from externally-caused outcomes
required to track changes in the different statistics
manipulated in the task (action-outcome dependency,
value, variance) and to flexibly adjust to these changes.
Overview of the experimental
paradigm
We ran two distinct experiments, in two different
groups of participants. In each experiment, the task
accurately would be too demanding.
Simulation and emulation hinge on two different assumptions,
which align snugly with the generative and counterfactual ap-
proaches to causation, respectively. The generative view assumes
that individuals infer causation by simulating the internal process
by which hidden states generate observable effects. The process is
computationally ruinous, but it may provide an accurate estimate
on the likelihood of a candidate cause, given what is observed. The
CF view, on the other hand, does not make any reference to the
generative source behind observation. Thus, contrary to generative
models that simulate all possible contingencies from a given situa-
tion, CF operates by emulating the unchosen alternative only, and
by making decision based on variations of some parameters value
(e.g., learning rates) when one travels from the real (factual) to the
emulated (counterfactual) world (see Lucas and Kemp, 2015).
consisted in a two slot-machines game (Figure 2A).
Thus, on each trial, the participants had to make two
distinct choices: (i) first, selecting which of the two
machines she wanted to know the result of, then (ii)
selecting which of the two buttons (a square or a cir-
cle) to press in order to trigger the machines. The
order of choice (see Figure 2A: machine then button,
or button then machine) was counterbalanced within
participants, while the spatial mapping of the task stim-
uli and the response keys was counterbalanced across
participants.
Crucially, the participant was informed that, al-
though she played the two machines simultaneously,
she would control one and only one machine. Thus,
for one machine only, whatever the button pressed (a
square or a circle) the average reward was the same,
whereas for the other machine, one button (the “best-
rewarding” button) gave on average a higher reward
than the other (the “least-rewarding” button). Put an-
other way, the chosen button influenced the gains of
one machine only (the “controlled” machine), whereas
the gains of the other machine (the “non-controlled”
machine) were independent of the button pressed by
the subject. To maximise her final payoff, the partici-
pant had to find out which machine she controlled, that
is, the machine for which there was a “best-rewarding”
and a “least-rewarding” button.
The participant was informed that she would always
win the sum of the gains from both machines on each
trial. This was to motivate her to track the controlled
machine (i.e., the machine for which her choice made a
difference) rather than systematically searching for the
best-rewarding machine. After a given number of trials,
a feedback screen displayed her current payoff, which
was graphically represented as the sum of the gains
produced by each machine during these last trials.
Gains produced by each bandit machine were drawn
from Gaussian probability distributions, of those mean,
variance, and “instrumental divergence” varied across
conditions. Instrumental divergence refers to the dis-
tance between gains distributions associated with each
button or machine. This divergence constituted our
measure of control. The machine with a positive diver-
gence was the controlled machine, that is, the machine
for which there was a (maximal) difference in the prob-
ability distribution of gains associated with each action
(e.g., Figure 4A, red and green distributions). Con-
versely, the non-controlled machine was the machine
with a null-divergence; that is, the machine for which
each action was similar with respect to its contingent
state (e.g., Figure 4A, grey distribution). Thus, instru-
mental divergence defines the ‘controlled’ machine as
the machine for which making a choice (e.g., selecting
button A vs. B) makes a difference in terms of the out-
come, consistently with various accounts of instrumen-
tal causation as “difference-making” (e.g., Liljeholm et
al., 2013; Walsh and Sloman, 2011; Beebee, Hitchcock,
and Price, 2017). It is worth noting that instrumental
divergence quantifies the degree to which alternative
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Figure 2: Schematic of trial procedure and stimuli. (A) A trial started with the presentation of two bandit machines above
and below a central fixation. In one half of the blocks, the subject had to first select a machine (here, the top machine,
Choice 1, top panel) and then a button (here, the left button, Choice 2, top panel), and conversely in the other half
(button, then machine; see bottom panel). Note that only the gains of the selected machine were displayed at the end of
the trial. Each trial lasted approximately 3s. (B) Schematic of reversals during the task. The solid line represents
the best button during the ongoing block, whereas the grey rectangles represent the location of either (i) the controlled
machine (expt. 1: dependency session), (ii) the best-rewarding machine (expt. 1: value session), or (iii) the low-variable
machine (expt. 1: variance session). The vertical red dashed lines signal a reversal on the best-rewarding button (circle
to square, or the converse) whereas the vertical blue dashed line signals a machine reversal. In all experiments, “button”
or “machine” reversals occurred after a variable number of trials.
actions differ with respect to contingent states, and
hence is formally equivalent to another highly related
information theoretic measure, mutual information,
which quantifies the statistical dependency between
an action and a subsequent event (see Liljeholm et al.,
2013).
Finally, participants were informed that unpre-
dictable reversals could occur during the task so that
either buttons or machines reversed unpredictably from
time to time (e.g., the best-rewarding button became
the least-rewarding button, or the controlled machine
became the non-controlled machine) (Figure 2B). Par-
ticipants were thus explicitly asked to pay attention to
the relationship between their gains and their choices
so as to identify these reversals as fast as possible and
to adapt their choices accordingly.
Importantly, the experimental conditions differed in
how these reversals were implemented. Thus, depend-
ing on the condition within each experiment, partici-
pants had to monitor reversals in either:
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• the statistical dependency between their action
and the resulting outcome,
• the rewarding value of the outcomes produced by
each machine,
• the variability of these outcomes over time.
The first experiment tested the influence of these
statistics on the participant’s choice separately, i.e.,
within independent experimental sessions. In this ex-
periment, either explicit (Expt. 1a) or implicit (Expt.
1b) instructions were given to participants about their
actual control over the task. The second experiment
(Expt. 2) implemented the same procedure but con-
trolled for interaction effects between the 3 statistics
manipulated (dependency, value, variability) by em-
ploying a full factorial design in which these statistics
were systematically crossed.
Modelling
In both experiments, four classes of models were built
and fitted to participant’s choices: (i) a simple rein-
forcement learning model (RL), (ii) a counterfactual
learning model (CF) built in a model-free reinforce-
ment learning framework, and two generative mod-
els whose aim was to learn the task environment cor-
rectly by searching for either (iii) the “best-rewarding”
state (Bayesian-maximizer, BM) or (iv) the “controlled”
state (Bayesian-controller, BC) in the task environment.
Each of these four models draws on different assump-
tions about how subjects’ beliefs are formed and up-
dated on a trial-by-trial basis, and hence makes dif-
ferent predictions on how choices are made based on
these beliefs.
In all four models, the two-stage decision process
was concatenated into one single decision made be-
tween the four possible combinations of machines and
buttons. We did so because reaction times suggested
that the two successive choices (machine then but-
ton, or button then machine) were chunked into one
unique choice made between four action sequences.
Indeed, in all tasks reaction times for choices were sig-
nificantly slower for the first choice made, whether
this choice was a button (paired t-tests, all experi-
ments: all t15/25 < −2.91, all p < 0.007) or a machine
(all t15/25 < −11.1, all p < 0.001). In these condi-
tions, it has been shown that modelling two successive
choices as one unique decision better predict the par-
ticipants’ data (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013; Solway
and Botvinick, 2015).
In all four models, each of the 4 possible actions
made by the participant on each trial (choosing be-
tween 2 buttons × 2 machines) was associated with
either an action value for both RL and CF models (Fig-
ure 3), or with beliefs (indexing the probability to be
in one particular state among all possible states) for
the generative models (Figure 4). All four models went
through the same two steps on each trial. The first
step consisted in updating the internal value or the
beliefs associated with each of the 4 possible actions,
depending on the outcome obtained in the previous
trial. The updating rule was different between models
(see below). The resulting internal values or beliefs
were then used to compute the probability to choose
one action over its 3 alternatives. The second step
consisted in making a choice based on either internal
values or beliefs, using a non-deterministic (softmax)
decision rule (see below, “Action selection”).
RL model
Each of the 4 possible actions was associated with an
internal value (Sutton and Barto, 1998), also called an
action-value (Figure 3, top panel). The values them-
selves are hidden, but are thought to drive choices
between alternatives actions. Specifically, the model
draws upon the notion of prediction error (δ), which
measures the discrepancy between actual outcome
value, called reward (R) here, and the expected out-
come for the chosen action (i.e., the chosen value) at
time step t:
δ(t) = R(t) − Vchosen(t)
According to the Rescorla and Wagner (1972)’s rule,
such prediction error is used to update the value of the
chosen action, as follows:
Vchosen(t+ 1) = Vchosen(t) + αF × δ(t)
αF is a fitted parameter capturing the rate at which
prediction error updates the action values, thus it is
called the (factual) learning rate. Action values rep-
resent the reward value expected for choosing this
particular action. Here the action values associated
with the three unchosen actions are kept constant (i.e.,
they are not updated):
Vunchosen(t+ 1) = Vunchosen(t)
CF model
Contrary to typical RL, values of the unchosen actions
(i.e., counterfactuals) were explicitly updated in the
CF model, and this update was performed according
to a specific dynamic (e.g., learning rate). Note that
counterfactual rewards were not experienced or seen,
and therefore must be somehow inferred by the par-
ticipant. CF models assume that such inference re-
quires to emulate the unchosen action, as if it was
effectively taken, and to derive the corresponding coun-
terfactual outcome from it (Figure 3, bottom panel).
Some uncertainty remains about how to model the
emulation process. Converging evidence from rein-
forcement comparison methods (Sutton, 1984; Dayan,
1991; Kaelbling, Littman, and Moore, 1996) and be-
havioural economics (Palminteri et al., 2015; Denrell,
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Figure 3: Schematic of the two-stages decision process in RL and CF models. On trial t, the circle button and the bottom
machine are chosen, and ‘32’ is obtained as a reward. RL (top) and CF (bottom) models differ in how action values are
updated. While both models use the current reward to update the value of the chosen action through the Rescorla-Wagner
(R-W) rule, only the CF model updates the value of the unchosen actions. The CF model derives a fictive counterfactual
outcome (here, ‘68’) from the actual outcome (‘32’), which it mirrors through a reference point approximating the mean
of the underlying reward distribution. The counterfactual outcome is then used to update the value of the unchosen
actions through the classical R-W rule. Importantly, these different updates can lead the two models to make different
choices: on the next trial, the RL model chooses the circle button and the bottom machine (choice C), while the CF model
chooses the circle button and the top machine (choice A). Note that the figure shows a reversal in contingency (C is no
longer the best valued action). As can be seen, the CF model adapts quickly to the reversal (it now chooses A), whereas
the RL model sticks to the same action (it keeps choosing C as before).
2015; Burke et al., 2016) suggests that people always
make decisions relative to a context-dependent refer-
ence. When the context is a (binary or continuous)
distribution of gain and losses, this reference approxi-
mates the mean of the distribution (Palminteri et al.,
2015; Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Interestingly the
mean is an important, often optimal, operator that
allows for minimizing error in error-prone situations,
i.e., under uncertainty (De Gardelle and Summerfield,
2011). In the following, counterfactual rewards were
thus inferred based on a simple contextual rule. The
counterfactual reward (RCF ) was derived from the
actual reward, which it mirrored through a reference
point (P ) approximating the mean of the underlying
generative distribution. The value of this reference (or
“context value”, Palminteri et al., 2015) was separately
fitted, rather than fixed or learned from reward history,
in each participant:
RCF (t) = 2 × P −R(t)
According to this rule, when participants obtained
a high reward (“high” being defined as being above
the reference), the counterfactual reward associated
with the unchosen action was inferred as being a “low”
reward (i.e., below the reference reward), and the
probability to stay with the same action on next trial
increased. Conversely, when the obtained reward was
low the counterfactual reward was inferred as being
“high”, and the probability to switch action on next trial
increased. The emulated counterfactual reward thus
allowed for computing a counterfactual prediction error
(δCF ) and a counterfactual learning rate (αCF ), which
was used to update the value of the unchosen actions
according to a generalized version of the Rescorla and
Wagner’s rule, as follows:
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Figure 4: Schematic of the two-stages decision process in BC and BM models. On trial t, the circle button and the bottom
machine are chosen, and ?32? is obtained as a reward. Both BC and BM models infer the current state of the world
(Z1, Z2, Z3, or Z4, bottom panel) based on the inferred reward distributions (G1, G2, G3, top panel), the volatility
parameter and the past history of actions and rewards. The models also update the mean and precision of the three
underlying distributions (from dashed to solid distributions, top panel). Because the two models aim to maximize
different statistics (control for BC, value for BM), they end up choosing different actions from the state inferred (here,
Z4). Thus, on the next trial, the BC model chooses the left button and the bottom machine (D = the best-rewarding
action of the controlled machine), while the BM model chooses either A or B, i.e., the current best-rewarding machine.
δCF (t) = RCF (t) − Vunchosen(t)
Vunchosen(t+ 1) = Vunchosen(t) + αCF × δCF (t)
Note that because participants chose between four
possible actions, there were necessarily three unchosen
actions for each choice made: (i) the unchosen button
associated with the chosen machine, (ii) the chosen
button associated with the unchosen machine, and
(iii) the unchosen button associated with the uncho-
sen machine. Hence, the model was endowed with 3
counterfactual learning rates (αCF1, αCF2 and αCF3),
which were fitted in each participant separately.
Generative model
The generative model was a Bayesian learner that up-
dated beliefs, and not values, associated with each
possible action, on each trial. Here, a belief referred to
a probability for an action to be in a given state (Figure
4, and Appendix A, “Generative model”). Instructions
that were explicitly given to participants defined four
possible states, associated with three generative distri-
butions (G):
• the state associated with having selected the best-
rewarding button of the controlled machine (G1),
• the state associated with having selected the least-
rewarding button of the controlled machine (G2),
• the state associated with having selected the non-
controlled machine (G3).
On each trial, the model aimed to infer the correct
state/action pair, i.e., to infer which among the three
possible distributions generated the observed outcome,
given the button pressed. The model then updated its
belief about all state/action pairs, together with the
parameters (mean, standard-deviation) of each gen-
erative distribution, given the new observations. Our
model was implemented with a specific task structure
defining the number of possible states (the three gener-
ative distributions), actions (the four possible actions),
and hidden variables to describe them (e.g., the mean
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and standard-deviation of the generative distributions).
The model assumed the generative distributions to be
Gaussian with fixed mean and standard deviation. On
each trial, the mean and variance of each generative
distribution was inferred by themodel, based on the his-
tory of observations, through Bayesian inference (see
Appendix A, “Generative model”, for details). As rever-
sals between actions occurred, the model also needed
to infer a volatility parameter, the volatility being the
probability for the states to reverse between actions.
Thus, on each trial, the Bayesian models needed to
infer a set of 7 parameters: the three Gaussian means,
the three Gaussian variances, and the volatility param-
eter (Figure S1).
To test how participants interpreted our instruc-
tions, we built two different Bayesian models: a
Bayesian-controller (BC), and a Bayesian-maximizer
(BM) model. The first model (BC) preferentially se-
lected the action which it believed was associated with
the controlled machine (i.e., the model made choices
based on a control belief, see Figure 4, top panel) while
the second model (BM) preferentially selected the ac-
tion associated with the best-rewarding Gaussian, ir-
respective of whether this Gaussian was or was not
associated with the controlled machine (i.e., the model
made choices based on the magnitude of the reward
see Figure 4, bottom panel).
Action selection
Across all four models, action and belief values were
used to drive action selection. On each trial, this selec-
tion was made through a softmax rule, based on either
updated action-values or beliefs (Daw et al., 2006).
Under this rule, one action is stochastically selected
according to the difference between each action’s ex-
pected value:
P1 =
eβ×V1(t)+ρm×cm,1(t)+ρb×cb,1(t)
e
∑
i β×Vi(t)+ρm×cm,i(t)+ρb×cb,i(t)
where i enumerates over all possible choices and cm,i
and cb,i were defined as the stickiness to the previous
machine or button choice, irrespective of the reward
history:
cm,i(t) =
{
1 if the same machine was chosen on t-1
0 otherwise
cb,i(t) =
{
1 if the same button was chosen on t-1
0 otherwise
The exploitation intensity parameter β is fitted and
represents the strength of the action values or beliefs
on action selection. The parameters ρm and ρb capture
the participant’s propensity to perseverate with their
action choice, which cannot be explained by reward
history (Lau and Glimcher, 2005).
Parameters fitting
Model parameters were fitted based on participants’
actions. Model fitting was performed separately for
each participant and each condition. The best parame-
ters were those maximising the log-likelihood (LLH),
defined as the sum of the log of the model’s fit to partic-
ipants’ action choices. Thus, LLH close to 0 indicates a
good model fit. To test the different possible combina-
tions of parameters, we used a slice sampling procedure
(Bishop, 2006). More specifically, using three different
starting points drawn from uniform distributions for
each parameter, we performed 100,000 iterations of
a gradient ascent algorithm to converge on the set of
parameters that best fitted the data.
All four models shared the same three parameters:
the perseveration biases ρm and ρb, and the exploita-
tion intensity parameter β. The two Bayesian models
(BC and BM) had no additional parameter to fit, since
the parameters used to compute the beliefs were in-
ferred. The RL and CF models shared the learning
rate parameter αF , but the CF model had 4 additional
parameters: the three counterfactual learning rates
(αCF1, αCF2 and αCF3), and the reference point (P ).
To account for the risk of overfitting, a relative quality-
of-fit metric, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
was also computed. The BIC penalizes models with a
high number of parameters:
BIC = k × log(N) − 2 × LLH
with k being the number of parameters and N the
number of trials.
BIC values were compared between our four mod-
els (RL, CF, BM and BC). As an approximation of the
model evidence, individual BICs were fed into the MBB-
VB toolbox (Daunizeau, Adam, and Rigoux, 2014), a
procedure that estimates how likely it is that a spe-
cific model generates the data of a randomly chosen
subject (the posterior probability of a model, PP), as
well as the probability that a given model fits the data
better than all other models in the set (exceedance
probability, XP).
Choice simulation
The four resulting models (RL, CF, BM and BC) were
simulated with the best-fitting parameters, and they
underwent the same experimental conditions as par-
ticipants did. On each trial, the outcome given to the
model was the one associated with the model’s choice,
and not the participant’s. Simulations were used to pro-
vide aggregated measures of models’ performance (e.g.,
Figure 5B) but also to compare trial-by-trial choice se-
quence after reversal across models (e.g., Figure 6A).
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Experiment 1: method
Participants
16 participants (8 females, age between 20 and 33
years-old) took part in Experiment 1. They provided
written informed consent prior to the experiment and
were all paid 20 euros for each experimental session
completed. No participants had a history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorder, and all had a normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was
approved by the local ethics review board (CCP C07-
28). Participants were informed about the general
procedure of the experiment through detailed written
instructions.
Stimuli and trial structure
On one half of the experiment, the first choice con-
sisted in selecting a machine, then selecting a button,
and the reverse on the other half (button first, then
machine). The order of choice was counterbalanced
within participants.
When the first choice was about the machine, a typi-
cal trial started with the presentation of two machines
above and below a central fixation. Each machine was
filled with a question mark (see Figure 2A, top panel,
“machine first”). Participants had 700ms to make their
choice. Once the selection made, the question mark
within the chosen machine disappeared. After a 500ms
delay two buttons (a square and a circle) appeared on
both sides of the central fixation. Again, the partici-
pant had 700ms to choose one button by pressing the
corresponding key. The chosen button was then filled
with white to confirm the participant’s key press. Once
the choice made, the two slot machines spinned for
200ms. The gain corresponding to the chosen button
then appeared in the chosen machine for 800ms. If
the participants did not press a key within the 700ms
delay, or if the wrong key was pressed, the trial was
“missed”, and the next trial started. Each trial lasted
approximately 3s.
The same timeline applied on trials where the first
choice to make was about selecting a button (Figure
2A, bottom panel, “button first”). As mentioned above,
the spatial mapping of task stimuli and response keys
was counterbalanced across the 16 participants: for
half of them the machines were positioned on a vertical
line whereas the buttons were on a horizontal line (as
represented in Figure 2A). This mapping was reversed
for the other half, as were the response keys.
Participants were informed that they would always
win the sum of the gains from both machines on each
trial. Thus, every 208 trials, a feedback screen dis-
played the participant’s current payoff, which was
graphically represented as the sum of the average gains
produced by each machine during the last 208 trials.
In total, a session consisted in 832 trials. Each session
was preceded by a short training (64 trials).
Experimental sessions
Participants completed three sessions, each carried out
in a different day and lasting approximately one hour.
Each session required participants to track occasional
changes in the structure of the task environment, and to
adjust their choices according to whether these changes
related to either i) the statistical dependency between
the option chosen and the subsequent outcome, or ii)
the value or iii) the variability of the outcomes pro-
duced by each machine.
Thus, each session was defined according to the type
of statistic manipulated in the task:
1. The statistical dependency between the action
made and the resulting outcome was manipu-
lated in the first experimental session. This ses-
sion implemented a “controlled” (divergent) ma-
chine for which each button led to a different
outcome, and a “non-controlled” (non-divergent)
machine for which the reward was the same, re-
gardless of the button pressed. For the controlled
machine the gains associated with the best- and
least-rewarding buttons were discretized rewards
drawn from Gaussian probability distributions
with identical variance (SD) but different means
(see Figure 5A, left panel, green and red distribu-
tions, means = 58 and 42, SD = 10, respectively).
For the non-controlled machine, the gains associ-
ated with both buttons were drawn from the same
Gaussian (Figure 5A, left panel, grey distribution,
mean = 50).
2. The value of eachmachine wasmanipulated in the
second session by implementing a machine that
was on average more rewarding than the other,
while keeping the two machines non-divergent.
Thus, regardless of the button pressed, outcomes
from each machine were drawn from Gaussians
with identical variance but different means, such
that the mean value of one machine (the “best-
rewarding machine”, see Figure 5A, middle panel,
light grey, mean = 58, SD = 10) was systemati-
cally higher than the other (the “least-rewarding
machine”, dark grey, mean = 42, SD = 10).
3. In a third session the variance of each machine
was manipulated by making the gains from one
machine more variable than the other, while keep-
ing the two machines non-divergent. Thus, re-
gardless of the button pressed, the two machines
were associated with Gaussian distributions that
had the same mean but different variance (low-
and high-variable machines: mean = 50, SD = 5
and 15, respectively) (see Figure 5A, right panel).
We were first interested in assessing (i) whether, and
how, the three statistics manipulated could influence
participants’ control beliefs, and second (ii) whether
and how well each class of models could account for
this influence on participants’ choice behaviours. To
assess independently the influence of the “value” and
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Figure 5: (A) Reward probability distributions associated with each button and machine of each experimental session
from Experiment 1. Left panel: In the first session, action-outcome dependency was implemented for one machine
only. For this controlled machine, the outcome depended on the button choice: one button led to a mean outcome of 58
(green) whereas the other button led to a mean outcome of 42 (red). For the other uncontrolled machine (dark grey), the
outcome displayed was drawn for a unique Gaussian distribution, irrespective of the button being chosen. Middle panel:
In the “value” condition, no machine was controlled, but one bandit was best rewarded (dark grey, mean outcome:
58) than the other (light grey, mean outcome: 42). Right panel: In the “variance” condition, the mean outcome (50)
was the same for both machines, irrespective of the button chosen, but outcomes from one machine were more variable
than outcomes from the other machine (light grey, SD = 15, vs. dark grey, SD = 5). (B) Mean proportion of choice
for the three sessions, and for each button and machine. Bars: participants’ choices (%); dots and diamonds:
models’ choices (%). RL: reinforcement-learning model; CF: counterfactual model; BC: Bayesian-controller model; BM:
Bayesian-maximizer model. The horizontal grey line indicates chance level (0.25%). All error bars indicate standard
error. For the sake of visibility, models’ error bars are not shown. Three-stars indicates p < 0.001.
“variance” statistics on choice, the last two sessions
did not implement any “divergent” machines. As a
result, participants had no real control over the gains
produced by the machines. The reason for this was
twofold. First, it allowed for assessing whether choice
behaviours modified in situations where one was told
that events in the task were under one’s own control
but where no true control in fact existed – such as in
classical settings implementing the so-called “illusion
of control” (Stefan and David, 2013). Second, the
procedure allowed for testing how best fitting models –
i.e., models that best accounted for participants’ choice
under normal conditions – did perform in a situation of
illusory control, and how well these models effectively
accounted for the participant’s data in this situation.
Finally, to keep all sessions as similar as possible,
the same instructions were delivered across all three
sessions. Thus, instructions in the “value” and the
“variance” sessions were the same as those given in the
“dependency” session, meaning that participants were
not told they had no control over the machines in these
conditions. All participants always started with the
“dependency” session, implementing divergent and non-
divergent machines, followed by the value and variance
sessions in counterbalanced order across participants.
Reversals
Each session comprised 32 “episodes”. An episode
referred to an uninterrupted series of trials before a
reversal occurred. The number of trials within an
episode was on average 26 but varied between 14
and 38 (uniformly jittered) so as to make reversals
as unpredictable as possible. In the “action-outcome
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dependency” session, two types of reversal could oc-
cur: either the buttons or the machines reversed, such
that the controlled machine became the non-controlled
machine or the best-rewarding button became the least-
rewarding button. As for the value and variance ses-
sions, only non-divergent machines were implemented,
so that only “machine” reversals occurred: either the
best-rewarding machine became the least-rewarding
machine (“value” session) or the low-variable machine
became the high-variable machine (“variance” session).
Modelling
To simulate participants’ choices, we implemented the
same four models that were previously described (RL,
CF, BC and BM). In order to test if participants would
adapt their strategy to the session, we fitted the mod-
els’ parameters separately across the three different
experimental sessions. As mentioned above, in both the
“value” and “variance” sessions instructions were the
same as those delivered in the “dependency” session:
participants were not told they had no real control
over the machines. This was explicitly accounted for
by in the two generative models (BC and BM) through
implementing the same latent states (i.e., generative
distributions) as in the “dependency” session. Thus,
our two generative models assumed there were a con-
trolled and a non-controlled machine in all conditions.
Experiment 1: results
Percentage of choices
We first assessed whether subjects could discriminate
between the two (divergent) states of the controlled,
relative to the non-controlled, machine, by comparing
choice proportion for each button of each machine,
within each session. As expected, participants discrim-
inated well between the two buttons of the controlled
machine in the dependency session (best- and least-
rewarding buttons: 0.45 vs. 0.15, t15 = 6.3, p < 0.001,
Figure 5B, green vs. red bars, left panel), while choos-
ing equally button 1 and button 2 of the non-controlled
machines in all sessions (all t15 < 1.62, all p > 0.12;
Figure 5B, grey bars). We then compared button pref-
erences across all sessions. To do so, we subtracted
choice proportion for one button from choice propor-
tion for the other button within each preferred ma-
chine, and compared the difference across sessions
using a one-way ANOVA (dependency vs. value vs.
variance). The ANOVA confirmed that “button” prefer-
ences differed across the 3 sessions (F2,45 = 28.98, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.56). Thus, participants discriminated
between buttons of the preferred machine in the de-
pendency session to a far greater extent than in the
value and variance sessions (0.30 vs. 0.016, and 0.30
vs. 0.017, respectively, post hoc tests: all p < 0.001).
Second, we tested whether participants showed a
preference for one machine over another within each
session, by comparing choice proportion for each ma-
chine against the chance level (0.50). We found that
participants showed a marked preference for the con-
trolled machine in the dependency session (t15 =
4.86, p < 0.001), as well as a marked preference for
the best-rewarding (t15 = 10.67, p < 0.001) and the
low-variable (t15 = 3.04, p = 0.004) machines in the
value and variance conditions, respectively. Finally, we
compared the proportion of choice for the preferred
machine across all 3 sessions. The one-way ANOVA
revealed that “machine” preferences differed across
the 3 sessions (F2,45 = 21.31, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48),
Thus, participants chose the best-rewarding machine
(value session, 0.76) more than the controlled machine
(dependency session, 0.62), and both controlled and re-
warding machines more than the low-variable machine
(variance session, 0.57) (post hoc tests, all p < 0.05).
Note that, in all sessions, participants were able
to quickly adjust to machine and/or button reversals:
on average, the plateau of performance was reached
within 5-10 trials after reversal (see Figure 6A, “Rever-
sal learning curves”).
Model comparison
Participants’ trial-by-trial choice sequence were best
accounted for by the CF model than by all other models
in the set (RL, BM or BC). This was true for all con-
ditions (exceedance probability > 98%) (Table 1 and
Figure 6B). In addition to comparing model parame-
ters across conditions and subjects, we also evaluated
the generative performance of each concurrent model,
i.e., its ability to replicate the participant’s proportion
of choices, but also the participant’s trial-by-trial choice
sequence after reversal (Palminteri et al., 2017). To do
so, the 4 models were simulated with the best-fitting
parameters on the whole experiment. Crucially, only
the CF model showed a pattern of choices similar to
that of participants in all sessions, whether with regard
to the choice of the machine or to the choice of the
button (see Figure 5B, CF = black circle).
Then, we plotted the models’ learning dynamics be-
fore and after a reversal. Again, only the CF model was
as flexible as participants, and adjusted to reversals
with a similar dynamic (see Figure 6A, CF = red bars).
In the dependency session, more specifically, the CF
model outperformed all 3 competitors for both types of
reversals. Thus, CF was able to retrieve the controlled
machine and the best-rewarding option as quickly as
participants, while the 3 other models adjusted more
slowly, as particularly evidenced by the RL model after
a button reversal (Figure 6A, top panel). In the value
session, CF also better simulated participants’ choices
than all competing models (Figure 6A, bottom panel,
left). Note that the BC model (dark green bars) aimed
at maximizing control, i.e., preferentially chose the
option associated with the controlled machine. Thus,
its poor performance in this session with no true con-
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Figure 6: (A) Reversal curves for human participants (solid black line) and models (colored bars), up to 15 trials after
a “machine” or a “button” reversal. Top panel: reversal curves for the A-O dependency session, after a (controlled vs.
non-controlled) machine reversal, or a (best vs. least-rewarding) button reversal. Bottom panel: reversal curves for
the value and the variance session after a machine reversal (best vs. least-rewarding machine, or low vs. high variable
machine, respectively). For the sake of readability, subjects’ error bars are not shown. Model simulations: CF (red bars);
RL (light grey); BM (light green bars); BC (dark green bars). Bars indicate standard error. RL: reinforcement-learning
model; CF: counterfactual model; BC: Bayesian-controller model; BM: Bayesian-maximizer model. Dashed vertical lines
indicate reversal point. Horizontal grey lines indicate chance level. (B) Comparison of the posterior probability (PP)
of each model, for each session. The PP is calculated from the BIC, which penalizes model complexity. The blue dashed
line represents the chance level at 0.25. The insert chart shows the exceedance probability (XP) of each model in the set.
The blue vertical dashed line shows the 95% threshold. In all three sessions, the CF model best explained the data.
trol comes at no surprise. The same remark applies to
the variance session where no machine was controlled
neither (Figure 6A, bottom, right). In this session, hu-
man participants showed a marked preference for the
low-variable machine, and switched their choice after
reversal so as to retrieve this preferred machine. Im-
portantly, only the CF model was able to simulate this
preference for poorly variable choice outcomes.
Experiment 1: discussion
The first experiment tested whether, and how well,
human participants adjusted to self- vs. externally
generated changes in a task where the source of these
changes was uncertain.
Our results show that participants discriminated well
between best- and least-rewarding buttons and be-
tween controlled and non-controlled machines. Hence,
they preferentially chose the controlled machine over
the non-controlled machine, while exhibiting a marked
preference for both highly rewarding and low-variable
machines. In the context of goal-directed control, this
preference for high reward and low variance is reminis-
cent of the literature on self-attribution biases: adults
are more likely to believe they control the occurrence of
positive, relative to negative, events (e.g., Mezulis et al.,
2004) while spontaneously assuming that series of low-
variable events are more likely to be generated by in-
tentional than non-intentional agents (e.g., Boland and
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Table 1: Mean (± s.e.m.) posterior probability (PP) of each model in each session and/or experiment. The exceedance probability
(XP, in bold) refers to the probability that a given model fits the data better than all other models. CF: counterfactual
model; RL: reinforcement-learning model; BC: Bayesian-controller model; BM: Bayesian-maximizer model.
Expt. Session CF RL BM BC
Dependency
.60 (± .01) .14 (± .005) .12 (± .003) .12 (± .003)
99% <1% <1% <1%
1a Value
.57 (± .01) .17 (± .01) .11 (± .003) .14 (± .006)
98% <2% <1% <1%
Variance
.58 (± .01) .16 (± .006) .12 (± .005) .12 (± .005)
98% <2% <1% <1%
Dependency
.47 (± .01) .19 (± .006) .17 (± .005) .17 (± .005)
92% <4% <3% <3%
1b Value
.53 (± .01) .18 (± .006) .14 (± .005) .13 (± .004)
97% <2% <1% <1%
Variance
.50 (± .01) .17 (± .006) .16 (± .005) .15 (± .004)
96% <2% <2% <2%
2
.85 (± .004) .06 (± .002) .04 (± .001) .04 (± .001)
99% <1% <1% <1%
Pawitan, 1999; Caruso, Waytz, and Epley, 2010). Un-
surprisingly, the pattern of preference exhibited across
all 3 sessions suggests that participants construe their
action, not only as a mean to make a difference to the
world (instrumental divergence), but also as an instru-
ment to bring about positive events, and to reduce the
inherent variability of the environment.
Both quantitative (BIC) and qualitative (simulated
learning curves) results showed that a model drawing
on pure associative processes (RL) cannot fully explain
participants’ behaviours, nor can generative models
making choices based on either gain (BM) or control
(BC) maximization strategies. Rather, we found that a
model (CF) deriving the consequences of the forgone
action from the current action taken, and assuming
relative (i.e., context-dependent) divergence between
both, best explained the data.
While BC and BM models had explicit priors about
control in the task – assuming distinct outcome distribu-
tions depending on the subject’s choice –, the CF model
was endowed with a more general prior about instru-
mental divergence. This prior implements the belief
that taking a specific action (e.g., choosing option A vs.
B) makes a difference in terms of the outcome. Impor-
tantly, instrumental divergence is a reliable proxy for
goal-directed control as the greater the action diverges
with respect to its contingent states (the factual and
counterfactual outcomes), the more flexible control
one has over the environment. The fact that CF best
explains data in all conditions suggests that human
subjects construe their causal power based on such a
prior. Interestingly, the CF model also best accounted
for the participants’ choice even when no true control
existed, suggesting that this prior holds as a default
belief, whereby goal-directed actions are thought to be
causally efficient (i.e., divergent) in nature.
This study had two limitations. First, all sessions
were not fully counterbalanced between subjects. All
participants underwent the dependency session first,
and then the two remaining sessions, where no true
control was implemented. Besides, instructions given
across all three sessions systematically emphasized the
notion of control over the task. In a follow-up experi-
ment (n=20), we thus ran a similar task while carefully
controlling for these two potential biases. Sessions
were fully counterbalanced and verbal and written
instructions were kept as minimal as possible (see Ap-
pendix B, “Experiment 1b: method and results”).
Most of the results from experiment 1 were repli-
cated. As expected, participants exhibited a strong
preference for high rewards and preferentially chose
low-variable machines, regardless of their overall value.
We also found that participants were able to discrimi-
nate between causally efficient actions, and to identify
where in the task environment choosing one action
rather than another made a difference to the outcome
(the controlled machine), and where it did not (the
non-controlled machine). Finally, we again found that
a model based on a simple context-dependent counter-
factual rule (CF) outperformed all competing models,
including a pure reinforcement learner (RL) and a
model that explicitly aimed at maximizing reward by
means of Bayesian inference (BM).
In both experiment 1 and its follow-up, each statis-
tic (dependency, value, variance) was tested within a
different session, therefore limiting the opportunity to
test and control for their potential interactions. In a
second experiment, we addressed this limitation by im-
plementing a factorial design where these statics were
systematically crossed. In addition to controlling for
interaction effects, this experimental design allowed
for better characterizing subjects’ choices in situations
where these statistics were explicitly conflicting.
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Figure 7: Schematic of experimental conditions in Experiment 2. Contribution of action-outcome dependency (controlled
vs. non-controlled machine), outcome value (x-axis) and outcome variance (y-axis), to the participant’s choice, was
assessed by manipulating the reward probability distributions associated with each button of each machine. Red and
green Gaussian distributions: rewards from the controlled machine when the best- and least-rewarding buttons were
selected, respectively. Grey distributions: rewards from the non-controlled machine, irrespective of the button selected.
X-axis: the value of the controlled, relative to the non-controlled, machine, varied across three levels (low, medium, and
high) – e.g., “low” level: the value of the controlled machine was low relative to the non-controlled machine. Y-axis: the
variance of the controlled, relative to the non-controlled, machine, varied across three levels (low, medium, and high) –
e.g., “low” level: the variance of the controlled machine was low relative to the non-controlled machine. Experimental
conditions are numbered from 1 to 9 (top left to bottom right).
Experiment 2: method
Participants
26 participants (14 females, age between 21 and 40
years-old) took part in Experiment 2. As before, they
provided written informed consent prior to the exper-
iment and were all paid 80 euros for the whole ex-
periment (4 sessions). No participants had a history
of neurological or psychiatric disorder, and all had a
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment
was approved by the local ethics review board (CCP
C07-28). Participants were informed about the general
procedure of the experiment through detailed written
instructions.
Experimental sessions
The task (stimuli, timeline, and trial structure) was
identical to that used in experiment 1. The only dif-
ference was implemented by the experimental design.
Each participant completed 4 sessions, each lasting ap-
proximately 1 hour. Each session was carried out on a
different day. A session consisted in 9 experimental con-
ditions of 140 trials each (Figure 7), and was preceded
by a brief training (64 trials). The order of conditions
was pseudo-randomized within each session.
As in the previous experiment, the “statistical depen-
dency” between action and outcome was manipulated
by implementing a controlled (divergent) machine for
which each button led to a different outcome, and a
non-controlled (non-divergent) machine for which the
reward was the same, regardless of the button pressed.
For the controlled and non-controlled machines the
gains associated with each button were discretized re-
wards drawn from Gaussian probability distributions,
whose variance and mean depended on the condition
(see below). The “value” and “variance” dimensions
were crossed within a 3-by-3 factorial design, with
each dimension varying across three levels (Figure 7):
1. The value dimension referred to the mean of the
reward probability distribution associated with
each machine. The mean of the controlled ma-
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chine could vary across three different values (i.e.,
low = 42, medium = 54, high = 62) whereas
the mean of the non-controlled machine was kept
constant (i.e., 62). Low, medium, and high value
characterized the average reward delivered by the
controlled, relative to the non-controlled, machine
(Figure 7, x-axis). The “low” value level indicated
that that the controlled machine was on average
less rewarding than the non-controlled machine,
whereas the “high” level indicated that the non-
controlled machine was more rewarding than the
non-controlled one.
2. The variance dimension referred to the standard
deviation (SD) of the reward probability distribu-
tion associated with each machine. The standard
deviation of the controlled machine was kept con-
stant all over the task (SD = 10) whereas the
standard deviation of the non-controlled machine
varied across three levels (low, SD = 5; medium,
SD =10; high, SD = 15) (Figure 7, y-axis). These
3 levels characterized the variability of the re-
wards delivered by the controlled, relative to the
non-controlled, machine. Thus, the “low” vari-
ance level indicated that the controlled machine
was less variable than the non-controlled machine,
whereas the “high” variance level indicated that
the controlled machine was more variable than
the non-controlled one.
Because the 3 levels of each dimension character-
ized the value and variance of the controlled machine
relative to the non-controlled machine, we now refer
to these as low, medium, and high, “relative levels”.
In the following, we looked at whether choice propor-
tion changed as a function of the relative value and
relative variance of the controlled machine. Specifi-
cally, we asked whether the proportion of choice for the
best-rewarding button and/or the controlled machine
would change as the controlled machine became more
or less rewarding, or more or less variable, than the
non-controlled machine.
Reversals
Finally, button or machine reversals could occur within
each experimental condition as before. Button rever-
sals consisted in the best-rewarding button (e.g., the
square) becoming the least-rewarding button (e.g., the
circle) of the controlled machine, whereas machine re-
versals consisted in the controlled machine becoming
the non-controlled machine. Within each experimen-
tal condition, 6 reversals (3 machine reversals and 3
button reversals) could occur after a variable number
of trials (between 14 and 26, uniformly jittered).
Experiment 2: results
Percentage of choices
We investigated the effect of the value and the variance
dimensions, together with their interaction, on two de-
pendent variables: (i) the proportion of choice for the
controlled machine, and (ii) the proportion of choices
for the best-rewarding button of the controlled ma-
chine. As in the previous experiment, the proportion of
choice for the best-rewarding button was normalized
by subtracting from it the proportion of choice for the
least-rewarding button, within each condition.
The proportion of choices for the controlled ma-
chine, as well as the proportion of choices for the
best-rewarding button, were analysed using two 3 ×
3 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with the value (low vs.
medium vs. high) and variance (low vs. medium vs.
high) as within-subjects factors. Participants discrimi-
nated well between the controlled and non-controlled
machines across all 9 conditions, but the proportion
of choice for the controlled machine differed signif-
icantly as a function of the dimension manipulated.
Thus, we found a significant main effect of the value
(F2,50 = 283.50, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.91) and a signif-
icant main effect of the variance (F2,50 = 5.48, p =
0.007, η2p = 0.18) factor on the proportion of choice for
the controlled machine. The proportion of choice for
the controlled machine progressively increased as its
relative value increased (low < medium < high, post
hoc test, all p < 0.001), but also when its relative vari-
ance decreased (low vs. medium, p = 0.009; medium
vs. high, p = 0.04). These results are consistent with
the high-value and low-variance biases observed in
experiment 1, wherein participants tended to prefer-
entially select the machine with the highest value and
the lowest variance (see Figure 5).
The value-by-variance interaction effect was also sig-
nificant (F4,100 = 6.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.21). Thus,
when the relative value of the controlled machine was
high, participants more often chose this machine, irre-
spective of the variance dimension; that is, they chose
the controlled machine in similar proportions whether
the controlled machine was highly or poorly variable
(post hoc tests comparing low vs. medium vs. high
variance, all p > 0.12). On the other hand, when the
value of the controlled machine was low, participants
tended to choose the controlled machine more when it
was poorly, rather than highly, variable (comparing low
vs. medium variance, p = 0.07; low vs. high variance,
p = 0.005). In other words, the variance dimension
had the strongest effect on the choice of the controlled
machine when the value of this machine was the lowest
(Figure 8, top panel, “Machine choice”, “LOW value”).
As in experiment 1, we then compared the propor-
tion of choice for the best-rewarding button across con-
ditions. We again found significant main effects of the
value (F2,50 = 78.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.75) and vari-
ance (F2,50 = 4.28, p < 0.019, η2p = 0.14) dimensions.
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Figure 8: Participants’ performance: mean proportion of choice (± s.e.m.) across each dimension manipulated. Top
panel: proportion of choice for the controlled machine in trials where the machine had a low, medium, or high value,
relative to the non-controlled machine (x-axis), and had a low, medium, or high, variance, relative to the non-controlled
machine (black, dark grey, and light grey, solid lines, respectively). The interaction effect between the value and variance
factors was significant: the variance dimension had the strongest effect on the choice of the controlled machine when the
value of this machine was the lowest. Bottom panel: normalized proportion of choice for the best-rewarding button in
trials where the controlled machine had a low, medium, or high value, relative to the non-controlled machine, and had a
low, medium, or high, variance, relative to the non-controlled machine. As for the choice of the controlled machine, the
interaction effect between the value and variance factors was significant. Two-stars: p < 0.005; Three-stars: p < 0.001;
ns. = p > 0.05.
With respect to the value dimension, the higher the
relative value of the controlled machine, the more of-
ten participants chose the best, relative to the least,
rewarding button (post-hoc tests: low vs. medium=
0.28 vs. 0.17, p < 0.001; medium vs. high, p < 0.001).
In other terms, the more rewarding was the controlled,
relative to the non-controlled, machine, the more par-
ticipants discriminated between each button, and the
more their choice reflected the true “divergence” of
the controlled machine (Figure S2). The same was
observed for the variance dimension: the proportion of
choice for the best, relative to the least, rewarding but-
ton increased as the relative variance of the controlled
machine decreased (post hoc tests comparing low vs.
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Figure 9: (A) Bar graphs comparing the proportion of choice (± error bars) across buttons and machines, averaged
across all dimensions of the task design. Bars: participants’ performance; dots and diamonds: models’ performance.
For the sake of visibility, models’ error bars are not shown. Three-stars: p < 0.001. (B) Reversal curves (± error
bars) for participants (solid black line) and models (colored bars), up to 15 trials after a button reversal. The
horizontal grey line indicates chance level. Dashed vertical lines indicate reversal point (left graph: machine reversal;
right graph: button reversal). Model simulation: CF (red bars); RL (light grey); BM (light green bars); BC (dark green
bars). (C) Comparison of the posterior probability (PP) of each model, for each session. The PP is calculated
from the BIC, which penalizes model complexity. The blue dashed line represents the chance level at 0.25. The right
graph shows the exceedance probability (XP) of each model in the set, with the blue dashed line representing the 95%
threshold.
medium variance: 0.15 vs. 0.17, p = 0.07; medium vs.
high variance: 0.17 vs. 0.19, p = 0.005) (Figure S3).
Finally, the value-by-variance interaction effect was
also significant (F4,100 = 8.54, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25).
We found the same pattern of interaction as for the ma-
chine choice: the variance dimension had the strongest
effect on button choice as the value of the controlled
machine decreased (Figure 8, bottom panel, “Button
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Figure 10: Models’ performance: mean proportion of choice (± s.e.m.) across each dimension manipulated. Stars
indicate a significant interaction between the value and variance factors. Only the CF model replicate the interactions
observed in human subjects, for both machine (left) and button (right) choices. The BC model actually shows the
opposite interaction effects. One-star: p < 0.05; Three-stars: p < 0.001; ns. = p > 0.05.
choice”, “LOW value”).
In sum, for both dependent variables (machine and
button choices), the outcome value had an overwhelm-
ing influence on participants’ choice, and this influence
largely overrode the effect of variance. As a conse-
quence, the effect of variance could only be observed
in conditions where the value of the controlled ma-
chine was the lowest (see Figure 8, top and bottom
panels).
Model comparison
The same four models were fitted and simulated to the
data as before. Again, the CF model best predicted
participants’ choices (exceedance probability = 99%,
Table 1, and Figure 9C), whether with regard to choice
proportion for the best-rewarding button (Figure 9A,
CF = black circles) or to choice proportion along the
value (Figure S2) or the variance (Figure S3) dimen-
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sions.
Importantly, the participant’s sensitivity to action-
outcome dependency was best accounted for by the
CF model. Thus, CF was the only model that did not
underestimate the difference in choice proportion be-
tween buttons of the controlled and non-controlled
machines (see Figure 9A, black circle). The CF model
also correctly simulated the participant’s choices along
the value dimension. Thus, the CF model was able to
reproduce the participant’s propensity to better discrim-
inate between the “best” and “worst” buttons as the
value of the controlled, relative to the non-controlled,
machine increased (Figure S2). The RL (grey circles)
and BM model (grey diamonds) showed a similar, al-
though less clear-cut, pattern of choice. In contrast, the
BC model (white diamonds) exhibited the same pat-
tern of choices across all 3 levels of the dimension, and
both BC and BM models underestimated the difference
between the two buttons of the controlled machine
in the high value condition. The same applied to the
variance dimension: both the CF and RL models were
able to discriminate buttons of the controlled machine
while choosing equally often the two buttons of the
non-controlled one (Figure S3). In contrast to the BC
and BM models, CF and RL also tended to more often
choose the low-variable, relative to the high-variable,
machine, as participants did.
As for participants, models’ choices for the controlled
machine and for the best-rewarding button were anal-
ysed further using two 3 × 3 ANOVAs, with value (low
vs. medium vs. high) and variance (low vs. medium
vs. high) as within-subjects factors. Relative to par-
ticipants’ performance, only the CF model was able
to replicate the main effects of the value (machine
choice: F2,50 = 289.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92; but-
ton choice: F2,50 = 86.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.77) and
of the variance (machine choice: F2,50 = 2.50, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.33; button choice: F2,50 = 5.03, p =
0.01, η2p = 0.16) factors, as well as the significant
interaction effects between them (machine choice:
F4,100 = 21.98, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.46; button choice:
F4,100 = 2.68, p = 0.035, η
2
p = 0.09; post hoc compar-
ing low vs. high variance, p = 0.032) (Figure 10, “CF
model”). Importantly, none of the 3 other models could
replicate this exact pattern of performance.
The CF model also showed the most consistent re-
versal curves across conditions, outperforming all com-
peting models when adjusting to changes according
to either action-outcome dependency (Figure 9B), out-
come value (Figure S2) or outcome variance (Figure
S3). Specifically, both the BM and CF models correctly
simulated the participant’s learning curves, whether
in terms of dynamic (slope) and absolute performance
(plateau), while the RL model converged to the plateau
of performance more slowly than real subjects did.
Note that the BC model (dark green line) was designed
to preferentially choose the action associated with the
controlled machine, and hence systematically reversed
choice after reversal of the best button.
Experiment 2: discussion
Experiment 2 reproduced most of the effects previ-
ously obtained, in a design controlling for potential
interaction effects between conditions. Importantly,
participants performed the task well despite no ex-
plicit cue was available to signal the transition from
one condition to the other. In a situation where un-
certainty was high, participants were able to monitor
the different statistics implemented by the task, and
to adjust when these statistics changed and reversals
in (either machine or button) contingencies occurred.
In line with experiment 1, we found that participants
chose more often the controlled machine when the rel-
ative value of this machine increased, but also when
its relative variance decreased, consistently with the
literature on self-attribution biases. Likewise, when the
value of control increased, participants discriminated
better between the best and worst option of the con-
trolled machine, and choice behaviour was hence found
to better reflect the true divergence of the controlled
machine. Finally, we found a significant interaction
between value and variance factors. Specifically, a sig-
nificant effect of variance onmachine and button choice
was observed in low-value trials only. This interaction
suggests that competition between both statistics is
fundamentally asymmetrical. In case of a conflict, sub-
jective preferences for highly valued options overrode
preferences for options giving rise to poorly variable
outcomes. On the other hand, when the difference
in value between competing options was low, subjects
made a choice based on variance estimates from past
choice outcomes.
As expected, the overall effect of value on choice was
well captured by algorithms that aimed at maximizing
rewarding value (RL, CF), while an optimal learner aim-
ing to maximize control (BC) failed to account for this
effect. We again found that the CF model outperformed
all competitors according to both quantitative (BIC)
and qualitative (reversal curves) criteria. Interestingly,
CF was the only model to not systematically under-
estimate the difference in choice proportion between
the two buttons of the controlled and non-controlled
machines, and to better discriminate between each
button of the controlled machine as the value of this
machine increased, as participants did. The CF model
was also the only model to replicate the exact pattern
of performance found in human subjects. Thus, the
CF model increasingly chose the controlled machine
and the best-rewarding button as the value of this ma-
chine increased (main effect of value), but also as its
variance decreased (main effect of variance). Critically,
choices of the CF model also exhibited a significant
value-by-variance interaction effect. Thus, the effect of
variance on the model’s choices was only observed in
low-value trials, as in human participants. In sum, we
found that one single model (CF) was able to simulate
participants’ performance across all three dimensions,
and was able to do so with the same set of parameters
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and same parameter values.
In the next section of the paper, we analysed and
compared further the parameters of the “winning” CF
model across both experiments 1 and 2, namely: (1)
the reference point, and (2) the factual and counter-
factual learning rates. Importantly, these two sets of
parameters can be seen as direct or indirect proxies for
instrumental control:
1. The “reference” is a fitted parameter whose value
approximated the mean of the reward distribu-
tion associated with the chosen action (see Figure
11A and 11B). It is an add-on to the classical RL
algorithm, that implements control as difference-
making. Thus, the more the value of the reference
departs from the true reference, the more diver-
gent actions are, that is the greater the difference
between the outcomes associated with the cho-
sen and unchosen actions (see Figure 11C, for an
illustration).
2. The “counterfactual (CF) learning rate” is a proxy
for howmuch weight is given to the counterfactual
prediction error. In a world where instrumental
control is assumed (i.e., a world where factual and
counterfactual actions give rise to different out-
comes), a CF learning rate is a measure of how fast
Figure 11: Fitted individual references across the different sessions of Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). The bars
represent the value of the fitted reference relative to the true reference, i.e., the true mean of the reward distributions
(vertical red line), in each participant. A negative value indicates that the participant underestimated the true reference.
The greater the negative value, the lower the counterfactual reward inferred by the subject, relative to the factual
reward (OCF < OF ). Conversely, the greater the positive value, the greater the counterfactual reward inferred by the
subject, relative to the factual one. Below the red line, the vertical dashed blue line represents the group mean of the
fitted reference. Over individual bars, the solid dark curve represents the divergence between chosen and unchosen
alternatives in each subject. The divergence was calculated by subtracting the factual from the counterfactual reward on
each trial, based on the subject’s fitted reference, and averaging the result over all trials. (C) True vs. fitted reference.
When combined with the contextual rule of the CF model, underestimating the true reference leads to exaggerating the
divergence between factual and counterfactual outcomes (e.g., 24 rather than 32).
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the divergence between factual and counterfactual
outcomes builds up over time.
CF model: best-fitting parameters
We first compared the value of the reference parameter
against the “true” reference, i.e., the true mean of the
reward distributions, in both experiments. The value
of the fitted reference overall approximated the mean
of the reward distributions (t-tests against the mean
of the reward distributions in each experiment: all
p > 0.05, except for the variance condition: p = 0.04,
see Figure 11). Note that the value of the fitted ref-
erence varied across subjects, with some participants
substantially underestimating the true mean of the cur-
rent distribution (see Figure 11, vertical dashed black
lines). Interestingly, participants who underestimated
the true mean also tended to exaggerate instrumental
divergence as a result – i.e., the difference between
chosen (factual reward) and unchosen (counterfactual
reward) alternatives (see Figure 11A and 11B, dark
solid curve, and 11C).
We next compared factual and counterfactual learn-
ing rates within and between experiments. Three coun-
terfactual alternatives were updated on each trial:
• the unchosen button of the chosen machine
(αCF1),
• the chosen button of the unchosen machine
(αCF2),
• the unchosen button of the unchosen machine
(αCF3).
To first compare the factual and counterfactual learn-
ing rates of experiment 1, we carried out a 2 × 2 × 3
repeated-measures ANOVA, with the button (chosen
vs. unchosen), the machine (chosen vs. unchosen),
and the 3 different statistics (dependency vs. value
vs. variance), as within-subjects factors. A similar 2
× 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on all
pooled conditions of experiment 2.
In experiment 1, the main effect of the “machine”
(F1,15 = 4.66, p < 0.03, η2p = 0.273) and the main ef-
fect of the “button” (F1,15 = 15.78, p = 0.005, η2p =
0.51) were significant. Thus, the learning rate associ-
ated with the chosen machine was significantly lower
than the learning rate associated with the unchosen
machine (post-hoc test, all p < 0.04), whereas the
learning rate associated with the chosen button was
globally higher than that of the unchosen button (all
p < 0.001).
The machine-by-button interaction effect was also
significant (F1,15 = 60.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80).
Across all three sessions of experiment 1, post hoc
tests showed that learning rates of the chosen buttons
did not differ across chosen (αF ) and unchosen (αCF2)
machines, while learning rates associated with the un-
chosen buttons (αCF1 vs. αCF3) differed significantly
(all p < 0.001). Chosen (αF ) and unchosen (αCF1) but-
tons of the chosen machine also differed significantly
(all p < 0.001), while they could not be distinguished
for the unchosen machine (αCF2 vs. αCF3) (Figure
12A). This interaction effect was observed in all con-
ditions equally (i.e., no significant modulation of the
machine-by-button interaction by the type of statis-
tics: F1,15 = 1.17, p = 0.3, η2p = 0.07). Experiment 2
showed the same tendency as in the previous exper-
iment (see Figure 12B). However, only the machine-
by-button interaction effect was statistically significant
(F1,25 = 4.06, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.21). Note that the pat-
tern of fitted learning rates from the CF model was
correctly recovered when applying the procedure to
simulated data, and hence was not an artefact of the
parameter optimization procedure (see Figure 12C,
and Appendix D, “Parameter recovery procedure”).
Interestingly, our findings reveal that participants
calibrate their learning rates in a way that reflects their
belief about the task structure. First, counterfactual
(CF) learning rates associated to the button or to the
machine were significantly higher than zero in all ex-
periments and conditions (see Figure 12, comparing
αCF1, αCF2, αCF3 > 0, all p < 0.005). A high CF
learning rate indicates that participants update the
value of the forgone alternative; this counterfactual
update results in making the value of the unchosen
alternative diverge from the value of what is currently
chosen. Thus, above-zero CF learning rates show that
our participants construed their actual choice as being
causally efficient, i.e., as making a difference relative
to the unchosen alternative.
A CF learning rate is formally equivalent to the no-
tion of “mutability” in previous work on counterfactual
reasoning (e.g., Dehghani, Iliev, and Kaufmann, 2012;
Kahneman and Miller, 1986). Mutability is a property
of a variable that signals whether the variable is likely
to take different values in the real and counterfactual
worlds. Thus, a highly mutable variable is highly likely
to diverge across factual and counterfactual worlds
(Lucas and Kemp, 2015). Similarly, a machine associ-
ated with a high CF learning rate is a highly mutable
machine: choosing this machine, rather than the other
one, should make a significant difference with respect
to the outcome. Conversely, a low CF learning rate
would minimize the divergence, while a null CF learn-
ing rate would signal a null divergence between the
chosen and unchosen options. Importantly, our re-
sults revealed a hierarchy across buttons and machines.
Counterfactual learning rates were higher for the ma-
chine than for the button, suggesting that participants
conceived the former as being more “mutable” than
the latter. In other words, participants considered that
making a choice about the machine was more likely
to make a difference to the world relative to making a
choice about the button.
What does this hierarchy account for? We suggest
that counterfactual emulation is more likely to be lever-
aged for testing control at most abstract levels of action
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Figure 12: Fitted learning rates from the winning model (CF). (A) Expt. 1: Factual (αF ) and counterfactual learning rates
(αCF ) within each experimental session, for each button (chosen, unchosen) and each machine (chosen, unchosen).
(B) Expt. 2: Factual and counterfactual learning rates for all conditions pooled together. (C) Parameter recovery
procedure: “True value”: learning rates used to simulate the data (see Appendix D, Table S1). “Recovered value”:
learning rates obtained from fitting the model on the simulated data. “Subjects” = highest learning rate for the
unchosen button; “flat” = identical learning rates across the unchosen button and the unchosen machine; “reverse” =
highest learning rates for the unchosen machine. Our parameter optimization procedure was able to correctly recover
the (true) parameter values from all patterns in all sessions.
representation (e.g., at the level of the machines), and
less required for less abstract levels (e.g., the level of
the buttons) where direct instrumental testing is avail-
able to the subject. Crucially, should this prediction
be correct, counterfactual emulation would be opti-
mal in an environment where instrumental divergence
is maximal between machines, rather than between
buttons.
We directly tested this hypothesis by simulating our
CF model across two different environments: (1) an en-
vironment where divergence wasmaximal between but-
tons, or (2) an environment where divergence wasmax-
imal between machines (see Figure 13A, left and right
panels, respectively, and Appendix D “Performance of
the CF model”). We tested the performance of differ-
ent patterns of learning rates across these two types
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Figure 13: (A) Simulated performance of the winning model (CF) across two different environments, with three distinct
patterns of learning rate. Left panel: performance of the CF model when the divergence is maximal between buttons
(red and green distributions). The pattern of participants (dark box: “subjects”) is outperformed by the two alternative
patterns (“flat” and “reverse”). Right panel: performance of the CF model when the divergence is maximal between
machines (dark and light grey distributions). Here, the pattern of participants outperforms the two alternative patterns.
Model’s performance is normalized against chance-level. αF = factual learning rate (chosen button of the chosen
machine); αCF = counterfactual learning rate (unchosen button and/or unchosen machine). Three-stars: p < 0.001.
(B) Averaged performance of the CF winning model (y-axis) across the two environments, depending on the
value of the reference point (x-axis). Model’s performance is optimal in both environments when the reference point
approximates the true mean (red vertical line), as most subjects did (green and dark circles). The hatched areas
delineate the range of reference values for which the CF model outperforms the RL model (horizontal dashed lines). In
both environments, model’s performance is normalized against chance-level.
of environment: i) a pattern that was similar to that
of participants (higher CF learning rates for the most
abstract level, i.e., the unchosen machine), ii) the re-
verse pattern (lower CF learning rates for the unchosen
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machine), and iii) a flat pattern (equal learning rates
across unchosen machines and buttons) (see Appendix
D, Table S1). Consistently with our prediction, we
found that the pattern of participants outperformed
the two alternative patterns in the environment where
the divergence was set at the most abstract level, i.e.,
the machine level (see Figure 13A). Importantly, this
was all the more true as values of the reference point
approximated the true mean of outcome distributions
(see Figure 13B).
General discussion
Using a modified reversal-learning procedure, we
tested whether, and how well, human participants
could adjust to self- vs. externally-generated changes in
a task where the source of these changes was uncertain.
Specifically, any perceived changes could potentially be
ascribed to three different causes: (i) the participant’s
choice, (ii) the intrinsic variability of the outcome, or
(ii) a reversal in either instrumental or environmental
contingencies. Thus, maximizing performance in the
task required the ability to discriminate action-related
changes from changes due to intrinsic feedback noise
and/or external volatility, and to adjust one’s choice
behaviours accordingly.
Behavioural results: control, value and variance
In all experiments, we found that participants were able
to discriminate best- from least- rewarding buttons,
and to distinguish between the controlled and non-
controlled machines – that is, between the machine for
which there was a best- and a least-rewarding button
and the machine for which both buttons were equally
rewarding. Participants performed the task well de-
spite no explicit cue was available to signal reversals in
the best-rewarding button or in the controlled machine.
In experiment 1, participants preferentially chose the
controlled machine over the non-controlled machine,
while also exhibiting a marked preference for the best-
valued and low-variable machines in both experiments
1 and 2. Interestingly, both outcome value and vari-
ance had an effect on the proportion of the controlled
machine. Thus, participants more often chose the con-
trolled machine when the relative value of this machine
increased but also when its relative variance decreased.
Likewise, when the value of control increased, partici-
pants discriminated better between the best and worst
option of the controlled machine, and choice behaviour
was hence found to better reflect the true divergence
of the controlled machine.
This interaction between value and control, and
between variance and control, is reminiscent of self-
attribution biases, whereby healthy adults take credit
for positive outcomes while denying responsibility for
negative events (e.g., Mezulis et al., 2004), and over-
estimate the variability of random series while under-
estimating the variability of self-caused events (e.g.,
Boland and Pawitan, 1999). Spurious positive rela-
tionships between control and value are further exem-
plified in situations where people mistake the value
of an event for real control over this event, through
inflating probabilistic estimates of action-event contin-
gencies (Kool, Getz, and Botvinick, 2013). This inter-
play between control, (high) value, and (low) variance,
suggests that individuals construe the effects of their
action along multiple dimensions: as a mean to make
a difference to the world, but also as an instrument to
bring about positive events, and to reduce the inherent
variability of the environment. Importantly, we found
that one single model (CF) was able to simulate partic-
ipants’ performance across all three dimensions, and
was able to do so with both the same set of parameters
and same parameter values.
Associative learning and counterfactual update
In both experiments, optimal performance required a
complete knowledge of the underlying causal structure
of the task, namely, a representation of each proba-
bility distribution relating each possible action to a
particular state. Thus reaching optimal performance
was computationally costly, as it ideally required main-
taining probability distributions across all alternative
causes and updating all possible alternatives at once,
whenever integrating new evidence. Whether such a
strategy is used, or even usable, by human subjects re-
mains conjecture (Eckstein et al., 2004; Jones and Love,
2011). Although they lack an explicit representation of
instrumental contingencies, simpler learning schemes,
e.g., based on pure associative processes, can readily
adapt to causally structured environments, at much
a lesser cost (Dickinson, 2001). On the other hand,
associative processes only enable a form of proximal
instrumentality, whereby acquisition and performance
of new and existing behavioural strategies are regu-
lated by their immediate consequences. Accordingly,
associative agents only slowly adapt to environments
with periodically changing action-outcome mappings,
and hence would hardly approximate the efficiency of
human performance (Gershman, Markman, and Otto,
2014). An intermediate solution would consist in com-
bining a (simple) associative learning scheme with a
generative rule for emulating an approximate version
of the environment’s causal structure. In contrast with
pure associative algorithms, this “combined” model
would assume a generative source behind observation,
but this source would not have to be a fully specified
probability distribution of expected action outcomes.
Models of counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Lucas and
Kemp, 2015) can be specified so as to permit action
outcomes to take different values in the real and coun-
terfactual worlds. Importantly, these models can also
account for hierarchical inference in causal reasoning
by allowing factual and counterfactual action values
to be updated according to different dynamics (e.g.,
Page 28 of 36
Believing in one’s power: a counterfactual heuristic for goal-directed control
learning rates).
We tested and compared the ability of associative,
generative, and counterfactual models to account for
the participants’ data across all experiments. We found
that models that merely aimed at maximizing action
value – whether by prediction-error minimization (RL)
or by means of Bayesian inference (BM) – could not
explain the participants’ choices well, neither could a
model (BC) that aimed at maximizing control over the
task, regardless of action value. On both quantitative
(BIC) and qualitative (reversal curves) criteria, partic-
ipants’ behaviour was best accounted for by a model
that made choices based on counterfactual contingen-
cies, i.e., a model that emulated unseen action-outcome
pairs according to a contextual rule. Thus, counter-
factual contingencies were emulated by deriving the
consequences of the forgone action from the current
action taken and by assuming relative (i.e., context-
dependent) divergence between both. Importantly, in-
strumental divergence was implemented in the model
as a prior.
Specifically, this prior conveys the belief that taking
a specific action (e.g., choosing option A vs. B) makes
a difference in terms of the outcome. As mentioned
above, instrumental divergence is a reliable proxy for
goal-directed control as the greater the action diverges
with respect to its contingent states (the factual and
counterfactual outcomes), the more flexible control
one has over the environment. The fact that the CF
model best explained the data in all conditions sug-
gests that human subjects construe their causal power
based on such a prior. Interestingly, the CF model also
best accounted for the participants’ choice even when
no true control existed (i.e., “value” and “variance”
conditions), suggesting that this prior holds as a de-
fault belief, whereby goal-directed actions are thought
to be causally efficient (i.e., divergent) in nature. Fi-
nally, only the CF model was able to replicate the value-
by-variance interaction observed in subjects, for both
machine and button choices, while the other models
replicated this pattern only partially (e.g., RL) or ex-
hibited the reverse pattern of performance (e.g., BC)
(see Figure 10).
The counterfactual world negatively covaries
with the real world
Counterfactual reasoning has been the subject of many
investigations in the decision-making domain, from
regret-based theory of choice (e.g., Coricelli et al.,
2005; Bell, 1982) to empirical works on fictive learn-
ing, i.e., learning from alternative action values (e.g.,
Lohrenz et al., 2007). While it has been repeatedly
shown that instrumental learning benefits from track-
ing alternative courses of action and their outcomes,
how these counterfactuals are generated, and based on
what rule, is currently unclear. In most studies on fic-
tive learning, subjects are explicitly informed about the
result of the forgone alternative (e.g., Lohrenz et al.,
2007; Palminteri et al., 2015; Boorman, Behrens, and
Rushworth, 2011). In our task, however, the reward as-
sociated with the unchosen machine was not shown to
the participant but had to be inferred given the chosen
button. Crucially, our CF model provides an algorith-
mic explanation for how counterfactual action values
were inferred, based on a flexible, context-dependent,
reference, whose value was fitted separately to each
participant’s data.
As previously argued, exploiting counterfactual in-
formation can be beneficial to the learner, provided
the cost of getting and storing the information is not
too high (Boorman, Behrens, and Rushworth, 2011).
Importantly, the context-dependent reference embed-
ded in the CF model approximated the mean of the
generative distributions in the task, and thus allowed
for emulating counterfactuals at low cost. The mean
is a simple and often-optimal operator that affords
minimizing error in error-prone situations. Under un-
certainty, making decisions based on an averaged rep-
resentation of the environment is often advantageous
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). In this respect, the CF model
would be efficient, not because it would maintain an
expensive, yet accurate, causal model of the task (e.g.,
the probability distributions over all possibilities), but
because it embeds a prior (the reference point) that
approximates the actual structure of the environment
(see also Parpart et al., 2017). In addition to showing
better performance than a classical RL, the CF model
also keeps simplicity in terms of algorithmic design and
computation. We argue that this simplicity provides
a step towards an explanation of how human agents
achieve a trade-off between robust causal inference
and the costs of maintaining an accurate model of the
world (Bramley et al., 2017).
Updating the counterfactual according to a context-
dependent reference is consistent with a broader lit-
erature on reference dependence in behavioural eco-
nomics, where the utilities of outcomes are assessed
relative to a context-specific reference point (e.g., Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1974; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006;
Denrell, 2015). Converging evidence from average-
learning algorithms and computational neuroscience
equally suggests that people make decisions accord-
ing to a context-dependent reference (Palminteri et
al., 2015; Klein, Ullsperger, and Jocham, 2017; Burke
et al., 2016). Importantly, providing counterfactual
information to the subject reinforces the dependence
on context for evaluating rewards and punishments
(Palminteri et al., 2015). Thus, when subjects are
informed about the result of the forgone alternative,
value contextualization is enhanced. Similar to our CF
model, such contextualization would consist in track-
ing the mean of the distribution of values of the current
choice context (i.e., the reference point), and using it
to center both factual and counterfactual option val-
ues. Such value contextualization echoes adaptive cod-
ing of outcomes in neural populations, whereby neu-
ral outputs rescale to the range of currently expected
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outcomes (Burke et al., 2016), and more generally is
consistent with studies on context-based processing
of outcome information showing that motivationally
relevant information is encoded in a relative fashion,
adapting to the current value-context (Seymour and
McClure, 2008).
Because it updates alternative action values based
on a context-dependent reference, the CF model can
be viewed as a generalization of the Rescorla-Wagner
(R-W) rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Interestingly,
counterfactual updating in associative learning can
also be modelled using a Bayesian generalization of
the R-W model, i.e., using Kalman filters based on
temporal difference (TD) learning (Keramati, Dezfouli,
and Piray, 2011). Kalman TD incorporates a compo-
nent of counterfactual thinking by encoding a negative
covariance between stimuli elements. In terms of in-
strumental learning, this covariance structure can be
leveraged to update both factual and counterfactual
action values, as learning one particular instrumental
contingency automatically leads to a reduction in the
associative strength of the unchosen contingency (Ger-
shman, 2015). In a recent study, Morris et al. (2017)
showed that instrumental learning was best explained
by a Kalman algorithm that combines prediction-error
learning with a similar covariance matrix, reflecting
the structure of the task environment. In their task,
several causal variables compete to explain the observa-
tion. The winning model assumes negative covariance
between these variables, meaning that a change in the
belief of one cause inversely affects the other (Mor-
ris et al., 2017). The covariance matrix thus allows
the learner to reason counterfactually about alternative
courses of action, hence to differentiate the unique
effects of action from background effects, i.e., from
effects that would have occurred in the absence of
that action. Morris and collaborators found that this
model, combining key features of associative learning
and model-based RL, better characterized behavioral
performance and neural activity associated with instru-
mental learning than models based on covariance or
prediction-error alone.
Morris et al. (2017)’s model has formal resemblance
with our CF model. In the CF model, however, the neg-
ative covariation between factual and counterfactual
values critically relied on a parameter, the reference
point, whose value was separately fitted in each partic-
ipant. Importantly, the value of this reference showed
some variability across participants, depending on their
subjective preferences and beliefs. Thus, while some
underestimated, some other overestimated, the true
mean of the current distributions. Interestingly, under-
estimating the true mean was self-serving in nature, as
it led to exaggerate the divergence between factual
and counterfactual outcomes. Thus, in subjects under-
estimating the true mean, the lower the reference, the
worse the outcome would have been had they made
another choice (OCF < OF , Figure 12). Conversely,
participants overestimating the true mean could be
seen as pessimistic, as they assumed that the alterna-
tive course of action would have been better off on
average (OCF > OF , Figure 12). This result agrees
with a variety of empirical works showing that, while
healthy adults exhibit attribution biases when judging
their agency, these biases vary substantially across in-
dividuals (see Mezulis et al., 2004, for a review). By
combining counterfactual updating with a subjective
reference point, the CF model allows accounting for
interindividual variability in self-serving beliefs, hence
perceived controllability, during online instrumental
learning.
Counterfactual emulation operates at most ab-
stract levels of action control
Negative covariance is at the heart of the notion of
“difference-making” in counterfactual theories of causal
reasoning. Counterfactual (CF) theories posit that a
cause is something that makes a difference to another
event (Walsh and Sloman, 2011). According to the CF
view, individuals would infer causal relations by simu-
lating models of close alternatives (“nearest possible
worlds”) in which the candidate cause (A) is negated
and the outcome is observed (O). If the outcome is
undone (O) as a result of negating the candidate cause
(A), then the probability that A is selected as the cause
should increase accordingly (e.g., Roese, 1997; Slo-
man and Lagnado, 2015; Woodward, 2005). When
applied to intentional causation, an action should be
considered ?causal? if simulating a change in that ac-
tion (e.g., the action is not taken) produces a change to
the outcome (e.g., the outcome does not occur). In CF
theories, “mutability” is a property that characterizes
the effects of “simulating” changes in one variable, and
hence can be seen as a measure of its causal power
(Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Dehghani, Iliev, and
Kaufmann, 2012). Thus, a variable is highly mutable if
realizing, relative to not realizing, this variable is likely
to make a difference to the world. Put differently: a
variable is mutable if it is likely to diverge across factual
and counterfactual worlds (Lucas and Kemp, 2015).
The notion of “mutability” closely relates to the no-
tion of counterfactual learning, as instantiated in the
CF model through a counterfactual (CF) learning rate
parameter. A CF learning rate can be viewed as measur-
ing the speed of divergence between factual and coun-
terfactual outcomes. Thus, the greater the value of the
CF learning rate, the faster the counterfactual action
value is assumed to diverge from the chosen action
value. In our task, a machine associated with a high
CF learning rate is a highly mutable machine: choosing
this machine, rather than the other one, is thought
to make a significant difference with respect to the
outcome. Importantly, our results revealed that coun-
terfactual learning was hierarchically organized: CF
learning rates were higher for the machine than for the
button, suggesting that participants conceived the for-
mer as being more “mutable” than the latter. In other
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words, participants considered that making a choice
about the machine was more likely to make a differ-
ence to the world relative to making a choice about the
button.
This hierarchy in learning from factual and coun-
terfactual action values might be well adapted to an
environment where changes in causal influence (e.g.,
reversals) operate at more or less abstract levels of
action control. Higher learning rates for the CF ma-
chine, relative to the CF button, suggest that subjects
are more likely to engage in counterfactual emulation
for testing their control at most abstract levels of ac-
tion representation (the machine), and less for less
abstract levels (the button) where direct instrumental
testing is available. Should this prediction be correct,
such hierarchy in counterfactual learning would be
advantageous in an environment where instrumental
divergence is maximal between machines, rather than
between buttons. We directly tested this hypothesis
by simulating our CF model across two different en-
vironments, where maximal instrumental divergence
was either between buttons or between machines. In
line with our predictions, we found that the CF model
was best suited to deal with an environment where the
divergence was set at the most abstract level, i.e., the
machine level (see Figure 13A).
That individuals are more likely to engage in coun-
terfactual emulation for the most abstract levels of
action control is consistent with evidence from hierar-
chical models of action representation (e.g., Chambon
et al., 2017; Kilner, 2011). In such models, an observer
predicts another people’s behaviour based on beliefs
derived from simulating one’s internal model (i.e., a
model of how people are likely to behave in a given
context). The nature of these beliefs critically depends
on the level at which the behaviour is represented,
from least to most abstract levels (e.g., kinematic vs.
motor vs. goal level). Thus, a change at the most ab-
stract level (e.g., the goal level: going to restaurant
vs. theatre) is assumed to have a greater effect on the
resulting behaviour than a change made at a less ab-
stract level (e.g., the kinematic level: using a power
vs. precision grip to grasp a mug). Importantly, human
subjects show greater reliance on their internal mod-
els when having to predict more and more abstract
behaviours (e.g., going to the restaurant vs. theatre
> using a power vs. precision grip) (Chambon et al.,
2017; Chambon et al., 2011). Likewise, our results
indicate that human subjects are more likely to emu-
late counterfactual alternatives when making decision
at more abstract levels of action control (machine >
button).
Control beliefs foster opportunities for learning
Assuming a negative covariance between factual and
counterfactual outcomes implies that the world can be
divided into states that are essentially anti-correlated.
In this scenario, two states only are possible: you are
the agent, or you are not. This assumption agrees with
the fact that judgments of agency are binary in nature.
Indeed, while individuals readily experience interme-
diate levels of sensorimotor control, confidence, or
difficulty, they rarely, if never, experience intermediate
levels of agency; they can be “more or less confident”,
but they do not feel “more or less agent” (Chambon and
Haggard, 2013). The all-or-none nature of agency is
supported further by the observation that people think
of causal relationships between actions and outcomes
in terms of “state” (is A the cause of O?) rather than in
terms of “force” (Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001). We
argue that the CF model outperforms all other mod-
els in the set because it embeds a prior that matches
the agentive structure of the current task, where bi-
nary and abrupt, rather than smooth and continuous,
changes in contingencies could occur. In this sense,
the CF model would be best suited to track changes in
agency (me vs. not-me) than gradual changes due to
external volatility (e.g., the light decreasing over the
course of a day).
We speculate that this prior about negative covari-
ance mirrors participants’ belief about their control
over machine outcomes: had their choice been dif-
ferent, the outcomes would also have been different.
Importantly, participants hold this control belief even
in sessions where no true control existed (see Exper-
iment 1, “value” and “variance” sessions), or despite
the fact that instructions made no reference to control
in the task (see Experiment 1b, Supplementary infor-
mation). Beliefs in one’s causal power are a strong
determinant of voluntary behaviours: individuals a
more likely to enact certain behaviours when they feel
or believe they can enact these behaviours successfully
(e.g., Ajzen, 2002). Control beliefs develop early and
are somewhat irrepressible: the need to be and feel
in control is so strong that individuals would do what-
ever they can to re-establish control when it disappears
or is taken away, including self-attributing unrelated
events (Langer, 1975) or acting superstitiously in the
belief that their action is accountable for uncontrol-
lable outcomes (Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2011).
Importantly, control beliefs would explain an enduring
puzzle in causal reasoning, that is, why people show
remarkable performance in causal inferences, which
they often make effortlessly and from very little data,
and yet readily experience illusory control, whether in
real-life uncontrollable situations (Matute, 1996) or in
experimental settings with null contingency (Blanco,
Matute, and Vadillo, 2011). This relationship between
illusory control and control beliefs is further corrob-
orated by people’s tendency to self-attribute positive
outcomes when perceived controllability of the envi-
ronment is high (Harris and Osman, 2012).
One explanation for assuming control as a default
belief – whether illusory or not – is learning. Indeed,
control beliefs would be particularly adapted to con-
trollable environments, whose latent causal structure
can be learnt so as to maximise rewards in the long run
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(Lake et al., 2017). In a structured environment, enact-
ing actions, relative to not acting, is advantageous on
average, as the reward/punishment ratio can be turned
in favour of rewards though implementing appropriate
actions. In this situation, agents would be better off
holding the belief that their actions are efficient means
for attaining desired outcomes. In sum, the detrimen-
tal consequences of assuming control as a default be-
lief would be offset by opportunities for learning the
causal structure of the world, and hence by the abil-
ity to flexibly switch preferences when reversals occur,
ultimately reducing the cost associated with missing
opportunities (Koechlin, 2016). Importantly, control
beliefs, such as self-efficacy, play a major role in general
health and wellbeing (Bobak et al., 2000). Lowered
sense of causation is associated with lower self-esteem,
greater mood disorders and greater depressive symp-
toms (Bandura, 1997). Depressed individuals perceive
their environment as being more random than non-
depressed people. In the depressed view (so-called
“depressive realism”), the reward/punishment ratio is
evenly balanced, which substantially reduces oppor-
tunities for learning and makes ultimately any action
pointless (Nettle and Bateson, 2012). This account
agrees with clinical reports of greater passivity in de-
pressed people, that is, a reduced ability to initiate
voluntary actions (Blanco, Matute, and Vadillo, 2012).
Acting with less frequency would make depressed in-
dividuals exposed to fewer incidental associations be-
tween actions and action-contingent events (reduced
“action-density” bias, see Matute et al., 2015), which
might in turn impede learning of instrumental contin-
gencies and aggravate depressive symptoms in the long
run.
The strength of the CF model stems from the simplic-
ity with which it embeds the participant’s prior about
control. This prior amounts to assuming relative (i.e.,
context-dependent) divergence between factual and
counterfactual worlds. We argue that this simple prior
allows the model to rapidly and flexibly switch prefer-
ences when a reversal occurs, as demonstrated by its
robust learning curves and performances in both exper-
iments, relative to more sophisticated models such as
those aiming at statistical optimality (e.g., BC model).
We believe that simplicity is required to account for
the ease with which resource-bounded agents learn
instrumental contingencies, but also to explain how
strong control beliefs can be sustained as a default
backdrop to our normal mental life. As mentioned
above, a pervasive belief in one’s causal power can
make instrumental learning sometimes depart from
statistical optimality, resulting in illusions of control
and an inflated perception of one’s own efficacy. The
influence of such a pervasive belief would explain why
learning of action-outcome causal relationships seems
not to suffer the same biases as other forms of causal
learning that are based on passive observation (Morris
et al., 2017; Chambers et al., 2017). Ultimately, strong
control beliefs in human agents could account for why
reasoning about external causes differs from reflecting
upon one’s own causal power, both in terms of under-
lying computations, normative principles and optimal
behaviour.
Conclusions
We designed a series of experiments that required par-
ticipants to continuously monitor their causal influence
over the task, through discriminating changes that were
caused by their own actions from changes that were
not. Comparing different models of choice, we found
that participants’ behaviour was best explained by a
model (CF) deriving the consequences of the forgone
action from the current action taken, and assuming
relative divergence between both. Importantly, this
model agrees with the intuitive way of construing cau-
sation as “difference-making”, and further endorses the
long-held view that goal-directed actions are divergent
in nature: they make a difference to the world, and
can hence be implemented as efficient means for pur-
suing desirable outcomes. In the CF model, difference-
making was explicitly accounted for by assuming neg-
ative covariance between factual and counterfactual
action values. Based on this covariance prior, the CF
model directly emulated counterfactual action values
through a subjective reference point that aligned with
the actual structure of the task environment. Crucially,
we found that counterfactual emulation wasmore likely
to occur at most abstract levels of action control, con-
sistent with evidence from hierarchical models of goal-
directed actions. Finally, we suggest that the CF model
outperformed all competitors because it closely mir-
rors people’s belief in their causal power, a belief that is
well suited to learning action-outcome associations in
controllable environments. We speculate that control
beliefs may be part of the reason why reflecting upon
one’s own causal power fundamentally differs from
reasoning about external causes.
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Appendix A. Generative model
As mentioned in the main text, the generative model was a Bayesian learner that updated beliefs associated with
each possible action, on each trial. Specifically, the model (either BM or BC) aims to infer the correct action
mapping between the four possible mappings (or states). We further define a state-function f specifying the
underlying reward distribution for a given action a and state z, as follows:
State 1: f(a = 1, z = 1) = G1; f(a = 2, z = 1) = G2; f(a = 3, z = 1) = G3; f(a = 4, z = 1) = G3.
State 2: f(a = 1, z = 2) = G2; f(a = 2, z = 2) = G1; f(a = 3, z = 2) = G3; f(a = 4, z = 2) = G3.
State 3: f(a = 1, z = 3) = G3; f(a = 2, z = 3) = G3; f(a = 3, z = 3) = G1; f(a = 4, z = 3) = G2.
State 4: f(a = 1, z = 4) = G3; f(a = 2, z = 4) = G3; f(a = 3, z = 4) = G2; f(a = 4, z = 4) = G1.
where a corresponds to each possible action (among the 4 possible combinations of button and machine), G1
is the distribution associated with having selected the best-rewarding button of the controlled machine, G2 is the
distribution associated with having selected the least-rewarding button of the controlled machine, and G3 is the
distribution associated with having selected the non-controlled machine (see respectively green, red, and grey
distributions of Figure 4, top panel). We assume the rewards to be drawn from Gaussian distributions, as they
were in the task (see Figure 5A).
The analytical model used to infer the state on each trial is a hidden Markov model, defined as follows:
z1 ∼ Unif({1, 2, 3, 4})
zt|zt−1, τ ∼ (1− τ)× δztzt−1 + τ × Unif(k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k 6= zt−1)
rt|at, zt, µ1, µ2, µ3, λ1, λ2, λ3 ∼ Norm(rt|µf(at,zt), λf(at,zt))
where zt corresponds to the state inferred on trial t, rt corresponds to the reward observed on trial t, at
corresponds to the action observed on trial t, and δ is the index function, i.e., δab =
{
1 if a = b
0 if a 6= b .
Note that the reward values were rescaled within the range [0,1].
Let the parameters be θ = (τ, µ1, µ2, µ3, λ1, λ2, λ3). The analytical model to infer the parameters on the first
trial, given their prior hyperparameters, is the following:
τ ∼ Beta(a0, b0)
p(µ1|µ2) ∝ Norm(µ1|µ01, λ01)× 1[µ1 > µ2]
p(µ2|µ1) ∝ Norm(µ2|µ02, λ02)× 1[µ1 > µ2]
µ3 ∼ Norm(µ03, λ03)
λg ∼ Gamma(α0, β0), for g ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where τ is the volatility parameter, and µg and λg are the mean and the precision of the Gaussian Gg for
g ∈ {1, 2, 3}. To obtain conjugate distributions, we used Gaussian precisions rather than their standard deviations.
We assumed the same hyper-parameters for the precisions of the three Gaussians. These hyper-parameters led to
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Figure S1: Generative graphical model assumed by the subject. The variable zt corresponds to the state on trial t (shown
in light blue). rt and at are the observed variables (shown in grey): rt corresponds to the reward observed on trial
t, and at corresponds to the action observed on trial t. The parameters are θ = (τ, µ1, µ2, µ3, λ1, λ2, λ3), shown in
white circles: τ is the volatility parameter, and µg and λg are the mean and the precision of the Gaussian Gg for
g ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The hyperparameters are shown in white boxes.
the less informative priors possible and were set to the following values: a0 = 1, b0 = 9, µ01 = 0.58, µ
0
2 = 0.42, µ
0
3 =
0.50, λ01 = λ
0
2 = λ
0
3 = 20, α0 = 80, β0 = 0.8.
The goal of the inference algorithm is to predict the state of the next trial:
p(zt+1|a1:t, r1:t)
Let us have I = 1, 000 samples (zit+1)i∈{1,...,I} distributed under the distribution p(zt+1|a1:t, r1:t). A Monte
Carlo approximation of the integral gives:
p(zt+1 = k|a1:t, r1:t) ∝
1
I
I∑
i=1
δkzit+1
To perform inference, we used a Gibbs algorithm sampling iteratively the latent states and the parameters.
Regarding the sampling of the latent states, for the first trial, the posterior distribution on the hidden state
takes the following form:
p(z1|θ, a1, r1) ∝ Norm(r1|µf(a1,z1), λf(a1,z1))p(z1)
Then, the forward recursion from trial i− 1 to trial i leads to:
p(zi−1, zi|θ, a1:i, r1:i) ∝ Norm(ri|µf(ai,zi), λf(ai,zi))× p(zi|zi−1, τ)× p(zi−1|θ, a1:i−1, r1:i−1)
with p(zi−1|θ, a1:i−1, r1:i−1) =
4∑
zi−2=1
p(zi−2, zi−1|θ, a1:i−1, r1:i−1).
The latent sample z1:t is thus obtained by drawing zt from p(zt|θ, a1:t, r1:t), and then by iteratively sampling
backward zi−1|zi ∼ p(., zi|θ, a1:i, r1:i) (Scott, 2002).
For the parameter sampling step, the posterior distribution of the volatility parameter τ depends on the number
of switches predicted by the sampling trajectory z1:t. Let us define Nswitch = Card(i ∈ {2, ..., t} | zi−1 6= zi). The
posterior distribution of the volatility parameter is updated as follows:
τ |z1:t, a1:t, r1:t ∼ Beta(a0 +Nswitch, b0 + t− 1−Nswitch)
Page 2 of 6
Supplementary material
The means and precisions of the three Gaussians are also updated based on past history of actions and rewards.
This update first requires identifying which Gaussian g each observed reward was drawn from. Let us define
Ig = {i ∈ {1, ..., t} | f(ai, zi) = Gg}. Then, the number of trials in which the rewards are drawn from the Gaussian
g is: Ng = Card(Ig), and the average reward observed for the Gaussian g is:
rg =
1
Ng
∑
i∈Ig
ri
To sample from the mean of G3, the Gaussian associated with the non-controlled machine, one just computes
the tractable posterior and samples from it:
µ3|z1:t, a1:t, r1:t ∼ Norm(
N3λ3r3 + λ
0
3µ
0
3
N3λ3 + λ03
, N3λ3 + λ
0
3)
For the means of G1 and G2, the Gaussians associated with the best- and the least-rewarding button of the
controlled machine, the additional inequality constraint makes the posterior distribution intractable. We thus us
Monte Carlo Markov Chain procedures within the Gibbs algorithm to sample from the constrained conditional
distributions of µ1 and µ2. For the proposal distribution of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithms implemented, we
use the unconstrained posterior:
µg|z1:t, a1:t, r1:t ∼ Norm(
Ngλgrg + λ
0
gµ
0
g
Ngλg + λ0g
, Ngλg + λ
0
g), for g ∈ {1, 2}
As for the posterior distributions of the precision parameters λg, they are of the form:
λg|z1:t, a1:t, r1:t ∼ Gamma(α0 +
Ng
2
, β0 +
1
2
∑
i∈Ig
(ri − µg)2), for g ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Appendix B. Experiment 1b: method and results
20 participants (11 females, age 21-29) took part in the experiment. The task (stimuli, timeline, and trial structure)
was identical to that used in experiment 1. The only differences were the instructions and the order of sessions.
The verbal and written instructions did not make any reference to a controlled machine or to a best-rewarding
button. Thus, participants were only instructed to choose the option that would maximize their total reward
while being reminded that they would always win the sum of the two machines on each trial. The order of the
three experimental sessions was fully randomized so that participants could begin by any of the three sessions
(dependency, value, or variability).
Experiment 1b comprised the same number of episodes as in experiment 1, with similar length and same
number of button and/or machine reversals. The same four models (RL, CF, BC, BM) were fitted to participants’
choices and simulated over all three sessions with their best-fitting parameters.
The results replicated the experiment 1. Participants discriminated well between the two buttons of the
controlled machine in the dependency session only (best- and least-rewarding buttons: 0.33 vs. 0.20, t19 =
3.96, p < 0.001) while choosing equally button 1 and button 2 of the non-controlled machines in all sessions (all
t19 < 2.16, all p > 0.12). Second, we tested whether participants showed a preference for one machine over
another within each session, by comparing choice proportion for each machine against the chance level (0.5).
As again expected, we found that participants showed a significant preference for the controlled machine in the
dependency session (t19 = 1.98, p < 0.05) and a marked preference for the best-rewarding machine in the value
condition (t19 = 5.97, p < 0.001). In contrast to experiment 1, however, they only showed a tendency to prefer
the low-variable machine in the variance condition (t19 = 1.2, p = 0.19).
As in the previous experiment, we compared “button” preferences across all sessions by subtracting choice
for one button from choice for the other button within each preferred machine. The one-way ANOVA confirmed
that button preferences differed across the 3 sessions (F (2, 57) = 12.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.30). Thus, participants
discriminated between buttons of the preferred machine in the dependency session to a greater extent than in
the value and variance sessions (post hoc tests: all p < 0.001). We then compared the proportion of choice for
the preferred machine across all 3 sessions. The one-way ANOVA revealed that “machine” preferences differed
across the 3 sessions (F (2, 57) = 17.95, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38), Thus, participants chose the best-rewarding
machine (value session, 0.65) more than the controlled machine (dependency session, 0.54), and more than the
low-variable machine (variance session, 0.52) (post hoc tests, all p < 0.001). Finally, participants were able to
Page 3 of 6
Supplementary material
adjust to machine and/or button reversals, on average reaching the plateau of performance around 10 trials after
reversal.
Again, replicating experiment 1, the CF model best predicted participants’ choices than all other models in the
set (RL, BM or BC), in all three sessions (exceedance probability > 92%) (see Table 1).
Most of the results from the previous experiment were replicated. As expected, participants exhibited a strong
preference for high rewards and preferentially chose low-variable machines, regardless of their overall value.
We also found that participants were able to discriminate between causally efficient actions (the two buttons)
and to identify where in the task environment choosing one action rather than another made a difference to the
outcome (the controlled machine), and where it did not (the non-controlled machine). Importantly, this pattern
of choice preference could neither be explained by the session order nor by the instructions. In this experiment,
participants could as well start with the dependency as with the value or the variability sessions. Furthermore,
participants were only instructed to make choices that maximized their rewards over both machines and time.
Finally, in this experiment as in the previous one, we found that a model based on a simple context-dependent
counterfactual rule (CF) outperformed all competing models, including a pure reinforcement learner (RL) and a
model that explicitly aimed at maximizing reward by means of Bayesian inference (BM).
Appendix C. Experiment 2: supplementary figures
Figure S2: Top panel: Mean proportion of choice for each button of each button across the “value” dimension. Low,
medium, high: the value of the controlled machine was low, medium, or high, relative to the value of the non-controlled
machine. The numbers between brackets refer to experimental conditions shown in Figure 5. All error bars indicate
standard error. For the sake of visibility, models’ error bars are not shown. Three-stars: p < 0.001. Bottom panel:
Reversal curves for participants (solid black line) and models (colored bars), across all three levels of the
“value” dimension. Model simulation: CF (red bars); RL (light grey); BM (light green bars); BC (dark green bars).
Bars indicate standard error. Dashed vertical lines indicate reversal point. Machine reversal curves are not shown.
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Figure S3: Top panel: Mean proportion of choice for each button of each button across the “variance” dimension. Low,
medium, high: the variance of the controlled machine was low, medium, or high, relative to the variance of the
non-controlled machine. The numbers between brackets refer to experimental conditions shown in Figure 5. All
error bars indicate standard error. For the sake of visibility, models’ error bars are not shown. Two-stars: p < 0.01;
Three-stars: p < 0.001. Bottom panel: Reversal curves for participants (solid black line) and models (colored
bars), across all three levels of the “variance” dimension. Model simulation: CF (red bars); RL (light grey); BM
(light green bars); BC (dark green bars). Bars indicate standard error. Dashed vertical lines indicate reversal point.
Machine reversal curves are not shown.
Appendix D. CF model simulations
Parameter recovery procedure
We used simulations to verify that the pattern of learning rates obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 did not arise
artificially from the parameter optimization procedure. We ran a parameter recovery analysis for discrete sets of
parameter values. For Experiments 1 and 2, we simulated 36 virtual participants on our behavioural tasks (36
being the total number of participants in both experiments) with different patterns of learning rates (see Table
S1). The other parameters were set to their mean fitted values across participants and conditions. The results
of these analyses confirmed the capacity of our parameter optimization procedure to correctly recover the true
parameters in all experimental conditions.
Performance of the CF model
We simulated the CF model in two different environments, where divergence was maximal between buttons
(‘Environment 1’) or between machines (‘Environment 2’) (see Figure 13A). We tested the performance of the
model with three different patterns of factual and counterfactual alpha rates (‘subjects’, ‘flat’, ‘reverse’). Parameter
values were varied according to Table S1, below. For the CF simulations illustrated in Figure 13B, parameter
values from the ‘subjects’ pattern were used, while for the RL simulations, the same parameter values as for the
CF model were used (αF = 0.5, β = 0.2, ρm = 8, ρb = 5).
‘Environment 1’ corresponded to the dependency condition in Experiment 1, whereas ‘Environment 2’ was
similar to the value condition in the same experiment. For the simulations, we used the same task structure as the
one experienced by the 16 human participants of our sample, but the model generated its own response, and
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received the outcome corresponding to this response, on each trial. Each model was simulated 10 times, for each
environment and pattern.
Table S1: Model parameters used in the parameter recovery procedure and to generate model?s performance, as shown on Figures
12C and 13A. Parameters of the model are: the (factual) learning rate αF , the 3 counterfactual learning rates αCF1,
αCF2 and αCF3, the reference point P , the exploitation intensity β and the 2 perseveration biases ρm and ρb. Note
that only the values of the counterfactual learning rates differed across the ‘subjects’, ‘flat’ and ‘reverse’ simulations.
αF αCF1 αCF2 αCF3 P β ρm ρb
‘subjects’ 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 50 0.2 8 5
‘flat’ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 50 0.2 8 5
‘reverse’ 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 50 0.2 8 5
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4.3 Additional simulations
In this draft, we have presented a novel model for reinforcement-learning, which
is emulating a counterfactual outcome to update the unchosen Q-values. While a
classical reinforcement-learning model has usually 2 parameters (i.e. the learning
rate α and the exploitation intensity β), this counterfactual model has 4 additional
parameters:
• the reference point P, used to emulate a counterfactual outcome, and thus a
counterfactual prediction error;
• the three counterfactual learning rates αCF1, αCF2 and αCF3, associated with
each of the unchosen actions, that are weighting the counterfactual prediction
error in the unchosen Q-values update.
We will now simulate this novel model in a classical stationary setting (Sutton and
Barto, 1998; Cazé and van der Meer, 2013) and show in which conditions and pa-
rameter values it outperforms the classical reinforcement learning model.
V"#$%&'(𝑡 + 1) = 	V"#$%&'(𝑡) + α		×	δ t δ t = R t − 𝑉"#$%&'(𝑡)
chosen
machine
unchosen
machine
chosen
button
unchosen
button
chosen
button
unchosen
button
𝑅78 t = 2	×	𝑃 − 𝑅 𝑡
δ78 t = 𝑅78 t − 𝑉;'"#$%&'(𝑡)
V;'"#$%&'< 𝑡 + 1 = 	V;'"#$%&'< 𝑡 + α78<	×	δ78 t
V;'"#$%&'= 𝑡 + 1 = 	V;'"#$%&'= 𝑡 + α78=	×	δ78 t
V;'"#$%&'= 𝑡 + 1 = 	V;'"#$%&'= 𝑡 + α78=	×	δ78 t
R t
Figure 4.1: An illustration of the counterfactual model architecture. On trial t, a ma-
chine and a button are chosen, which leads to an obtained reward R(t). Both classi-
cal and counterfactual models use the prediction error to update the Q-value of the
chosen dyad machine-button. In the counterfactual model, the reward is also used
to emulate a counterfactual reward RCF(t) by symmetry with a reference point P.
The counterfactual prediction error is weighted by a different counterfactual learn-
ing rate αCF, depending on whose unchosen action the Q-value is updated. In green
the parameters shared by the classical and counterfactual models, and in blue the
parameters specific to the counterfactual model.
4.3.1 The counterfactual learning rates: a theoretical perspective
We have shown that the pattern of counterfactual learning rates is optimal only
when adapted to the structure of the task (section “CF model: best-fitting param-
eters”). We wanted here to understand why. We again used the “dependency” and
the “value” conditions from Experiment 1, to be the environments on which we will
test the different patterns of learning rates.
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Here we assumed that the average of all reward distributions (here 50) was taken
as the reference point. It should be noted that the dependency condition has what we
call ‘button-symmetric’ reward distributions. It means that, for a given machine, the
outcome received for the chosen button is symmetric to the outcome of the unchosen
button. Therefore the counterfactual model should use the counterfactual outcome
to update the Q-value of the unchosen button of the chosen machine (αCF1 > 0), but
not the Q-values of the two other unchosen actions (αCF2 = αCF3 = 0).
58
42
Button-symmetric
reward distributions
Machine-symmetric
reward distributions
58
42
42
Figure 4.2: Left panels: an illustration of the two conditions on which the models
will be simulated. Middle panels: the optimal counterfactual updates according to
the condition symmetry. Right panels: the pattern of counterfactual learning rates
corresponding to these optimal updates. The value of the factual learning rate α is
shown here for comparison purposes.
The value condition has the inverse symmetry: its reward distributions are machine-
symmetric. There the optimal counterfactual model will update the Q-values of the
unchosen machine (for both chosen and unchosen buttons) with the counterfactual
outcome (αCF2 > 0 and αCF3 > 0), but the Q-value of the unchosen button of the
chosen machine should stay unchanged (αCF1 = 0).
The optimal pattern of counterfactual learning rates can therefore be deduced
from the reward distributions of the two conditions.
4.3.2 The counterfactual learning rates: simulations
To test this hypothesis, we ran 10,000 simulations of the two patterns of learning
rates, and of a classical reinforcement-learning model. We set the beta value at 0.1
to allow some explorative behavior. As said above the reference point used was 50.
The learning rates (factual and counterfactual) were set at 0.1 or 0, according to the
pattern tested. The four Q-values are initiated at 50, the average of reward distribu-
tions. The simulations lasted for 200 trials in the two first conditions of Experiment
1. Unlike the simulations in the draft, here the action-outcome relations were sta-
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tionary, i.e., no reversal occurred during the whole task.
Figure 4.3: The dynamics of the Q-values of counterfactual models with button- (in
purple, left panel) and machine-symmetric (in orange, right panel) pattern of coun-
terfactual learning rates. We have also plotted the Q-values dynamics of a classical
reinforcement-learning model (in grey) for comparison purpose. The dotted lines
represent the average reward for the reward distributions associated with the differ-
ent actions. In this figure, and for all the following ones, the upper and lower panels
show the simulations in the dependency and value conditions respectively.
We looked at the dynamics of the Q-values for the different models in the two
environments. In both tasks, the classical Reinforcement-Learning model is approx-
imating well the average reward of each action (58, 50 and 42 for the dependency
condition; 58 and 42 for the value condition). Interestingly we can see different dy-
namics in high and low Q-values: the Q-values approximating 42 were slower to
converge than the Q-values approximating 58, as they were associated to actions
less frequently chosen by the model.
For the counterfactual model, the Q-values dynamics depended on whether the
pattern of counterfactual learning rates was adapted, or not, to the task. For the de-
pendency condition and the button-symmetric counterfactual model, the Q-values
not only approximated well the average reward, but also were faster to converge,
compared to a Reinforcement-learning model. The same can be observed for the
machine-symmetric counterfactual model in the value condition. Interestingly, we
can see that for this model, both high and low Q-values displayed the same speed
of convergence, as outcomes were used to update both the chosen and unchosen
Q-values.
It should be emphasized that the counterfactual models with unadapted pat-
terns of learning rates poorly approximated the underlying average rewards. The
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machine-symmetric counterfactual model’s Q-values converged to biased estimates
of average rewards in the dependency condition, while the button-symmetric model
was unable to dissociated the high-rewarding actions from the low-rewarding ones
(Q-values staying around 50) in the value condition.
The Q-values dynamics were good predictors of a model’s performance, as the
models are using the difference in Q-values to guide the action selection. We can
thus predict that models with well-discriminated Q-values will perform better than
models with more similar Q-values, for a fixed exploitation intensity parameter β.
Indeed, the counterfactual model whose pattern of learning rates was adapted to
the condition outperformed both the Reinforcement-Learning model and the un-
adapted counterfactual model, in both tasks. It should be noted that counterfactual
model was more advantageous than the classical one only when their counterfactual
learning rates reflected well the task’s structure.
Figure 4.4: The performances of the classical reinforcement-learning model (in grey)
and the counterfactual models with button- (in purple) and machine-symmetric (in
orange) patterns of counterfactual learning rates. The x-axis represents the trial
number. The chance level is represented in dotted line (0.25 for the A-O dependency
condition as only one action is correct, but 0.5 for the Outcome value condition, as
two actions among 4 possible are associated with the high-rewarding machine).
4.3.3 The reference point: simulations
We then wondered how the dynamics of the counterfactual model may change when
the reference point was no longer the underlying average of reward distributions.
We looked at the Q-values dynamics when we set the reference point to the val-
ues of 40 and 60 and ran simulations similar to those described above. As we can see,
when the reference point departed from the value of 50, the Q-values did not con-
verge anymore to the average reward for each action. They underestimated the real
reward average when the reference point was set under 50, and they overestimated
them when the reference point was set at 60.
It seemed that the lower the reference point, the higher the difference between
Q-values was. We could therefore predict that a reference point lower than 50 would
increase the model’s performances. Still, we considered purposeless to further ex-
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Figure 4.5: The dynamics of the Q-values of the counterfactual models for a reference
point P of 40 and 60. We only plotted the model that was shown to be more adapted
to the task, therefore the button-symmetric model for the dependency condition, and
the machine-symmetric model for the value condition. The dotted lines represent the
average reward for the reward distributions associated with the different actions.
plore the mechanisms of this counterfactual model, as it has become a degenerate
model, whose internal variables were no longer related to the true statistics of the
task.
In summary, when the pattern of counterfactual learning rates was reflecting the
task’s symmetry, the counterfactual model outperformed the classical reinforcement-
learning model. Still a non-adapted counterfactual model performed worse than the
classical one, or even at chance. It should be added that the performances of the
counterfactual model were reference-dependent. The counterfactual model devel-
oped here had never been described before in the reinforcement-learning literature.
Our simulations confirmed that this model can be advantageous in stationary sym-
metrical tasks with more than 2 possible actions.
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Study II
5.1 Introduction
A fundamental experience of everyday life is the feeling that we control our own
actions. When these actions produce effects in the environment, we feel that we
cause those too. This cluster of experiences is referred to as the Sense of Agency
(Haggard and Chambon, 2012).
In the previous study, we were interested in how human participants would
compute an on-the-fly estimate of instrumental control in an instrumental condition-
ing experiment. Here for the first time, we measured participants’ feeling of agency
during an instrumental task. We used the intentional binding paradigm, as there
is compelling evidence supporting a link between intentional binding and sense of
agency (Moore and Obhi, 2012).
Sense of agency or subjective control depends on the ability to learn and make
use of action-outcome contingencies and one of the more classical algorithm to model
this learning originates in the field of reinforcement learning. Our goal was to
study the possible correlations between implicit feelings of agency and reinforce-
ment learning processes.
5.2 Our published research article
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T he sense of agency refers to the feeling thatwe control our actions and, through them,effects in the outside world. Reinforcement
learning provides an important theoretical frame-
work for understanding why people choose to
make particular actions. Few previous studies have
considered how reinforcement and learning might
influence the subjective experience of agency over
actions and outcomes. In two experiments, par-
ticipants chose between two action alternatives,
which differed in reward probability. Occasional
reversals of action-reward mapping required par-
ticipants to monitor outcomes and adjust action
selection processing accordingly. We measured
shifts in the perceived times of actions and sub-
sequent outcomes (‘intentional binding’) as an im-
plicit proxy for sense of agency. In the first experi-
ment, negative outcomes showed stronger binding
towards the preceding action, compared to posi-
tive outcomes. Furthermore, negative outcomes
were followed by increased binding of actions to-
wards their outcome on the following trial. Exper-
iment 2 replicated this post-error boost in action
binding and showed that it only occurred when
people could learn from their errors to improve
action choices. We modelled the post-error boost
using an established quantitative model of rein-
forcement learning. The post-error boost in action
binding correlated positively with participants’ ten-
dency to learn more from negative outcomes than
from positive outcomes. Our results suggest a
novel relation between sense of agency and rein-
forcement learning, in which sense of agency is
increased when negative outcomes trigger adap-
tive changes in subsequent action selection pro-
cessing.
Keywords
Agency; learning; intentional binding; time perception;
decision-making; motor control
Introduction
Achieving one’s goals requires detection of errors and
consequent adjustments to behaviour (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998). A distinctive subjective experience
accompanies committing an error and registering its
outcome (Charles, King, and Dehaene, 2014). Sense
of agency is defined as the feeling of controlling one’s
actions and their effects in the outside world (Haggard
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and Chambon, 2012). However, the extensive litera-
ture on learning from errors (Dayan and Niv, 2008)
has evolved largely independently from the literature
on sense of agency. Therefore, in two experiments,
we investigated how errors in a reversal-learning task
influence sense of agency.
Explicit judgements of control or agency are influ-
enced both by performance bias (Metcalfe and Greene,
2007) and by a general self-serving bias (Bandura,
1989). A confounding effect of errors on explicit agency
judgements therefore seems inevitable. The intentional
binding paradigm (Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras,
2002; for a review, see Moore and Obhi, 2012) of-
fers an implicit measure related to sense of agency,
which may be less subject to task demand characteris-
tics. Participants report the time of an action or of its
outcome. If the outcome follows the action with a short
and constant latency, the perceived time of the action
tends to shift towards the subsequent outcome. Simi-
larly, the perceived time of the outcome tends to shift
towards the preceding action. Critically, these effects
are stronger for voluntary actions than for involuntary
movements (Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras, 2002).
Intentional binding may be one instance of a more gen-
eral temporal binding effect that applies to causal rela-
tions (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009; but see Cravo,
Claessens, and Baldo, 2009; Cravo, Claessens, and
Baldo, 2011). However, experimental designs that con-
trast appropriately chosen conditions can nevertheless
use binding measures as a proxy measure to investigate
different components of sense of agency.
Previous laboratory research on sense of agency of-
ten lacked ecological validity. For example, intentional
binding studies have investigated associations between
a single action and a single outcome without any signif-
icance or value for the participant (Haggard, Clark, and
Kalogeras, 2002). Outside the laboratory, however, ac-
tions are embedded in a rich perceptual, affective and
social landscape. People frequently select one action
from several possible in a given situation, to achieve
a desired goal. Only a few studies have attempted to
link implicit measures of sense of agency with outcome
valence. In Takahata et al. (2012), participants’ actions
caused tones that were associated with monetary re-
wards or penalties. They found reduced binding for
penalty trials compared to neutral or rewarded trials.
Yoshie and Haggard (2013) used human vocalizations
as either negative or positive action outcomes. They
found that negative vocalization outcomes were associ-
ated with a reduction in binding compared to neutral
and positive vocalization outcomes. Neither study ma-
nipulated the effects of contingency between partici-
pants’ actions and the rewards received, and neither
study tried to distinguish the informational value of
outcomes from their reward value. In the present work,
we manipulated occurrence of rewards to investigate
effects of reinforcement and learning.
Accordingly, we have combined intentional binding
with reward-based decision-making, seemingly for the
first time. We used a probabilistic reversal-learning ap-
proach (Cools et al., 2002; Rolls, 2000), which requires
the participant to continuously learn action-outcome
mappings, and update their action choices according
to error feedback. The action-outcome structure of re-
versal learning can be combined straightforwardly with
the intentional binding paradigm. Furthermore, prob-
abilistic reversal learning can be challenging enough
to require consistent cognitive engagement. In con-
trast, humans often readily achieve agency in situa-
tions involving new stable action-outcome relations, so
instrumental learning and sense of agency emerge too
rapidly to be measured with current paradigms.
In reversal learning, participants need to monitor the
outcome linked to each action and then correctly up-
date their expectations so as to select their next action
accordingly (Sutton and Barto, 1998). A central issue
in research on learning is how behaviour changes trial
by trial in response to feedback (Daw, 2011). In this
study, we were interested in the fluctuation of sense
of agency that accompanies reward-based decision-
making. We predicted that the occurrence of rewards
might influence not only the intentional binding asso-
ciated with a given outcome but also the intentional
binding reported on the subsequent trial.
Experiment 1: method
Participants
This study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics
Committee and conformed to the Declaration of
Helsinki. In the absence of any previous study combin-
ing intentional binding with reward-guided decision-
making, the sample size was based on a study of in-
tentional binding with valenced trial outcomes (Yoshie
and Haggard, 2013). A total of 16 participants (nine
females, all right-handed, mean age = 23 years, age
range = 18-41 years) completed the experiment and
were paid £8/hr plus a bonus for correct responses.
Data from one participant were lost due to a technical
error. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and hearing.
Procedure
Participants were seated at a standard computer key-
board and screen. They fixed a clock with a single
rotating hand. The clock diameter was 20mm and
the hand completed one full rotation within 2560ms.
In baseline conditions, participants pressed a key at a
time of their free choice or heard an auditory tone at a
random time. In ‘agency’ conditions, participants both
pressed a key and heard a tone. The tone occurred 250
ms after the key press. Participants were instructed
to wait for one full rotation of the clock before press-
ing a key. Tones were either high (2000 Hz) or low
(500Hz) in frequency and lasted 100ms. The high tone
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Baseline action and tone measures were first taken in 
six separate blocks of 20 trials (see below) in pseudoran-
dom order, to provide estimates of the perceived time of 
each action and each tone when presented alone, and when 
presented as the only event within a block, or mixed with 
the alternative action or tone. Next, participants completed 
two counterbalanced ‘agency’ blocks. In one block, they 
reported the perceived time of the action, in the other block 
the perceived time of the tone. Finally, the six baseline 
conditions were repeated in the reverse order. Thus, there 
were always 40 trials in each condition, and conditions 
were always blocked.
In the agency conditions, one key delivered rewarded 
high tones with a probability of 0.8 and the other key with 
probability of 0.2. The mapping was maintained across a run 
of several trials, until the participant had selected the key that 
produced the high tone (i.e., the reward) between five and 
seven times consecutively (randomized). Probability map-
pings then reversed. Nine such reversals occurred in each 
block, so each block involved 10 ‘runs’ of responses. The 
actual number of key presses per block therefore depended 
on how rapidly each participant learned the ‘correct’ key.
The cumulative total of rewarded trials was displayed at 
the end of each trial. At the end of each block, all partici-
pants were told they had reached the threshold number of 
rewarded trials required to trigger a bonus. In fact, this 
threshold was fictitious, and a bonus of £3 for each block 
was paid at the end of the experiment. This arrangement 
ensured that participants were not overpaid for prolonging 
the experiment by repeatedly making incorrect responses.
In each trial, a visual feedback indicating either reward 
(tick) or no reward (cross) reward was presented for 1 s 
after each judgement, followed by an inter-trial interval of 
1 s. The visual signal recapitulated the information previ-
ously conveyed by the auditory tone, but was included to 
facilitate decision-making on the next trial, without plac-
ing strong demands on memory.
We did not directly probe participants’ awareness of 
action–outcome contingencies. Rather, we considered that 
generating a sequence of repeated key presses of the ‘good’ 
key, and thus triggering a reversal, was a sufficient indica-
tor of learning. All stimuli were presented using LabView 
2012 (National Instruments, Austin, TX)
Baseline measures
Baseline judgement errors are presented in Table 1.
No significant differences were observed between the 
baseline blocks in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left- and right-hand responses (F(1, 
Figure 1. Timeline of events on a typical agency trial in Experiment 1. The trial started when the clock hand began to rotate. At a 
time of their free choice, allowing for at least one full rotation of the clock hand, participants pressed one of two keys. Key presses 
were followed after 250 ms by a high or low frequency tone. The clock hand continued to rotate for a random interval and then 
stopped. Participants then reported the time they perceived the action or tone to have occurred. Immediate visual feedback then 
confirmed the earlier auditory signal, indicating a reward (tick) or non-reward (cross).
Figure 1: Timeline of events on a typical agency trial in Experiment 1. The trial started when the clock hand began to rotate.
At a time of their free choice, allowing for at least one full rotation of the clock hand, participants pressed one of two
keys. Key presses were followed after 250 ms by a high or low frequency tone. The clock hand conti ued to rotate for a
random interval and then stopped. Participants then reported the time they perceived the action or tone to have occurred.
Immediate visual feedb ck then confirmed the earlier auditory signal, indicating a reward (tick) or non-reward (cross).
was always the ‘correct’ tone and was associated with
a monetary reward. Informal piloting indicated that
participants had clear prior associations, interpreting
high tones as positive and low as negative. These may
reflect common conventions of everyday electronic de-
vices. Therefore, we did not counterbalance the tones
across participants. The ‘F’ and ‘J’ keys of a standard
keyboard were used for left- and right-hand responses.
Following the tone (or the key press if no tone), the
clock hand continued to rotate for a random interval
between 1100 and 2800ms and then disappeared. Par-
ticipants then used the keyboard to report the time that
they pressed the button or the time that they heard the
tone, according to condition (Figure 1).
Baseline action and tone measures were first taken
in six separate blocks of 20 trials (see below) in pseu-
dorandom order, to provide estimates of the perceived
time of each action and each tone when presented
alone, and when presented as the only event within a
block, or mixed with the alternative action or tone.
Next, participants completed two counterbalanced
‘agency’ blocks. In one block, they reported the per-
ceived time of the action, in the other block the per-
ceived time of the tone. Finally, the six baseline condi-
tions were repeated in the reverse order. Thus, there
were always 40 trials in each condition, and conditions
were always blocked.
In the agency conditions, one key delivered rewarded
high tones with a probability of 0.8 and the other key
with probability of 0.2. The mapping was maintained
across a run of several trials, until the participant had
selected the key that produced the high tone (i.e., the
reward) between five and seven times consecutively
(randomized). Probability mappings then reversed.
Nine such reversals occurred in each block, so each
block involved 10 ‘runs’ of responses. The actual num-
ber of key presses per block therefore depended on
how rapidly each participant learned the ‘correct’ key.
The cumulative total of rewarded trials was displayed
at the end of each trial. At the end of each block, all
participants were told they had reached the threshold
number of rewarded trials required to trigger a bonus.
In fact, this threshold was fictitious, and a bonus of £3
for each block was paid at the end of the experiment.
This arrangement ensured that participants were not
overpaid for prolonging the experiment by repeatedly
making incorrect responses.
In each trial, a visual feedback indicating either re-
ward (tick) or no reward (cross) reward was presented
for 1s after each judgement, followed by an inter-trial
interval of 1 s. The visual signal recapitulated the in-
formation previously conveyed by the auditory tone,
but was included to facilitate decision-making on the
next trial, without placing strong demands on memory.
We did not directly probe participants’ awareness of
action-outcome contingencies. Rather, we considered
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Table 1: Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of judgement
errors (ms) in baseline and agency conditions in Ex-
periment 1.
Baseline before Baseline after
M SD M SD
Action (left hand) −42 87 22 60
Action (right hand) −40 63 −17 88
Action (free choice) −40 103 −16 78
Tone (high) 15 70 51 72
Tone (low) 25 76 29 68
Tone (mixed) 12 79 29 84
All agency trials
M SD
Action 42 64
Tone −83 135
that generating a sequence of repeated key presses of
the ‘good’ key, and thus triggering a reversal, was a suf-
ficient indicator of learning. All stimuli were presented
using LabView 2012 (National Instruments, Austin,
TX).
Baseline measures
Baseline judgement errors are presented in Table 1.
No significant differences were observed between the
baseline blocks in the perceived times of key presses in
milliseconds for left- and right-hand responses (F1,14 =
0.176, p = 0.681, η2p = 0.012), mixed or repeated pre-
sentation (F1,14 = 0.236, p = 0.635, η2p = 0.017), or
for pre- or post-experiment blocks measures (F1,14 =
3.137, p = 0.098, η2p = 0.183).
Consequently, all action baseline blocks were col-
lapsed in further analysis. Likewise, no significant dif-
ferences were observed in the perceived times of high-
and low- frequency auditory tones (F1,14 = 0.599, p =
0.452, η2p = 0.041), for mixed or repeated presenta-
tion (F1,14 = 1.827, p = 0.198, η2p = 0.115) or for pre-
or post-test measures (F1,14 = 3.107, p = 0.1, η2p =
0.182). Consequently, these were also collapsed in fur-
ther analysis.
Analysis
Perceptual shifts were then calculated for each partic-
ipant and each condition by subtracting the relevant
mean baseline error for action or tone from that in
agency trials. A positive action binding measure there-
fore corresponds to a shift of the perceived time of the
action towards its outcome and a negative outcome
binding measure to a shift of the perceived time of
the outcome towards the action. Agency trials were
categorized according to two design factors:
1. whether the outcome received on the current trial
was rewarded (high tone) or not rewarded (low
tone)
2. whether feedback on the previous trial was re-
warded or not rewarded.
Experiment 1: results
The overall ratio of trials with non-rewarded outcomes
to rewarded outcomes was 0.6:1 (mean number of
trials per block = 109, standard deviation [SD] = 35).
Performance
Participants learned the action-outcome contingencies
(Figure 4a). As the criterion for advancement was set
at five to seven presses of the more rewarded key, par-
ticipants’ performances were necessarily 100% before
reversal of action?outcome mappings. Reversal events
unsurprisingly triggered errors. We analysed the pro-
portion of correct choices using a repeated-measure
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with trial number after
reversal as a factor. The trial number had a significant
effect on participants’ performance (F4,56 = 66.2, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.250). As the figure shows, participants
adapted their responses after a few reversal-induced
errors occurred.
Intentional binding
Action and outcome binding data are shown in Fig-
ure 2. Action binding data were subjected to a 2 ×
2 ANOVA with factors of current trial outcome: low
tone (no reward) or high tone (reward) and previous
trial outcome. There was a highly significant effect
of previous trial outcome (low tone: M = 87.2, SD =
62.8; high tone: M = 63.0, SD = 49.2), with stronger
action binding following low tones than following high
tones (F1,14 = 9.20, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.397). There
was no effect of current trial outcome (low tone: M
= 69.8, SD = 60.2; high tone: M = 74.2, SD = 48.1;
F1,14 = 1.72, p = 0.210, η
2
p = 0.110) and no interaction
(F1,14 = 0.01, p = 0.941, η2p = 0.000).
A similar ANOVA was performed for outcome bind-
ing. This showed a significant effect of current trial
outcome (low tone: M = -119.3, SD = 100.4; high
tone: M = -105.1, SD = 93.9), with low tones be-
ing more strongly bound towards actions than high
tones (F1,14 = 6.32, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.311). There was
no effect of previous trial outcome (low tone: M =
-114.6, SD = 93.6; high tone: M = -108.2, SD = 99.8;
F1,14 = 0.02, p = 0.89, η
2
p = 0.002) and no interaction
(F1,14 = 1.89, p = 0.19, η2p = 0.119).
Experiment 1: discussion
In a reversal-learning task, we observed that non-
rewarded outcomes were more strongly bound back
to their actions than rewarded outcomes. Our results
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did not involve the crucial element of selection between 
alternative outcomes. In our study, unlike previous work, 
the sequential effects on action binding may be linked to 
errors and to learning.
In a second experiment, we therefore aimed to repli-
cate this post-error boost of action binding and investi-
gate whether it was indeed dependent on learning and 
reward. We thus added a ‘non-learning’ condition in 
which participants made actions and received outcomes 
as before, but action–outcome mappings were now 
entirely unpredictable. We explicitly informed partici-
pants about the nature of these two conditions. We pre-
dicted stronger action binding in the learning condition 
than in the random condition.
Experiment 2: method
Participants
A total of 30 participants (21 females, all right-handed, 
mean age = 28 years, age range = 21-53 years) completed 
the experiment and were paid £7.5/hr plus a bonus for cor-
rect responses and precision. The number of participants 
was increased, compared to Experiment 1, to allow us to 
correlate intentional binding measures with learning meas-
ures across participants.
General procedure
The general procedure was similar to Experiment 1, 
except for the following: here the keys used to select an 
action were the ‘right-arrow’ and ‘left-arrow’ keys of a 
standard keyboard, using the index and middle fingers of 
the right hand, respectively. Participants reported the time 
by typing on the keyboard with their left hand. No visual 
feedback was presented following timing judgements. 
Participant reports from Experiment 1 indicated that they 
did not particularly attend to the visual feedback. Because 
it was redundant with the tone frequency, it was omitted in 
Experiment 2.
We focused on measuring action binding, and not tone 
binding, because action binding has been linked to out-
come prediction mechanisms (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007) and to experience-dependent plasticity (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008). Furthermore, excluding tone binding 
allowed us to increase the trial numbers in agency blocks 
without making the experiment excessively long.
Agency conditions
Besides the baseline measures, participants completed 
five blocks of 30 trials in the learning condition, and five 
in the chance condition, in pseudo-randomized order. In 
the learning condition, one key delivered rewarded high 
tones with a probability of 0.8 and the other key with 
probability of 0.2. The high tone was always the ‘correct’ 
tone, and participants were told to learn which key was 
most frequently associated with the high tone. We also 
explicitly informed subjects that reversals of the action–
tone mapping would occur occasionally and unpredicta-
bly. These explicit instructions aimed to reduce the high 
inter-individual variability in performance found in 
Experiment 1, by clarifying the task for poorer perform-
ers. Furthermore, reversals now occurred after a variable 
number of trials (randomly 6, 10 or 14 trials) so partici-
pants could not predict when they would occur. We 
adjusted the run length after the last reversal in the block 
to ensure the same number of trials for each participant. 
At the end of each block of the learning condition, if par-
ticipants achieved a threshold of at least 20 rewarded tri-
als, they gained a bonus of 50p. We used a large blockwise 
reward rather than smaller trialwise rewards, to avoid 
satiety after several successful trials and to maintain 
motivation throughout.
Figure 2. Outcome and action binding in Experiment 1.
Error bars represent standard errors.
Figure 2: Outcome and action binding in Experiment 1. (Error bars represent standard errors.)
therefore differ markedly from previous studies of bind-
ing and valence (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie and
Haggard, 2013), in which negative outcomes showed
less binding than positive outcomes. This difference
may reflect the presence of both error-based learning
and action selection in reward-based decision-making
in the current task, but not in those previous studies.
Furthermore, action binding on the trial following a
non-rewarded outcome was stronger than following a
rewarded outcome. To our knowledge, this is a first
time that previous trial outcome has been reported to
have a sequential effect on action binding. Some previ-
ous studies reported effects of the occurrence (Moore
and Haggard, 2008) or timing (Walsh and Haggard,
2013) of preceding outcomes on subsequent action
binding, but those studies did not involve the crucial
element of selection between alternative outcomes. In
our study, unlike previous work, the sequential effects
on action binding may be linked to errors and to learn-
ing.
In a second experiment, we therefore aimed to repli-
cate this post-error boost of action binding and inves-
tigate whether it was indeed dependent on learning
and reward. We thus added a ‘non-learning’ condition
in which participants made actions and received out-
comes as before, but action-outcome mappings were
now entirely unpredictable. We explicitly informed
participants about the nature of these two conditions.
W predicted stronger action binding in the learning
condition than in the random condition.
Experiment 2: m thod
Participants
A total of 30 participants (21 females, all right-handed,
mean age = 28 years, age range = 21-53 years) com-
pleted the experiment and were paid £7.5/hr plus a
bonus for correct responses and precision. The number
of participants was increased, compared to Experiment
1, to allow us to correlate intentional binding measures
with learning measures across participants.
General procedure
The general procedure was similar to Experiment 1,
except for the following: here the keys used to select an
action were the ‘right-arrow’ and ‘left-arrow’ keys of a
standard keyboard, using the index and middle fingers
of the right hand, respectively. Participants reported the
time by typing on the keyboard with their left hand.
No visual feedback was presented following timing
judgements. Participant reports from Experiment 1
indicated that they did not particularly attend to the
visual feedback. Because it was redundant with the
tone frequency, it was omitted in Experiment 2.
We focused on measuring action binding, and
not tone binding, because action binding has been
linked to outcome prediction mechanisms (Engbert
and Wohlschläger, 2007) and to experience-dependent
plasticity (Moore and Haggard, 2008). Furthermore,
excluding tone binding allowed us to increase the trial
numbers in agency blocks without making the experi-
ment excessively long.
Agency conditions
Besides the baseline measures, participants completed
five blocks of 30 trials in the learning condition, and
five in the random condition, in pseudo-randomized
order. In the learning condition, one key delivered re-
warded high tones with a probability of 0.8 and the
other key with probability of 0.2. The high tone was
always the ‘correct’ tone, and participants were told to
learn which key was most frequently associated with
the high tone. We also explicitly informed subjects that
reversals of the action-tone mapping would occur occa-
sionally and unpredictably. These explicit instructions
aimed to reduce the high inter-individual variability in
performance found in Experiment 1, by clarifying the
task for poorer performers. Furthermore, reversals now
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occurred after a variable number of trials (randomly 6,
10 or 14 trials) so participants could not predict when
they would occur. We adjusted the run length after the
last reversal in the block to ensure the same number
of trials for each participant. At the end of each block
of the learning condition, if participants achieved a
threshold of at least 20 rewarded trials, they gained a
bonus of 50p. We used a large blockwise reward rather
than smaller trialwise rewards, to avoid satiety after
several successful trials and to maintain motivation
throughout.
In the random condition, the probability of hearing a
high tone or a low tone was unrelated to the key chosen
(50%/50%). Participants were explicitly told that their
choice of action would not influence the tones they
would hear. In the learning condition, they were in-
structed to ‘find the good key, maximizing the number
of high tones’, while in the random condition they were
told, ‘whichever action is chosen, it will have no influ-
ence on the following tone’. Since learning could not be
used to maximize reward in this condition, the number
of high-tone trials did not lead to a monetary bonus.
This arrangement ensured that participants were not
incentivized to search for contingencies that did not
exist. Although this creates a motivational difference
between the two conditions, this bias is intrinsic to any
reinforcement-learning experiment (O’Doherty, 2014).
Furthermore, at the beginning of each block, partici-
pants were explicitly told which condition they were
in.
As before, participants reported the timing of their
action. To further improve the precision of our mea-
sure, we instructed participants that at the end of each
block they would receive an additional 25p if they im-
proved the precision of timing estimates relative to the
previous block. We used the SD of their judgement
errors to measure precision – note that this measure
is independent of the mean timing judgement and
thus independent of action binding estimates. Thus,
in the learning condition, participants were rewarded
for precision of timing judgements and for choosing
the ‘correct’ key. In the random condition, they were
rewarded only for precision of timing judgements.
Baseline measures
We also measured the perceived times of actions pre-
sented without tones in a baseline condition. Partici-
pants performed two baseline blocks of 20 trials each,
at the beginning and end of the agency session. In base-
line blocks, participants freely chose which of the two
keys to press. Baseline judgement errors are presented
in Table 2.
No significant differences were observed in the per-
ceived times of key presses in milliseconds for left- and
right-hand responses (F1,29 = 1.01, p = 0.319, η2p =
0.018) or for pre- or post-experiment blocks measures
(F1,29 = 0.129, p = 0.721, η2p = 0.002). Consequently,
Table 2: Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of judgement
errors (ms) in baseline and agency conditions in Ex-
periment 2.
Baseline before Baseline after
M SD M SD
Action −27 139 −10 112
(free choice, left hand)
Action −34 77 −47 105
(free choice, right hand)
All agency trials
M SD
Action −5 110
(learning condition)
Action −28 93
(random condition)
action baseline blocks were collapsed in further analy-
sis.
Analysis
Action binding was calculated for each participant and
each condition by subtracting the relevant mean base-
line error from the error in agency trials. Agency trials
were categorized according to three design factors:
1. whether the outcome on a given trial was a high
or low frequency tone (associated with a positive
or negative outcome, respectively, in the learning
condition);
2. whether the trial was in the learning or random
condition;
3. whether the outcome on the previous trial was a
high or low frequency tone.
Action binding data were then subjected to a 2 × 2 ×
2 ANOVA.
Experiment 2: results
Performance
In the learning condition, participants demonstrated
an ability to learn the correct action. As in Experiment
1, the trial number after reversal had a significant effect
on participants’ proportion of correct choice (F5,145 =
57.14, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.200). They quickly returned to
initial performance levels after a reversal event (Figure
4a).
Action binding
Action binding data are shown in Figure 3. A 2 × 2 ×
2 ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect of
condition (learning condition: M = 28.8, SD = 53.3;
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current trial outcome × previous trial outcome: F(1, 
29) = 1.01, p = 0.323, ηp
2 = 0.034; and current trial 
outcome × condition × previous trial outcome: F(1, 
29) = 0.13, p = 0.718, ηp
2 = 0.005 ).
Experiment 2: discussion
With some changes in implementation, we replicated the 
post-error boost in action binding in the learning condi-
tion. Crucially, we showed that this effect is specific to a 
learning context and is absent when participants cannot 
learn stable action–outcome relations. Our results there-
fore provide strong evidence that action binding reflects 
the ability to influence events through learning to improve 
one’s own action choices. Critically, this learning depends 
on previous error feedback.
We next used a formal reinforcement-learning model 
to investigate how the post-error boost in action binding is 
related to how people learn to maximize rewards. 
Reinforcement-learning models distinguish between the 
learning opportunities offered by errors and by rewards, 
respectively. Interestingly, these two elements of learning 
are differentially expressed across the population. 
Negative learners are better at avoiding negative out-
comes, while positive learners are better at choosing posi-
tive outcomes. Interestingly, the electroencephalogram 
(EEG) feedback-related negativity (FRN) evoked by an 
error signal has been found to be larger in negative learn-
ers than in positive learners (Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 
2005). Similarly, we hypothesized that the post-error 
boost in action binding might be positively correlated 
with participants’ bias to learn more from negative than 
from positive outcomes.
Statistical modelling of results from 
Experiments 1 and 2
Method
We fitted an established model of reinforcement learning to 
investigate whether inter-individual variance in asymmetric 
learning is correlated with the post-error boost in action bind-
ing. According to the reinforcement-learning algorithm, each 
of the two possible actions (choosing the left or right button) 
was associated with an internal value called an action value 
(Sutton & Barto, 1991). The values themselves are hidden but 
are thought to drive choices between alternative actions.
Value updating. The model is based on the concept of pre-
diction error, which measures the discrepancy between 
actual outcome value and the expected outcome for the 
chosen action (i.e., the chosen action value)
δ t t t( ) = ( )− ( )Outcome Valuechosen
Figure 3. Mean action binding (ms) following a rewarded (light grey) or non-rewarded (dark grey) outcome on the previous trial, 
for both chance and learning conditions. Error bars represent standard errors. Note that the high/low tones were associated with 
rewarded/non-rewarded outcome in the learning condition, but not in the chance condition.
***p < 0.001.
Figure 3: Mean action binding (ms) following a rewarded (light grey) or non-rewarded (dark grey) outcome on the previous trial,
for both random and learning conditions. Note that the high/low tones were associated with rewarded/non-rewarded
outcome in the learning condition, but not in the random condition. (***: p < 0.001)
random condition: M = 5.6, SD = 39.0), with stronger
action binding in the learning condition compared to
the random condition (F1,29 = 17.48, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.376). There was no effect of current trial outcome
(low tone: M = 16.4, SD = 42.7; high tone: M =
17.8, SD = 44.7; F1,29 = 0.02, p = 0.896, η2p = 0.001).
Importantly, we found a significant main effect of pre-
vious trial outcome (low tone: M = 21.3, SD = 43.2;
high tone: M = 14.7, SD = 44.7; F1,29 = 14.56, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.334) and also a highly significant inter-
action between learning condition and previous trial
outcome (F1,29 = 9.71, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.251; see
Figure 3).
We performed simple-effect t-tests to further investi-
gate this interaction. In the learning condition, non-
rewarded outcomes significantly increased the action
binding on the following trial compared to rewarded
outcomes (simple-effect paired t-test: t29 = 3.73, p <
0.001, Cohen?sd = 685). This difference was numer-
ically almost abolished and became statistically non-
significant, in the random condition (t29 = 0.46, p =
0.646; see Figure 3).
No other interactions were significant (current trial
outcome × condition: F1,29 = 0.33, p = 0.573, η2p =
0.011; current trial outcome × previous trial outcome:
F1,29 = 1.01, p = 0.323, η
2
p = 0.034; and current trial
outcome × condition × previous trial outcome:F1,29 =
0.13, p = 0.718, η2p = 0.005).
Experiment 2: discussion
With some changes in implementation, we replicated
the post-error boost in action binding in the learn-
ing condition. Crucially, we showed that this effect is
specific to a learning context and is absent when par-
ticipants cannot learn stable action-outcome relations.
Our results therefore provide strong evidence that ac-
tion binding reflects the ability to influence events
through learning to improve one’s own action choices.
Critically, this learning depends on previous error feed-
back.
We next used a formal reinforcement-learning model
to investigate how the post-error boost in action bind-
ing is related to how people learn to maximize rewards.
Reinforcement-learning models distinguish between
the learning opportunities offered by errors and by re-
wards, respectively. Interestingly, these two elements
of learning are differentially expressed across the popu-
lation. Negative learners are better at avoiding negative
outcomes, while positive learners are better at choosing
positive outcomes. Interestingly, the electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) feedback-related negativity (FRN) evoked
by an error signal has been found to be larger in nega-
tive learners than in positive learners (Frank, Woroch,
and Curran, 2005). Similarly, we hypothesized that
the post-error boost in action binding might be posi-
tively correlated with participants’ bias to learn more
from negative than from positive outcomes.
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Statistical modelling of results
from Experiments 1 and 2
Method
We fitted an established model of reinforcement learn-
ing to investigate whether inter-individual variance
in asymmetric learning is correlated with the post-
error boost in action binding. According to the
reinforcement-learning algorithm, each of the two pos-
sible actions (choosing the left or right button) was
associated with an internal value called an action value
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). The values themselves are
hidden but are thought to drive choices between alter-
native actions.
Value updating. The model is based on the con-
cept of prediction error, which measures the discrep-
ancy between actual outcome value and the expected
outcome for the chosen action (i.e., the chosen action
value):
δ(t) = Outcome(t)− V alueChosen(t)
Prediction error is then used to update the value of
the chosen action. The values were set as 0.5 at the
beginning of each block. Because we were interested
in the specific effect of rewarded and non-rewarded
outcomes, we set two different learning rates, α+ and
α−, to reflect different updating processes after a posi-
tive or negative prediction error (Lefebvre et al., 2016;
Niv et al., 2012). This asymmetrical model therefore
accounts for individual differences in the way partici-
pants learn from positive and negative outcomes.
V alueChosen(t+ 1) =
V alueChosen(t) +
{
α+ × δ(t) if δ(t) > 0
α− × δ(t) else
We then normalized the action values of the two
possible actions by keeping their sum constant.
We also constructed a reduced model with only one
learning rate for both rewarded and non-rewarded
outcomes, and the Aikake Integration Factor (AIC)
comparison showed that the AIC of the two learning
rate model was significantly lower than the AIC of the
one learning rate model for Experiment 1 (paired t-
test : t14 = 4.56, p < 0.001) and for Experiment 2
(t29 = 2.37, p = 0.025). The model with two learning
rates (α+ and α−) was thus the best fitting model.
Decision rule. In the model, the action with the
higher action value is more likely to be selected. The
probability to choose an action will depend on the
two action values and on the ‘inverse temperature’ pa-
rameter β, which represents the strength of the action
values’ effect on action selection:
PChoosingLeft =
eβ×V alueLeft
eβ×V alueLeft + eβ×V alueRight
Parameter fitting and simulations. We fitted the
model parameters based on participants’ choices on
each trial. The three parameters fitted were the two
learning rates, α+ and α−, and the inverse temperature
β. They were fitted independently for each participant,
on the data from the learning condition in Experiments
1 and 2. The best parameters chosen were those that
maximized log likelihood (LLH), defined as the sum of
the log of the model’s fit to participant’s action choices.
Thus, LLH values close to 0 indicate a good model
fit. To test the different possible combinations of pa-
rameters, we used a slice sampling procedure (Bishop,
2006). More precisely, using three different starting
points drawn from uniform distributions for each pa-
rameter, we performed 10,000 iterations of a gradient
ascent algorithm to converge on the set of three param-
eters that best fitted the data.
Results
From the fitted parameters, we simulated the model’s
choices and found a generally good match with par-
ticipants’ behaviour (Figure 4a). The probability of
model selecting the same action as the participant was
M = 0.80, SD = 0.06 in Experiment 1; and M = 0.83,
SD = 0.09 in Experiment 2. Thus, our reinforcement-
learning model seemed to accurately reflect partici-
pants’ learning processes. Similar to Lefebvre et al.
(2016), we found overall higher learning rates for re-
warded outcomes than for non-rewarded outcomes
(Experiment 1: α+: M = 0.89, SD = 0.13 and α− : M
= 0.48 SD = 0.14; t14 = 9.15, p < 0.001 and Experi-
ment 2: α+: M = 0.67, SD = 0.27 and α−: M = 0.51
SD = 0.23; t29 = 3.26, p = 0.003), justifying the use
of an asymmetrical model.
We further calculated the normalized learning rate
asymmetry (Lefebvre et al., 2016; Niv et al., 2012),
defined as:
α− − α+
α− + α+
to investigate whether the post-error agency boost
could be related to the outcome-specific learning rate.
We defined our post-error boost in action binding as
the difference between action binding after a non-
rewarded outcome and action binding after a rewarded
outcome, as before. For Experiment 1, we did not find
any relation between post-error agency boost and nor-
malized learning rate asymmetry (t13 = −0.66, p =
0.518, R2 = 0.03). However, we found a positive corre-
lation between post-error agency boost and normalized
learning rate asymmetry in the learning condition of
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Figure 4: (a) Proportion of correct responses before and after a reversal event for Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2
(right panel). Participants’ data are in black and predictions of the reinforcement-learning model are in grey. (b)
Post-error boost in action binding plotted against the normalized learning rate asymmetry for Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 (t28 = 5.6, p = 0.026, R2 = 0.17; Fig-
ure 4b), implying that individuals who learn from er-
rors also show a strong post-error agency boost. The
absence of any effect in Experiment 1 ay reflect
the lower statistical power and may also reflect the
very restricted inter-individual variability in learning
rate asymmetry (asymmetry i Experim nt 1: M =
-0.31, SD = 0.14 and in Experiment 2: M = -0.15,
SD = 0.32; F-test for comparison of sample variances:
F29,14 = 5.29, p = 0.002).
Finally, we explored whether other confounding fac-
tors, in addition to normalized learning rate asymme-
try, could predict individual variability in post-error
agency boost in Experiment 2. In particular, an alter-
native view hypothesizes that the post-error agency
boost could mere y reflect saliency of rare error events,
akin to the non-s ecific alerting effect of an oddball,
rather than any relation be ween errors a d learning.
This alternative model also pre icts a negative relation
between an individual’s post-error agency boost and
the frequency of their errors, yet no such relation was
found (t28 = 0.53, p = 0.603, R2 < 0.001), and the
sign was not as predicted.
General discussion
We have shown that intentio al binding, the compres-
sion of the temporal interval between an action and
its outcome, is sensitive to the occurrence of rewards
in a reinforcement-learning environment. I tentional
binding has been proposed as an implicit measure of
sense of agency (Mo r and Obhi, 2012). The capacity
to choose between actions in order to obtain desired
outcomes seems essential f r functi nal control of ac-
tions in everyday life – indeed, this is the standard
m ani of the term ‘sens of agency’ in th social
sciences (Haggard, 2017). However, previous experi-
mental studies have not convincingly linked the experi-
ence of action to acquiring control over outcomes. Our
reversal-learning task forced participants to continu-
ously learn relations between actions and outcomes.
revious studies showed th i tentional binding is sen-
sitive to economic (Takahata et al., 2012) a d ffect ve
(Yoshie and Hagga d, 2013) valence, but these studi s
did ot address how outco es can guide learning an
decision-making. Here, we describe for the first time
how outcome success or failure influences the sense of
agency in a dynamic learning environment.
Experiment 1 found that the tone indicating no re-
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ward was more strongly bound back towards the action
that caused it than the tone indicating a reward. This
effect was small and contrary to previous results (Taka-
hata et al., 2012; Yoshie and Haggard, 2013) so its
meaning remains unclear. Those studies suggested
that the well-known self-serving bias (Bandura, 1989)
might influence not only explicit attributions of agency
but also implicit measures of the basic experience of
agency. However, our study adds an additional, impor-
tant element of learning, which those earlier studies
lacked. The effects of learning from errors appear to
replace or outweigh the effects of valence. In our de-
sign, errors provided important evidence for learning
what action to perform next. In contrast, the valence
of outcomes in previous experiments was completely
predictable and unrelated to action choices. Future
studies could directly compare these two conditions in
the same participants.
We also found stronger action binding following a
non-rewarded outcome than following a rewarded out-
come, across two studies. To date, only a few studies
have considered trial-to-trial variation in intentional
binding (Moore and Haggard, 2008; Walsh and Hag-
gard, 2013). Both these studies showed that experience
on recent trials can influence binding on subsequent tri-
als. However, neither study involved learning to choose
between alternative actions in order to optimize out-
comes. Specifically, in neither experiment could par-
ticipants choose between alternative actions, nor did
the outcomes have any value or particular significance
for the participant. Experiment 2 replicated this post-
error boost in action binding in a new and somewhat
larger sample. Experiment 2 further showed that it
was absent in a condition where actions and tones
were identical, but the action-outcome mapping was
random and therefore could not be learned. This speci-
ficity allows us to discount purely perceptual effects of
high/low tones on subsequent action binding.
The concept of ‘cognitive control’ refers to the con-
trol and monitoring of cognitive resources to achieve
successful task performance. Errors signal a failure
of effective control and trigger a number of adapta-
tions, notably ‘post-error slowing’ (Danielmeier and
Ullsperger, 2011). Post-error slowing is classically as-
sociated with increased caution in action selection af-
ter errors (Dutilh et al., 2012). The relation between
post-error agency boost and post-error slowing remains
unclear. However, it seems unlikely that a mere tran-
sient increase in availability of general cognitive re-
sources devoted to action selection, as suggested by
conflict adaptation theories, can explain the increase
in post-error action binding. A general boost in atten-
tion following an error would be expected to cause
a general increase in precision of timing judgements,
reducing judgement errors and therefore reducing both
action binding and tone binding effects – yet we found
a specific increase in judgement errors for actions only.
Instead, we suggest that post-error binding may re-
flect a specific strategic adaptation to the information
value of the trial following an error. This adaptation
reflects the fact that errors may be highly informative
for future action. For example, following an error in
a probabilistic reversal-learning task, it is important
to decide whether the action-outcome mapping has
changed or not. Was the just-experienced error simply
‘noise’ or does it require a change in behaviour? We
suggest that strongly linking actions to outcomes on
the trial following an error may be an important ele-
ment for this classic credit-assignment problem and for
guiding future action choices. Taken overall, we sug-
gest that cognitive control mechanisms engaged when
people make errors may have two distinct effects: an
increase in cognitive resources to restore performance
and an increase in the experiential link between ac-
tion and outcome. The latter effect could trigger a
post-error boost in agency. However, our study cannot
identify for certain the direction of any causal relation
between post-error agency boost and learning from
errors.
The computations underlying reinforcement learn-
ing are classically thought to take place between the
moment when the outcome is received and the moment
when the next action needs to be performed (Rangel,
Camerer, and Montague, 2008; Sutton and Barto,
1998). During that time, the outcome is used to up-
date participants’ expectancy regarding their available
actions. Reinforcement-learning processes are thus
thought to correspond to this sequential effect. There-
fore, we formally modelled participants’ choices using a
reinforcement-learning model. Consistent with the lit-
erature, we found that participants learned more from
rewarded than from non-rewarded outcomes (Lefeb-
vre et al., 2016; Niv et al., 2012). This positive bias
obviously cannot explain the boost in action binding
that occurs specifically after non-rewarded outcomes.
However, we found that the inter-individual variability
of the post-error boost was related to asymmetry of
participants’ learning rates. Participants whose learn-
ing was more marked for non-rewarded relative to
rewarded outcomes also displayed stronger post-error
boosts in action binding. While we cannot be sure of
the direction of causation underlying this relation, the
observed correlation suggests a strong linkage between
learning and agency.
Interestingly, this asymmetric effect on sense of
agency recalls similar asymmetries in FRN, an EEG
component thought to reflect anterior cingulate cor-
tex activity. FRN is stronger after unfavourable out-
comes and stronger for participants who tend to learn
more from their mistakes (Frank, Woroch, and Curran,
2005). Moreover, similar to our post-error boost in
action binding, the FRN was increased only when par-
ticipants could actually learn, i.e., when they had the
opportunity to choose an action that could influence
outcomes (Yeung, Holroyd, and Cohen, 2004) or were
told that a task was ‘controllable’ compared to ‘uncon-
trollable’ (Li et al., 2011). These parallels point to a
possible link between action binding and FRN, which
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we will investigate in future research.
The structure of the reversal-learning paradigm in-
evitably carries some confounds when investigating ef-
fects of errors. Specifically, errors occur less frequently
than successful, rewarded trials. Furthermore, error
trials are often associated with the reversal or rule-
change event itself. These additional factors could, of
course, contribute part of the post-error agency boost
we observed. However, we consider that learning from
errors remains the more convincing explanation. First,
our analyses comparing post-error action boost with
frequency of errors found no significant association.
Indeed, the numerical sign of the relation was in the
opposite direction to the hypothesis described above.
We thus found no evidence that post-error boost in
action binding is related to non-specific consequences
of errors, such as general arousal from ‘oddball’ events.
Second, in our paradigms, the reversal event was never
made explicit to the participant and was never en-
tirely predictable. Finally, Experiment 2 found a sig-
nificant contrast between learning and random con-
ditions, even though actions, outcomes and reversals
were equally present in both conditions. Thus, our
design clearly links post-error agency boost to the po-
tential for learning about action-outcome relations.
While sense of agency is usually defined as the feel-
ing of controlling one’s actions and their consequences
(Haggard and Chambon, 2012), few studies have in-
vestigated the contribution to sense of agency of ac-
tion selection processes and of discriminative ability to
control outcomes. One previous study suggested that
action-outcome relations had no effect on intentional
binding (Desantis, Hughes, and Waszak, 2012). Un-
like previous studies, our study involved an element of
reward-guided decision-making. Experiment 2 showed
that discriminative control of outcomes does influence
action binding, but only when this element is present,
i.e., when people can learn the relation between their
actions and possible outcomes. Thus, we suggest that
action binding is a useful implicit measure of goal-
directed agency over outcomes. Binding measures can
thus capture a key feature of the sense of agency in
the rich sense of everyday life, i.e., the ability to gener-
ate one particular external event, rather than another,
through one’s own motivated, endogenous action.
People normally make actions for a reason. That
is, they choose actions to achieve a desired outcome.
They then monitor and evaluate whether the action
succeeded or failed in achieving the outcome. Thus,
one might intuitively expect a link between adaptive
behaviour and sense of agency, yet these two traditions
in action control have evolved through largely separate
research literatures. We show, for the first time, that an
implicit measure of sense of agency is sensitive to er-
rors and to reinforcement-learning features. Our data
suggest that when people experience unfavourable out-
comes, they feel more control, not less, in the next
trial. This may initially seem counterintuitive, but it is
strongly consistent with the view that sense of agency
is related to acquiring and maintaining control over
external events.
We hypothesize that sense of agency has an impor-
tant functional role in adaptive behaviour. We specu-
late that error feedback might transiently boost partici-
pants’ feeling of agency, because action failures should
strongly motivate the requirement to act appropriately
on subsequent occasions and also to learn what ac-
tions are now appropriate. Sense of agency could be
understood in the context of motivation to improve
performance on subsequent actions. The human mind
houses a specific cognitive/experiential mechanism to
ensure that ‘If at first you don’t succeed, try and try
again’ (Hickson, 1936). Our study breaks new ground
in linking the subjective experience of agency to the
cognitive mechanisms of reinforcement learning.
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5.3 Additional experiment
We have also analyzed the results of another experiment conducted by Steven di
Costa. In this experiment, we have varied the action-outcome contingencies. Its
results replicated our published article.
5.3.1 Methods
16 participants were tested on the same general procedure as in Experiment 1. The
only difference was in the action-outcome contingencies: in some blocks, one key de-
livered rewarded high-tone with a probability of 0.7 and the other key with a prob-
ability of 0.3, while in the other blocks the probabilities were 0.9 and 0.1. Therefore
there were four agency conditions: one action binding condition and one outcome
binding condition for the 70%/30% contingencies, and again one action binding con-
dition and one outcome binding condition for the 90%/10% contingencies.
Experimental trials were categorized according to three design factors: 1. condi-
tion (90%/10% vs. 70%/30%), 2. whether outcome on a given trial was positive or
negative. 3. whether outcome on the previous trial was positive or negative. Action
binding data and outcome binding data were then subjected to a 2x2x2 ANOVA. To
further understand participants’ strategy, we used the same computational model
as the one described in our article.
5.3.2 Results
In both the 70%/30% and the 90%/10% condition, participants were able to learn
the correct action. Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2, the trial number after rever-
sal had a significant effect on participants’ proportion of correct choice in both the
70%/30% (F(4, 56) = 48.1, p < 0.0001) and in the 90%/10% (F(4, 56) = 139.7, p <
0.0001) conditions.
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Model	simulations
Trial	number after a	reversal	event
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Figure 5.1: Proportion of correct responses before and after a reversal event for the
70%/30% and the 90%/10% conditions. Participants’ data are in orange, and pre-
dictions of the reinforcement-learning model are in purple. Error-bars represent the
standard error of mean.
Consistently with previous findings (Vulkan, 2000), participants followed the
probability matching law, i.e. their proportion of correct choices after learning were
matched to the probability of reward of the correct action. Indeed in the 70%/30%
104
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condition, participants reached a plateau of 70% of performance a few trials after the
reversal while in the 90%/10% condition, the plateau was at 90%.
A 2×2×2 ANOVA on action binding yielded no significant main effect of condi-
tion, current outcome or previous outcome, nor any significant interaction (all p >
0.25). The same ANOVA on outcome binding revealed similar results (all p > 0.25).
But because this experiment was a replication, we then directly used paired t-tests
on the pooled 70%/30% and 90%/10% conditions, to investigate the effect of the
previous and current outcomes on action and outcome binding respectively.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the previous outcome valence had a significant effect
on action binding (t15 = 2.3, p = .038), with stronger action binding following a neg-
ative outcome than following a positive outcome. Regarding outcome binding that
was tested only in Experiment 1, the current outcome valence had again a significant
effect on outcome binding (t15 = -2.4, p = .030), with negative outcomes being more
strongly bound towards actions than positive outcomes.
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Figure 5.2: On the left, the mean outcome binding (ms) measured for rewarded
(blue) and non-rewarded (red) outcomes. On the right, mean action binding (ms)
following a rewarded or non-rewarded outcome on the previous trial. Error-bars
represent the standard error of mean.
From the fitted parameters, we simulated the model’s choices, and we again
found a generally good match with participants’ performances (see the previous per-
formance figure). Similarly to Lefebvre et al. (2016), Palminteri et al. (2017) and our
published article, we also found a higher learning rate for positive outcomes than
negative outcomes (paired t-test, t15 = 6.94, p < 0.001). We will develop extensively
this learning rate assymetry results and interpret it in Study III.
We finally explored the correlation between the difference in action binding and
the learning rate asymmetry. We found a positive correlation between the post-error
boost of agency and the normalized learning rate asymmetry, although it was not
significant (R = 0.38, p = 0.15).
In this additional experiment, we have used novel action-outcome contingencies.
We replicated that, in a reinforcement-learning environment, negative outcomes led
to increased outcome binding, while also increasing action binding in the following
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trial. Unfortunately, we lacked statistical power to further analyze the difference
between the 70%/30% and 90%/10% conditions. We also found a positive, although
non significant, correlation between the post-error boost of action binding and the
learning rate asymmetry. This experiment generalized our findings to new action-
outcome contingencies, although it remained inconclusive about the specific effects
of the manipulated contingencies.
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5.4 Additional analyses
After the article publication, we further analyzed Experiment 2’s results. Experi-
ment 2 consisted of two main conditions: a learning condition in which one key
delivered rewarding high tones with a probability of 0.8 and the other key with
a probability of 0.2, and a random condition in which the probability of rewarding
tones was the same for the two keys (0.5). These conditions were explicitly explained
to participants: in the learning condition they were instructed to "find the good key,
maximizing the number of high tones", whereas in the random condition they were
told, "whichever action is chosen, it will have no influence on the following tone".
Furthermore, participants could earn a performance bonus only in the learning con-
dition, thus they had no motivation to follow action-outcome contingencies in the
random condition. This experiment thus gives us a unique opportunity to study the
impact of an explicit lack of instrumental control on participants’ behavior.
5.4.1 Behavioral results
Adaptive behavior is often described as a tendency to switch response when the
last action led to a negative outcome and to keeping pressing the same key when
it previously led to a positive outcome. We expected participants to adapt their
responses accordingly to the previous outcome only in the learning condition, and
not in the random condition.
Figure 5.3: The proportion of switch between trial t and t+1 as a function of the
valence (positive or negative) of the outcomes seen on the trial t, sorted between the
trials in the learning and random conditions. The standard errors appearing on this
graph (and the following ones) were calculated across participants, while the stars
indicate significance on paired t-tests (*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001).
We computed the proportion of key switch between trial t and t+1, as a func-
tion of the outcome valence (positive or negative) on trial t, and as a function of
the experimental condition (learning or random condition). We subjected these pro-
portions to a 2×2 ANOVA. We found a highly significant effect of outcome valence
(F1,29 = 25.9, p = 1.5× 10−6), with more switching behavior following negative out-
comes than following positive outcomes. There was no main effect of experimental
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condition (F1,29 = 0.36, p = .55). Crucially there was a significant valence × condi-
tion interaction (F1,29 = 9.4, p = 2.7× 10−3).
We performed simple-effect t-tests to further investigate this interaction. In both
the learning and the random conditions, non-rewarded outcomes significantly in-
creased the proportion of switch on the following trial compared to rewarded out-
comes, but the difference was stronger in the learning condition than in the ran-
dom condition (learning condition: t29 = 14.3, p = 1.1× 10−14; random condition:
t29 = 4.7, p = 5.5× 10−5; difference between conditions: t29 = 8.7, p = 1.1× 10−9).
Although participants were explicitly told their actions had no influence on out-
comes in the random condition, they still displayed adaptive behavior, instead of
randomly choosing between any key or always choosing the same. But this adapta-
tion was less pronounced than in the learning condition, showing that the instruc-
tions did regulate participants’ strategy.
5.4.2 Computational results
We then used a reinforcement-learning model to further understand the different
strategies implemented by participants in the two conditions, and to investigate
whether an explicit lack of control had an impact on the asymmetry between the
positive and the negative learning rates.
We applied the same modeling procedure as the one described in the above ar-
ticle, baring a few differences. First, we used this model to fit both conditions in
Experiment 2 (and not only the learning condition). Second we fitted four learn-
ing rates, instead of two: we used a pair of alphas (α+ and α−) to fit the learning
condition, and another pair to fit the random condition.
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Figure 5.4: Mean learning rates for positive (α+, in blue) and negative (α−, in red)
outcomes in the learning and random conditions.
We then subjected the learning rates to the same 2×2 ANOVA as the proportions
of switch, i.e., the outcome valence and experimental condition as the predictors.
We found a significant effect of outcome valence (F1,29 = 8.6, p = 4.0× 10−3), with
higher learning rates for positive outcomes than for negative ones. There was a
highly significant effect of experimental condition (F1,29 = 17.1, p = 6.8× 10−5), with
higher learning rates in the learning than in the random condition. Interestingly we
found no valence × condition interaction (F1,29 = 0.02, p = 0.88).
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The asymmetry between α+ and α− was thus considered similar between the
learning and the random conditions. This result is striking because we will see in
the next study that being forced to choose between two options abolished the asym-
metry between α+ and α−. Therefore a lack of agency in action choice made the
learning rate asymmetry vanish, while here an explicit lack of agency over action
outcomes did not prevent positive outcomes to be more integrated than negative
outcomes.
Still we found learning rates to be higher in the learning than in the random con-
dition. We can interpret it as participants choosing more randomly between the two
keys, regardless of previously observed outcomes, in the random than the learning
condition. But a change in learning rates can be interpreted differently, as reflecting
the environment stability (Behrens et al., 2007). Our reinforcement-learning model
allowed us to investigate how far participants’ choice was from randomness, as the
model computed the probabilities to choose each key on each trial. We could thus
compute how likely the participants’ choices were to occur, according to the model.
We found that the probability of the model selecting the same action as the partic-
ipant was 0.82 ± 0.02 (mean ± standard error mean) in the learning condition and
0.65 ± 0.03 in the random condition. This difference in predictive power was sig-
nificant (paired t-test: t29 = 4.8, p = 4.8 × 10−5). Participants’ choices were thus
predicted to a lesser extent by a reinforcement-learning model in the random than in
the learning condition, showing that participants’ behavior was less outcome-driven
and more stochastic in the random condition.
*
Figure 5.5: Mean predictive power, i.e. percentage of choices predicted by the model,
for the learning and the random conditions.
When participants were told they had no control over outcomes, we found that
their adaptive behavior was reduced and that a reinforcement-learning model was
less able to explain participants’ choices, thus making their choices more stochastic,
than when participants are instructed to learn action-outcome contingencies. Con-
sistently with Lefebvre et al. (2016)’s findings, we also found a lack of control to have
no effect on the learning rate asymmetry.
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Study III
6.1 Introduction
In the previous study, we found participants’ learning rates to be higher for positive
than negative outcomes for factual learning, i.e., learning from obtained outcomes.
Palminteri et al. (2017) found the same result, but also the opposite valence-induced
bias for counterfactual learning, as negative counterfactual outcomes were preferen-
tially integrated, relative to positive ones. These results can be generally seen as a
choice-confirmation bias.
Fig 2. Factual and counterfactual learning biases. (A) Predicted results. Based on previous studies we expected that in Experiment 1 factual learning
would display a “positivity” bias (i.e. the learning rate for the chosen positive outcomes would be relatively higher than that of the chosen negative
outcomes (aác > a
 
c ; note that in Experiment 1 the “positivity” and the “confirmation” bias are not discernible). In Experiment 2, one possibility was that this
“positivity” bias would extend to counterfactual learning, whereby positive outcomes would be over-weighted regardless of whether the outcome was
chosen or unchosen (“valence” bias) (aáu > a
 
u ). Another possibility was that counterfactual learning would present an opposite bias, whereby the learning
rate for unchosen negative outcomes was higher than the learning rate of unchosen positive outcomes (aáu < a
 
u ) (“confirmation” bias). (B) Actual results.
Learning rate analysis of Experiment 1 data replicated previous findings, demonstrating that factual learning presents a “positivity” bias. Learning rate
analysis of Experiment 2 indicated that counterfactual learning was also biased, in a direction that was consistent with a “confirmation” bias. ***P<0.001
and *P<0.05, two-tailed paired t-test.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005684.g002
Confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning
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Figure 6.1: The choice-confirmatio bia re ently fou d in learning rates. Factual
and counterfactual learning rates are respectively denoted αC and αCF. (Figure re-
produced from Palminteri et al., 2017.)
Choice-confirmation is a self-centered bias: we want our choice to be correct,
and thus interpret the given outcomes in this light. In our previous study, when
we fitted the learning rates independently in Experiment 2’s learning and random
conditions, we found the same difference between positive and negative learning
rates for explicit presence and lack of outcome control. The choice-confirmation bias
appeared to persist in a situation in which participants were told that their actions
could not control outcomes and that there were no ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ choice to
make.
In this study, we hypothesized the learning rate asymmetry to disappear when
participants were forced to select an action, and we investigated the optimality of
differential learning rates in various experimental conditions.
6.2 Our draft in preparation
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R ecent findings show that even at the ‘low-level’ reinforcement learning process, indi-viduals display a choice-confirmation bias,
i.e. they preferentially take into account infor-
mation that confirms their current decision. Be-
yond classical learning, individuals are also able
to learn from merely observing outcomes gener-
ated by an external source. We wondered if partici-
pants would still display a choice-confirmation bias
in the case of observational learning. We analysed
two experiments in which the participants’ choice
was either ‘free’ or ‘forced’, and used a computa-
tional model adapted to test if outcome valence in-
fluences learning. We found that the confirmation
pattern previously described can only be found in
free-choice trials, as forced-choice trials triggered
a valence-impartial learning. A model comparison
analysis confirmed this findings, as the winning
model had valence-independent learning rates in
forced-choice trials.
Keywords
Reinforcement learning; confirmation bias; observa-
tional learning; outcome valence; free vs forced-choice;
counterfactual outcome.
Introduction
Humans should be able to take impartially into account
different information, regardless of its irrelevant fea-
tures like valence. Classical theories of reinforcement
learning assume that action values are learnt via the
calculation of a reward prediction error, i.e., the differ-
ence between the obtained and the expected outcome,
and they suppose that subjects learn similarly, inde-
pendently of the valence (positive or negative) of the
prediction error (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Theoret-
ical simulations ground this supposition for valence-
independent learning: having a bias for positive or
negative prediction error has been shown to be a sub-
optimal strategy in most situations, although differen-
tial learning rates were sometimes advantageous (Cazé
and van der Meer, 2013).
Yet, recent findings from various paradigms show
that humans display a significant valence-induced bias.
It generally goes in the direction of preferentially learn-
ing from positive, compared to negative prediction
error (Lefebvre et al., 2017). This asymmetry may be
interpreted as a general optimism bias in human in-
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Figure 1: (A) Experiment 1 was composed of a condition with only free-choice trials, and a condition with intermixed free-
and forced-choice trials. Only partial trials were used. In Experiment 2, we had always free- and forced-choice trials
intermixed, and there were two conditions: one with partial trials, and one with complete trials. (B) Description of the
four trial types implemented in Experiments 1 and 2. In free-choice trials, participants could freely select between the
two options, while in forced-choice trials, participants had to match a preselected option. In partial trials, participants
were shown only the reward (+1 or -1) associated to the chosen option, while in complete trials, participants were
shown the outcome of both the chosen and unchosen option.
formation integration (Sharot and Garrett, 2016; Kuz-
manovic and Rigoux, 2016). A recent article designed
an experiment in which participants were shown not
only the obtained outcome for their chosen option
(factual outcomes), but also the forgone outcome asso-
ciated with the unchosen option (counterfactual out-
comes, Palminteri et al., 2017). For factual outcomes,
they have replicated that participants learned preferen-
tially from positive, relative to negative, outcomes. But
for counterfactual learning, negative outcomes were
preferentially taken into account, relative to positive
ones. These results are therefore best explained by a
choice-confirmation bias (i.e. people integrate prefer-
entially information that confirms their choice) than a
positivity bias.
If participants are more prone to integrate choice-
confirming outcome, one can wonder what happens
when participants see information without any choice
to make. Indeed, individuals are able to learn not only
from their own actions and outcomes but also from
those that are observed, this observational learning
appeared to rely on similar neural mechanisms as clas-
sical learning (Burke et al., 2010; Cooper et al., 2012;
Burke et al., 2016; Monfardini et al., 2013). It should
be noted that these experiments involved learning from
observing another person’s actions and outcomes.
We conducted two simple instrumental learning
tasks in which the participants’ choice was either ‘free’
or ‘forced’ (Figure 1). We followed a classical oper-
ationalization of choice freedom: in an instructed or
forced choice, actions are fully specified by external
stimuli while a free action occur in underdetermined
external environments (Filevich et al., 2013). In a first
experiment (N = 24), participants were shown only
the factual outcome corresponding to their choices.
We hypothesized that in forced-choice, participants
would not be subjected to the choice-confirmation bias.
In a second experiment (N = 24), the counterfactual
outcome, i.e., the outcome associated with the un-
chosen symbol, was also displayed. Our goal was to
replicate our findings, and verify that counterfactual
learning would also be not be subjected to the choice-
confirmation bias in forced-choice trials.
Results
In the two experiments, participants performed an in-
strumental learning tasks in which their choices were
either ‘free’ or ‘forced’. Participants were instructed
to find the symbol associated with a higher probabil-
ity of reward (i.e., ‘+1’ outcome). In free-choice tri-
als, the participant freely chose between two symbols,
whereas in forced-choice trials the computer prese-
lected one symbol and the subject was forced to match
this choice. Crucially in forced-choice trials, the two
stimuli were pseudo-randomly preselected, thus ensur-
ing equal sampling from both the option associated
with high value and the other.
Only the factual outcomes, i.e., the outcomes asso-
ciated with the chosen stimuli, were shown in Experi-
ment 1 (N = 24). We called these trials ‘partial’, as only
a part of the two possible outcomes was shown (see
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Figure 2: Behavioral results from Experiments 1 and 2 (re-
spectively shown on the left and right panels). (A)
The participants’ mean proportion of correct choices
for the two conditions, separated between the first
and the second halves of the learning block. (B) The
proportion of choice switch between trial t and t+1
as a function of the factual (F) and counterfactual
(CF) outcomes seen on the trial t, sorted between
when the trial t was a free- or a forced-choice trial.
For the Experiment 1, this analysis was made on the
Partial Free + forced Condition data, as it contained
both free- and forced-choice trials. For the Exper-
iment 2, this analysis was made on the Complete
Free + forced Condition data, as it contained both
factual and counterfactual outcomes. Standard er-
rors shown by the error bars were calculated across
participants.
Figure 1, upper panels). Experiment 1 was composed
of 12 blocks, each with a new pair of symbols:
• 6 blocks that each contained 40 free-choice partial
trials (the ‘Partial Free only’ condition)
• 6 blocks that contained 40 free- and 40 forced-
choice partial trials, pseudo-randomly intermixed
(the ‘Partial Free + forced’ condition)
In the second experiment (N = 24), we also used
trials in which both the factual and the counterfactual
outcomes, i.e., the outcomes associated with the cho-
sen and unchosen stimuli, were shown (see Figure 1,
lower panels). These trials were called ‘complete’, as
participants had access to the complete information.
Experiment 2 was composed of 16 blocks:
• 8 blocks that contained 20 free- and 20 forced-
choice partial trials (the ‘Partial Free + forced’
condition)
• 8 blocks that contained 20 free- and 20 forced-
choice complete trials (the ‘Complete Free +
forced’ condition)
Behavior
We first analysed participants’ behavior to assess if they
were able to perform correctly the task. They were able
to find the high-rewarding symbol, as performance (i.e.
average correct choice proportion) was significantly
higher than chance level in each condition and in each
experiment (t-tests against 50%: t23 > 10, p < 10−9;
see Figure 2A).
Performance data was further categorized accord-
ing to two design factors: whether the trial was part
of the first or second half of the learning block; and
depending on the condition the trial belonged to. We
thus subjected performance to a 2×2 repeated-measure
ANOVA. In both experiments, we found a significant
effect of the leaning block phase, with performance
increasing between the first and second halves of the
blocks (Exp. 1: F1,23 = 7.5, p = 7.6 × 10−3; Exp. 2:
F1,23 = 13, p = 5.3× 10−4; see Figure 2A).
Participants seemed to use information from forced-
choice trials and from counterfactual outcomes to im-
prove their performance, as their performances were
higher in the ‘Partial Free + forced’ condition than in
the ‘Partial Free only’ condition, and were also higher
in the ‘Complete Free + forced’ condition than in the
‘Partial Free + forced’ condition. But these differences
were not significant, as we found no main effect of
condition (Exp. 1: F1,23 = 1.5, p = 0.22; Exp. 2:
F1,23 = 3.5, p = 0.063), nor a phase-by-condition inter-
action effect (Exp. 1: F1,23 = 0.11, p = 0.74; Exp. 2:
F1,23 = 0.018, p = 0.89).
We can show that participants did pay attention to
the outcome associated with the preselected stimuli
in forced-choice trials, and with the counterfactual
outcomes. The hallmark of adaptive behavior is to
switch choice after a negative outcome and to repeat a
choice after a positive outcome. We therefore analysed
the proportion of choice switch depending on: whether
the previous factual outcome was positive or negative;
whether the previous trial was a free- or forced-choice;
and for Experiment 2 only, whether the counterfactual
outcome was positive or negative.
The ANOVAs revealed a main effect of the factual
outcome (Exp. 1: F1,23 = 16, p = 1.1× 10−4; Exp. 2:
F1,23 = 74, p = 4.2 × 10−15). Thus after observing a
negative factual outcome in a previous trial, partici-
pants indeed switched more often options than after
observing a positive factual outcome. Crucially this
phenomenon occurred similarly after a free- and a
forced-choice trial. Moreover we found a main effect
of counterfactual outcome in Experiment 2 (F1,23 =
39, p = 3.6× 10−9), with participants switching more
often when the outcome associated with the unchosen
option was positive, relative to negative (see Figure
2B).
It should be noted that we found a main effect of
choice type (F1,23 > 36, p < 10−7), with participants
switching more after a forced-choice trial than after
a free-choice trials. Indeed a symbol was pseudo-
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Figure 3: Parameter results of the ‘Full’ model from Experiments 1 and 2. (A)We represented the positive learning rates in blue and
the negative learning rates in red, fitted from the free- and forced-choice trials. The factual (respectively counterfactual)
learning rates are in the upper (respectively lower) panels. Note that Exp. 1 included only factual outcomes, while in
Exp. 2, counterfactual outcomes were sometimes displayed, allowing us to fit counterfactual learning rates. The stars
indicate significance on paired t-tests (*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001). (B) Parameter recovery results of the
‘Full’ model with 4 (Experiments 1, left panels) or 8 (Experiment 2, right panels) learning rates. We have represented the
matrices of averaged correlation coefficients R of the correlations between the manipulated parameters used to simulate
artificial datasets and the recovered parameters from using our fitting procedure on these simulated datasets.
randomly preselected in forced-choice trials. The ‘cor-
rect’ and the ‘incorrect’ symbols had thus the same
probability to be chosen, causing a high proportion of
choice switch on the following trial.
We found that participants efficiently used forced-
choice trial and counterfactual information to learn
action-outcome contingencies, justifying a computa-
tional model learning from both free- and forced-choice
trials, and from factual and counterfactual outcomes.
Model parameter analyses
To assess a difference in learning between free- and
forced-choice trials, we fitted an established model of
reinforcement-learning, with different pairs of positive
and negative learning rates (α+ and α−) in free- and
forced-choice trials, and for factual and counterfactual
outcomes in Experiment 2. The resulting learning rates
were subjected to the same ANOVAs as the previous
proportions of choice switch.
The learning rate asymmetry was different between
the free- and forced-choice trials. Indeed we found
a significant choice × valence interaction in the Ex-
periment 1 (F1,23 = 7.4, p = 7.6 × 10−3), and a sig-
nificant choice × valence × factuality interaction in
the Experiment 2 (F1,23 = 6.8, p = 1.0 × 10−2). We
performed post-hoc t-tests to further investigate these
interactions. The difference between positive and nega-
tive learning rates was always significant in free-choice
trials (Exp. 1: t23 = 2.5, p = 2.0 × 10−2; Exp. 2, fac-
tual: t23 = 4.1, p = 4.3 × 10−4; and counterfactual:
t23 = −6.2, p = 2.6 × 10−6), and non-significant in
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forced-choice trials (Exp. 1: t23 = −2.0, p = 0.055;
Exp. 2, factual: t23 = −1.3, p = 0.20; and counterfac-
tual: t23 = −1.5, p = 0.14, see Figure 3A). Although
the difference between the positive and negative learn-
ing rates was close to significance in Experiment 1, this
difference almost completely vanished in Experiment 2.
The ANOVA also revealed a significant valence ×
factuality interaction in Experiment 2 (F1,23 = 11, p =
1.2 × 10−3), replicating Palminteri et al. (2017)’s re-
sults. Indeed we can see a confirmatory bias in the
free-choice learning rates: participants learned pref-
erentially from positive, relative to negative, factual
outcome whereas the opposite pattern appeared for
counterfactual outcomes. All other main or interaction
effects were non-significant (p > 0.05, see Tables 1 and
2).
Table 1: The F- and p-values from the 2×2 ANOVA on the
learning rates fitted on participants’ choice from Ex-
periment 1.
F-values p-values
Choice .17 .68
Valence .015 .90
Choice×Valence 7.4 .0076
Table 2: The F- and p-values from the 2×2×2 ANOVA on the
learning rates fitted on participants’ choice from Ex-
periment 2.
F-values p-values
Choice 3.5 .064
Valence .59 .44
Factuality 1.8 .18
Choice×Valence .88 .35
Choice×Factuality .77 .38
Valence×Factuality 11 .0012
Choice×Valence×Factuality 6.8 .010
We then used a parameter recovery procedure to
assess whether these results were parameter fitting
artefacts. We applied the same parameter fitting pro-
cedure to simulated datasets and found that on aver-
age parameters were significantly well recovered (all
Rs > 0.78, all ps < 10−3). Crucially, our fitting pro-
cedure introduced no spurious correlations between
the manipulated parameters and the other recovered
parameters (all −0.058 < Rs < 0.082, all ps > 0.43,
see Figure 3B).
Parcimony-driven parameter reduction
Although we found no valence-driven difference in
forced-choice learning rates, it is possible that partici-
pants had opposite biases that cancelled one another
on aggregate measures. We therefore ran a parcimony-
driven parameter reduction to see if fitting different
learning rates in forced-choice was important to pre-
dict participants’ data. The ‘Full’ model (i.e., the model
with 4 α in Exp. 1 and 8 α in Exp. 2, whose parameters
are shown in Figure 3A) corresponds to the one whose
parameters were described previously. In the ‘Interme-
diate’ model, the negative and positive learning rates
are set to be equal on forced-choice trials only. Finally,
in the ‘Reduced’ model, the negative and positive learn-
ing rates are always equal on free- and forced-choice
trials (see Figure 4A)..
We first compared the models using a Bayesian
model selection (Daunizeau, Adam, and Rigoux, 2014)
based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The
‘Intermediate’ model was found to better account for
the data compared to other models, as its average pos-
terior probability was higher than the posterior proba-
bilities of the other models. Moreover, its exceedance
probability, i.e., the probability of this model being
more likely than any other model, was 0.81 in Experi-
ment 1 and 1.0 in Experiment 2 (see Figure 4B).
The BIC tend to favor overly simple models because
it relies on specific assumptions (Bishop, 2006; Daw,
2011). We thus also used a cross-validation proce-
dure. We can see that the ‘Reduced’ model under-fitted
the data as its cross-validation likelihood was signif-
icantly lower than the ‘Intermediate’ model’s (Exper-
iment 1: t23 = −3.9, p = 6.7 × 10−4; Experiment 2:
t23 = −4.0, p = 5.1 × 10−4). In Experiment 1, the
difference between the ‘Intermediate’ (3 α) and ‘Full’
(4 α) models was not significant (t23 = 1.4, p = 0.18),
although a parsimony approach would recommend to
keep the simpler model at equal performance. Still
Experiment 2’s results indicated that the ‘Full’ (8α)
model over-fitted participants’ choices, as its cross-
validation likelihood was lower than the ‘Intermediate’
(6α) model’s (t23 = −3.7, p = 1.1 × 10−3; see Figure
4C).
Table 3: The mean and standard errors of the winning model parameters for Experiments 1 and 2.
Factual Counterfactual
β α+free α
−
free αforced α
+
free α
−
free αforced
Exp. 1 4.2 .35 .14 .13 - - -
(±0.50) (±.063) (±.054) (±.036)
Exp. 2 6.3 .30 .11 .14 .065 .27 .089
(±0.60) (±.035) (±.020) (±.022) (±.011) (±.033) (±.011)
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Free choices Forced choices
‘Full’ model:
4a (Exp. 1) / 8a (Exp.2)
‘Intermediate’ model:
3a (Exp. 1) / 6a (Exp.2)
‘Reduced’ model:
2a (Exp. 1) / 4a (Exp.2)
⍺+ ⍺ -
⍺+/-
(A)
(B)
(C)
Figure 4: Model comparison results from Experiments 1 and 2. (A) illustration of the model space. The ‘Full’ model had different
positive and negative learning rates in both free- and forced-choice trials. In the ‘Intermediate’ model, the positive and
negative learning rates were set to be equal in forced-choice trials, while in the ‘Reduced’ model, the positive and negative
learning rates were always set to be equal. The ‘Reduced’ model is thus nested within the ‘Intermediate’ model, which
is itself nested within the ‘Full’ model. Note that in Experiment 2, this parameter reduction occurred for both factual
and counterfactual learning rates. (B) The expectations and the variances of the posterior probability for each model,
based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values, with the exceedance probability (XP) for each model in small
windows. (C) The average likelihood per trial after applying a cross-validation procedure.
Our model comparison showed that the ‘Intermedi-
ate’ model is the most likely. The parameters of this
winning model are shown in Table 3.
Parameter optimality
Then we simulated models with different learning rate
patterns to understand how parameter values can af-
fect performance in our task. We set learning rates to
be either choice-confirmatory (‘Conf’), valence-neutral
(‘Neut’) or choice-disconfirmatory (‘Disc’), and the
learning rate patterns could be different in free-choice
and forced-choice trials (see Figure 5C and Table 4).
Cazé and van der Meer (2013) have found that dif-
ferent learning rate patterns can be advantageous for
certain reward contingencies, that they called ‘low-
reward’ and ‘high-reward’ (when the reward proba-
bilities are respectively both low or both high for the
two possible actions). We have thus used in our ex-
periments low-reward conditions in which the reward
contingencies were 0.4 and 0.1, and high-reward con-
ditions in which the contingencies were 0.9 and 0.6.
Replicating Cazé and van der Meer (2013)’s findings,
we also found the choice-confirmatory models to out-
perform the other models in low-reward conditions,
and the choice-disconfirmatory models to have bet-
ter performances in the high-reward conditions (see
Figure 5).
When we looked at the general performance across
both conditions, we found that the highest performing
model was the model corresponding to the participants’
learning rate patterns, i.e., the ‘Conf & Neut’ model
whose learning rates were choice-confirmatory in free
choices and valence-neutral in forced choices (see Fig-
ure 5). Even in Experiment 1, the ‘Conf & Neut’ model
had a performance of 85,1%, while the closest one, the
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(A)
(B)
(C)
Figure 5: Parameter optimality was tested by simulating models with different learning rate patterns in Experiments 1 (A)
and 2 (B). The models were named depending on their learning rate patterns, shown in (C). For example, ‘Conf &
Neut’ designated a model with choice-confirmatory learning rates in free-choice trials and valence-neutral learning
rates in forced-choice trials. The diamonds and the squares correspond to the performance in high- and low-reward
conditions respectively. The circles correspond to the performance averaged across the two conditions. The performance
corresponding to the participants’ pattern of learning rates was highlighted with a dashed square. Participants’ actual
performances were also shown in grey. Error-bars were plotted, although they were often too small to be seen.
‘Neut & Disc’ model had a lower performance of 84,3%.
Therefore the learning rate patterns we found in our
participants can be said to be optimal.
Interestingly, the performances of the ‘Conf & Neut’
model were also quite close on the high- and low-
reward conditions.. In Experiment 1, the ‘Conf & Neut’
model had the smaller difference in performance (2%)
between the high and low-reward conditions, while
this difference was over 4% for the other models. In
Experiment 2, the performance difference was 0.46%
for the ‘Conf & Neut’ model. It was only smaller for the
‘Neut & Conf’ model (0.27%), as this difference was
over 2% for the rest of the models. Therefore the ‘Conf
& Neut’ model not only outperformed the others, but
also had stable performances in our two different con-
ditions. Crucially we could also see in our participants’
data similar performances in high- and low-conditions
(paired t-tests for Exp. 1: t23 = 0.25, p = 0.80; for Exp.
2: t23 = −0.027, p = 0.98).
Discussion
Two cohorts of healthy adult participants performed
an instrumental learning task intermixing free-choice
and forced-choice trials. We have investigated the re-
lation between the type of choice and the subsequent
reinforcement learning processes. We replicated the
choice-supportive bias usually found when participants
were free to choose between two alternatives (Lefeb-
vre et al., 2017; Palminteri et al., 2017). Crucially, we
found this valence bias to be absent in forced-choice
trials. This result was further supported by model com-
parison analyses.
Another experiment has computationally investi-
gated how learning from free and forced choice out-
comes may differ. Cockburn, Collins, and Frank (2014)
have simulated a reinforcement learning model similar
to ours but they used it to predict participants’ post-
learning choice rate, whereas we have predicted partici-
pants’ trial-by-trial choices during learning. They found
positive outcomes in free choices to have more impact
on learning that negative outcomes. Consistently with
our findings, they modelled no difference between pos-
itive and negative outcomes in forced choices. This
model was able to explain why humans exhibit a pref-
erence for freely chosen options.
A vast literature in psychology have investigated how
choice can affect preferences and explicit memory. For
example, choice-induced preference change, for ex-
ample, refers to an observation that after choosing
between two similarly valued items, participants rate
the selected item better than they initially did, and the
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rejected option as worse (Brehm, 1956). As a control,
it was shown that preferences were not altered when a
computer instructed the participants decision (Sharot,
Velasquez, and Dolan, 2010). Choice was also shown
to alter memory (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather,
Shafir, and Johnson, 2000). Participants were asked
to virtually choose between two potential roommates,
each with some positive and negative features. When
asked after their choice, participants displayed a choice-
supportive memory distortion: they tended to attribute,
both correctly and incorrectly, more positive features
to the chosen person, and more negative features to its
competitor (Mather, Shafir, and Johnson, 2000). As
the authors said, the consequences of such bias is that
‘it is problematic for learning from past experience’.
Still, this effect also disappeared when one option was
assigned, and not chosen by the participant (Mather,
Shafir, and Johnson, 2003). Our results furthermore
support the idea that choice-confirmation biases are
pervasive in human cognition (Nickerson, 1998).
A few studies have also shown that free choice result
in robust enhancements of declarative memory (Voss
et al., 2011; Murty, DuBrow, and Davachi, 2015). This
behavioral results are consistent with different human
neuroimaging studies founding greater BOLD response
for free, compared with instructed, actions in areas in-
volved in action planning, as the supplementary motor
area (Krieghoff et al., 2009; Filevich et al., 2013) and
the anterior cingulate cortex (Lau et al., 2004; van
Eimeren et al., 2006). Event-related potential analyses
in electroencephalogram showed that choice freedom
can also alter processing of action outcomes. The au-
ditory N1 and the feedback-related negativity were
enhanced in tasks involving a free, compared with an
imposed, choice (Yeung, Holroyd, and Cohen, 2004;
Yu and Zhou, 2006; Caspar et al., 2016). In our exper-
iments, we have observed that participants could learn
as well from free and forced choices. It should be noted
that forced choice outcomes could be used to guide
subsequent free choices in our task. This may be the
reason why participants could learn as well, although
differently, from the two trial types.
Interestingly, a neuroimaging study has found that
activity for unexpected vs. expected reward was
stronger in the right striatum in active learning. In
contrast activity in the hippocampus was bilaterally
enhanced in observational learning (Bellebaum et al.,
2012). Another neuroimaging experiment has found
that anticipating an opportunity for choice was asso-
ciated with increased activity in a network of brain
regions thought to be involved in reward processing
(Leotti and Delgado, 2011). A recruitment of different
brain structures may explain the difference in learning
bias we found between free- and forced-choice trials.
Similarly to Cazé and van derMeer (2013), we found
the optimistic models to outperform the pessimistic
models in the low-reward condition, while this was
reversed in the high-reward condition. We have shown
here that the participants’ learning rate pattern was not
biasing them to suboptimal performances, but rather
guaranteeing high and stable performances across con-
ditions. We can thus interpret our participants’ param-
eter values as being optimal in our setting, and not as
emerging from a maladaptive cognitive bias. However
it should be stressed that we were using unusual con-
tingencies, and a stationary setting (i.e., the symbol
values were fixed during the learning blocks), which
prevents us from generalizing our findings too far. In-
deed, an optimistic model was shown to have worse
performance than a rational model in a changing envi-
ronment, and the participants with a higher optimistic
bias were worse than the participants having a lower
or nonexistent bias (Palminteri et al., 2017).
In summary, by investigating free- and forced-choice
learning, the current experiments demonstrate that
participants display a choice-confirmation learning pat-
tern in free choices and are impartial to outcome va-
lence in forced choices. This absence of low level
reinforcement-learning bias in forced choices may
help understand why taking a third-person perspective
comes with benefits.
Methods
Participants
This study included two experiments. In each, we
tested N = 24 participants (Experiment 1: 13 males,
mean age = 25.1 ± 0.8; Experiment 2: 9 males, mean
age = 23.9 ± 0.5). The local ethics committee ap-
proved the study. All participants gave written in-
formed consent before inclusion in the study, which
was carried out in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki (1964, revised 2013). The inclusion criteria
were being older than 18 years, reporting no history
of neurological or psychiatric disorders and a normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. They were paid 10, 15
or 20 euros, depending on the number of points they
had accumulated during the experiment.
General procedure
Participants performed a probabilistic instrumental
learning task based on previous studies (Lefebvre et al.,
2017; Palminteri et al., 2017). Briefly, the task involved
choosing between two cues that were associated with
stationary reward probability. The possible outcomes
were either winning or losing one point. Participants
were encouraged to accumulate as many points as pos-
sible and were informed that one cue would result in
winning more often than the other. They were given
no explicit information about the exact reward proba-
bilities, which they had to learn from trials and errors.
Participants were informed that some trials (indi-
cated by the word ‘observateur’, i.e., ‘observer’ in
French) would be observational trials, meaning that
the observed outcome would not be accumulated to
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their number of points but would allow them to gain
knowledge on what would have happened if they had
chosen this cue. In Experiment 2, participants were
also informed that in some blocks, they would see the
outcome associated with the unchosen cue, although
they would only accumulate the points of the chosen
outcome.
Conditions
Four types of trials were used in this study (see Figure
1). In free-choice trials, participants could freely se-
lect between the two possible options, while in forced-
choice trials, participants had to match a preselected
option. In partial trials, participants were shown only
the outcome (‘+1’ or ‘-1’) associated to the chosen op-
tion, while in complete trials, participants were shown
the outcome of both the chosen and unchosen options.
Experiment 1 was composed of two conditions: a con-
dition with only partial free-choice trials (each block
of this condition lasted 40 trials) and a condition with
intermixed partial free- and forced-choice trials (each
block lasted 40 + 40 = 80 trials). Experiment 2 first
parallels the condition with intermixed partial free-
and forced-choice trials, and added a condition with
intermixed complete free- and forced-choice trials. For
the sake of duration, we decided to half the number
of trials in Experiment 2 (20 free-choice trials + 20
forced-choice trials in each block).
Blocks
A new pair of cues was used at the start of every block,
and participant had to learn from scratch the correct
cue over the course of a number of trials. The free-
and forced-choice trials experienced by the participant
were pseudo-randomly intermixed within a block, and
the same pair of cues was used in the free- and forced-
choice trials.
In Experiment 1, participants underwent twelve
blocks of ≈ 3 min (each condition included 6 blocks).
Independently from the condition, six blocks were
‘high-reward’ and six were ‘low-reward’. During high-
reward blocks, one of the two cues presented produced
a gain (+1 point) with probability 0.9 and a loss (-1
point) with a probability of 0.1. The other cue was asso-
ciated with a probability of 0.6 to produce a gain, and
thus a loss probability of 0.4. Regardless of participants’
actions, the high-reward blocks led to accumulate more
gains than losses. During low-reward blocks, one cue
was associated with a gain probability of 0.4, and the
other one with a gain probability of 0.1, leading to a
majority of losses over gains. In Experiment 2, each
condition was composed of eight blocks of ≈ 2 min.
Half of them were high-reward blocks and the other
half were low-reward blocks. The low- and high-reward
blocks were associated with the same contingencies as
in Experiment 1.
The first block was preceded by a short training (60
trials for Experiment 1; 40 trials for Experiment 2).
To ensure participants would not be biased to expect
more positive or negative outcomes in the experiment,
the action-outcome contingencies during the training
block were 0.5 for both possible cue choices.
Trial structure
Trials began by a fixation cross, except when free- and
forced-choice were intermixed, in which case the word
‘acteur’ (respectively ‘observateur’) appeared for 500ms
to indicate the beginning of a free-choice (resp. forced-
choice) trial (see Figure 1). A pair of two cues was then
presented. The side (right or left) on which the cues
appeared was pseudo-randomly chosen on each trial.
Participants made their choice by pressing the right or
left arrow with their right hand. When the trial was
forced-choice, the preselected cue was surrounded by
a square. Participants had to press the corresponding
arrow in order to move on (nothing happened if they
tried to press the other arrow).
Crucially, the cues were preselected to assure equal
sampling: in half of the forced-choice trials cue A was
preselected, while in the other half cue B was pres-
elected. The obtained outcome was then presented
on the side of the chosen cue. When the trial was a
complete trial, the foregone outcome was also shown
on the side of the unchosen cue. To ensure that par-
ticipants paid attention to outcomes, even in the case
of forced-choice trial, they were asked to press the up
arrow when winning a point and the down arrow when
losing a point. The choice and the outcome confirma-
tion timing were both self-paced.
The ‘full’ computational model
Wewill first describe the ’full’ model, whose parameters
are shown in Figure 3. According to the reinforcement-
learning algorithm, each of the 2 possible stimuli is
associated with an internal value called a Q-value (Sut-
ton and Barto, 1998). The Q-values were set as 0 at
the beginning of each block, corresponding to the a
priori expectation of an equal probability of a positive
or negative outcome. Value updating is based on the
concept of prediction error, which measures the dis-
crepancy between actual outcome and the expected
outcome for the chosen cue, i.e., the chosen Q-value:
δchosen(t) = Ofactual(t)−Qchosen(t)
where Ofactual(t) represents the factual outcome on
trial t.
The prediction error is then used to update the cho-
sen Q-value:
Qchosen(t+ 1) = Qchosen(t) + α× δchosen(t)
where α represents the learning rate parameter.
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In the complete condition experienced in Experi-
ment 2, participants were found to learn from both
the factual and counterfactual outcomes so in these
trials the unchosen Q-value was also updated with the
counterfactual outcome using to the same rule:
δunchosen(t) = Ocounterfactual(t)−Qunchosen(t)
Qunchosen(t+ 1) = Qunchosen(t) + α× δunchosen(t)
We set different learning rates, α+ and α−, to reflect
different updating processes after a positive or negative
outcome (Lefebvre et al., 2017; Palminteri et al., 2017).
Because we were interested in the specific effect of
forced choice on learning, we fitted different pairs of
asymmetrical learning rates in free- and forced-choice
trials, and for factual and counterfactual outcomes
in Experiment 2. The ‘full’ model thus had 4 αs in
Experiment 1, and 8 αs in Experiment 2.
In the reinforcement learning framework, the stimuli
with the higher Q-value is more likely to be selected.
The probability to choose a stimulus will be computed
through a softmax function:
pstimA =
eβ×QstimA
eβ×QstimA + eβ×QstimB
where β is the exploitation intensity parameter, which
represents the strength of the Q-values’ effect on choice
selection. We fitted a unique parameter β for all trial
and outcome type, to avoid biasing the learning rate
comparisons.
The other computational models
We created two simpler versions of the ‘Full’ model
presented above (see Figure 4A):
• an ‘Intermediate’ model in which the negative and
positive learning rates are set to be equal in forced-
choice trials, thus leading to 3 αs in Experiment 1
and 6 αs in Experiment 2;
• a ‘Reduced’ model in which the negative and posi-
tive learning rates are set to be equal in both free-
and forced-choice trials, thus leading to 2 αs in
Experiment 1 and 4 αs in Experiment 2.
Note that the number of learning rate parameters
was always two times higher in Experiment 2 than
in Experiment 1, because in Experiment 2 we fitted
separately factual and counterfactual learning rates.
Parameter fitting
We fitted the model parameters based on participants’
choices on each free-choice trial, independently for
each participant. We used a maximum posterior ap-
proach (or MAP, Bishop, 2006), to avoid degenerate
parameter estimates. The best parameters chosen were
therefore those that maximizing the logarithm of the
posterior probability (LPP):
ln(p(θ|Choice1:N )) ∝ ln(p(θ)) +
N∑
t=1
ln(p(Choicet|θ))
where θ represents our parameter set, N is the total
number of trials in the experiment, and p(Choicet|θ) is
the probability that the model would choose the same
stimulus as the participant on trial t. To maximize
the LPP with respect to θ, we used Matlab’s ‘fmincon’
function with the ranges: 0 < β <∞ and 0 < αi < 1.
The parameter prior probabilities were based on Daw
et al. (2011), and we used a gamma distribution with
hyperparameters 1.2 and 5 for the β parameter and
a beta distribution with hyperparameters 1.1 and 1.1
for the α parameters. To avoid biasing the learning
rate comparisons, the same priors were used for all
learning rates.
Parameter recovery
We then used a parameter recovery analysis to ensure
that our learning rate results were not an artefact from
our parameter fitting procedure. Our goal was to assess
our capacity of recovering the correct parameters using
simulated datasets.
We first simulated performance on our two behav-
ioral tasks using virtual participants in which one learn-
ing rate value was being randomly drawn from a uni-
form distribution between 0 and 1. We then averaged
the correlation coefficients R and p-values from 100
correlations between the manipulated parameter and
the parameter recovered from the fitting procedure
applied to the simulated data set (see Meyniel et al.,
2016 for an example of this procedure). This analysis
was conducted on all the learning rate parameters of
the ‘Full’ model.
Bayesian Integration Criterion
The logarithm of the parameter posterior probability
was used to compute the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) for each model and each
participant, as followed:
BIC = k × ln(N)− 2× ln(p(θMAP |Choice1:N ))
where k is the number of parameters, and
ln(p(θMAP |Choice1:N )) is the logarithm of the
posterior probability (LPP) of the MAP parameters
given the participant’s choice data.
BIC were then compared between the ‘Full’, ‘Inter-
mediate’ and ‘Reduced’ models to the verify whether
the extra learning rate parameters were justified by
the data. As an approximation of the model evidence,
individual BICs were fed into theMBB-VB toolbox (Dau-
nizeau, Adam, and Rigoux, 2014), a procedure that
estimate how likely it is that a specific model generated
the data of a randomly chosen subject (the posterior
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probability of a model) as well as the exceedance prob-
ability of one model being more likely than any other
model.
Cross-validation
As the BIC do not take account of the uncertainty in
the model parameters, it tend to favour overly simple
models (Bishop, 2006; Daw, 2011). To assess our true
risk of under-fitting our data, we used a cross-validation
procedure. In our two experiments, we had different
experimental sessions, that were separated by short
breaks (3 sessions in Experiment 1, and 4 sessions in
Experiment 2).
For each participant and each session, we fitted the
model parameters to participants’ choices from all other
sessions by the same MAP procedure described before.
Given these parameters, we then calculated the like-
lihood of the data in the held-out session. The total
likelihood of the data of each participant was then di-
vided by the number of trials in the held-out session to
obtain the average choice likelihood per trial.
Parameter optimality
To test the parameter optimality, the models with dif-
ferent learning rates underwent the same experimen-
tal conditions as participants did. We simulated the
models 1,000 times for each participant (we thus ran
1, 000× 24 simulations in each experiment). On each
trial, the outcome given to the model was the one
associated with the model’s choice, and not the partici-
pant’s. Simulations were used to provide aggregated
measures of models’ performance.
The learning rate values used for the simulations are
described in Table 4 and were chosen to be close to
the participants’ averaged MAP learning rate values.
The exploitation intensity parameter β was set to 5, a
value also close to the participants’ MAP exploitation
intensity parameter.
Table 4: The learning rate values used to simulate models
with a choice-confirmatory (‘Conf’), valence-neutral
(‘Neut’) or choice-disconfirmatory (‘Disc’) pattern on
free- or forced-choice trials.
Factual Counterfactual
α+ α− α+ α−
‘Conf’ 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3
‘Neut’ 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
‘Disc’ 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1
Statistical analyses
The ANOVAs were performed on R (version 3.3.2)
through the ‘aov’ function. Paired t-tests and correla-
tion tests were performed on Matlab R2017a through
the respective functions ‘ttest’ and ‘corrcoef’.
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6.3 A normative perspective on differential learning rates
Other studies with various protocols have also found differential learning associated
with positive and negative outcomes (Frank, Seeberger, and O’reilly, 2004; Sharot,
Korn, and Dolan, 2011; Niv et al., 2012; see Sharot and Garrett, 2016 for a review).
This difference is often interpreted as a cognitive bias, or perhaps the result of limited
cognitive resources, but this pervasive asymmetric updating actually raises norma-
tive questions. Cazé and van der Meer (2013) have recently tested the performance
of agents able to differentially update positive and negative prediction errors, under
action-outcome contingencies that are rarely tested in human participants.
6.3.1 Previous findings
Classical theories of reinforcement learning assume that action values are learnt via
the calculation of a reward prediction error, i.e., the difference between the obtained
and the expected outcome, independently of the valence of the prediction error. This
way action values represent a weighted average of the past reward associated with
each action, and of the initial estimate Q0 (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Provided the
learning rate is small enough and the environment is stationary, the action values
will optimally converge to the average reward associated with that action. But using
differential learning rates for positive and negative outcomes will cause the Q-value
to be a biased estimate of the underlying average reward.
Reward
=	-1
Reward
=	+1
Probability (Reward =	+1)	=	60%
Q-value
=	0.2 40%60%
𝛼	" > 𝛼	$𝛼	" > 𝛼	$
(Optimistic learner)(Pessimistic learner)
Figure 6.2: Q-values estimate the action average reward. Here we take the example
of an action yielding positive outcomes (r = +1) in 60 per cent of cases, and thus
negative outcomes (r = -1) in 40 per cent of cases. Asymmetric learning rates will
cause the Q-value to be a biased estimate of average reward. For optimistic learners
(α+ > α−), the Q-value will overestimate the true average reward, as positive out-
comes will be preferentially updated. In contrast for pessimistic agents, the Q-value
will underestimate the true average reward.
To obtain the Q-value distortion exerted by different α+ and α−, Cazé and van
der Meer (2013) derived the equation for Q-value differential update for one action
and one state. At a steady state, they found:
Q∞ =
px− (1− p)
px + (1− p) (6.1)
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where p is the probability of positive outcomes, and x is the ratio between the learn-
ing rate for positive over negative prediction error x = α+/α−.
Their simulations of Q-values after 800 trials for different values of p were con-
sistent with the above equation. They found the Q-values of a rational learner
(α+ = α−) to be good estimates of the reward average (here 2p − 1). But for an
optimistic agent (α+ > α−), the Q-values were an overestimation of the true average
reward. In contrast a pessimistic agent (α+ < α−) underestimated the true average
reward. Biol Cybern (2013) 107:711–719 713
Fig. 1 Differential learning rates result in biased estimates of true
expected values. Analytically derived Q-values (black filled circles,
Q∞) for different true values of Q : 0.8, 0.6,−0.6,−0.8 (gray dotted
lines) and for different ratios of α+ and α−. Note that the true Q-values
are the means of probabilistic reward delivery schedules. Error bars,
computed using numerical simulations, show the variance of the esti-
mated Q-values after 800 trials averaged over 5,000 runs (the means
converge to the analytically derived values). When the learning rates for
negative and positive prediction errors are equal, the derived Q-values
correspond to the true values, whereas they are distorted when the learn-
ing rates are different. A “pessimistic” learner ( α
+
α− < 1) underestimates
the true values, and an “optimistic” learner ( α
+
α− > 1) overestimates
them
A number of properties of this result are worth noting.
When α− > α+ the Q-values are “pessimistic”, i.e., they are
below the true value; whereas when α+ = α−, the steady-
state Q-value converges, as expected, to the true mean value
for this action (equal to 2p − 1; see Fig. 1 where α+ = α−).
Moreover, when α+ > α−, the Q-values are “optimistic”,
i.e., they are above the true value. This bias is illustrated in
Fig. 1 where α+ = 4α−. Note also the complex dependence
of the bias on the true mean value. The bias is lower for
low Q values than for high Q values in the case of a pes-
simistic agent, while this is the opposite for an optimistic
agent.
To introduce our simulation testbed, we first sought to
confirm the above analytical results numerically. The ana-
lytical results predicted with high accuracy the behavior of
a modified Q-learning algorithm (5,000 iterations of 800
trials each; error bars in Fig. 1 show the variance across
iterations). Thus, differential learning rates for positive and
negative RPEs lead to biased estimates of true underly-
ing values, in a heterogeneous manner that depends on
the true mean value as well as the learning rate asym-
metry. In the next section, we examine the impact of this
distortion on performance in choice settings (“two-armed
bandits”).
3 Impact of differential learning rates on performances
In this section, we consider the consequences of biased esti-
mates resulting from differential learning rates in simple
choice situations. In particular, we simulate the performance
of three Q-learning agents on two different “two-armed ban-
dit” problems. The “rational” (R) agent has equal learning
rates for negative and positive prediction error α = 0.1;
the optimistic (O) agent has a higher learning rate for pos-
itive prediction errors (α+ = 0.4) than for negative pre-
diction errors (α− = 0.1), and the pessimistic (P) agent
has a higher learning rate for negative (α− = 0.4) than
for positive prediction errors (α+ = 0.1). All agents use
a standard softmax decision rule with fixed temperature
β = 0.3 to decide which arm to choose given the Q-
values; we employ this decision rule here because it is the
de facto standard in applications of reinforcement learning
models to behavioral and neural data. We discuss the applica-
bility of these results for the epsilon-greedy decision rule
below.
The three agents are tested on two versions of a dif-
ficult two-armed bandit task, with large variance in the
two outcomes but small differences in the means (Sut-
ton and Barto 1998). For simplicity, we again consider
binary outcome distributions {−1, 1}, however, the results
that follow are quite general (see Sect. 6). In the first,
“low-reward” task, the respective probabilities of r = 1
are 0.2 and 0.1; in the other “high-reward” task, the two
arms are rewarded with reward probabilities of 0.9 and 0.8,
respectively.
When simulated on these two tasks, a striking pattern
is apparent (Fig. 2a): in the low-reward task, the opti-
mistic agent learns to take the best action significantly more
often than the rational agent, which in turn performs better
than the pessimistic agent (left panel). The agents’ perfor-
mance is reversed in the high-reward task (right panel). To
understand this pattern of results, recall that reinforcement
learners face a trade-off between exploitation and explo-
ration (Sutton and Barto 1998): choosing to exploit the
option with the highest estimated Q-value does not guar-
antee that there is not an (insufficiently explored) better
option available. This problem is particularly pernicious for
probabilistic rewards such as those in the current setting,
where only noisy estimates of true underlying values are
available.
To quantify differences in how the agents navigate this
exploration versus exploitation trade-off in the steady state,
we estimated the probability that an agent repeats the same
choice between time t and t + 1, after extended learning
(800 trials). For both tasks, we expect that agent will “stay”
more than “switch” owing to differences in mean expected
reward for both choices. However, as shown in Fig. 2b, the
different agents have a distinct probability of switching, and
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Figure 6.3: Differential lea ning r te result in biased estim tes of the true expected
values. Estimated Q-values after 800 trials averaged over 5,000 simulations for dif-
ferent ratios of α+ and α−. The dotted lines repres nt th tru values of Q: 0.8, 0.6,
-0.6, -0.8. The error bars represent the variance of the estimated Q-values. From the
upper to the lower lines, the probability of positive outcome were respectively 0.9,
0.8, 0.2, 0.1. (Figure reproduced from Cazé and van d r M er, 2013).
To perform w ll, a model has to maximize the difference of Q-values between
the high- and the low-rewarding actions. It is interesting to see that when the prob-
abilities were 0.9 or 0.8, the model that maximized the difference between Q-values
was the pessimistic learner, while the Q-values for p = 0.2 or p = 0.1 were the most
divergent for an optimistic learner. From the previous equation, Cazé and van der
Meer (2013) had computed the ratio for which ∆Q∞ is maximal:
x∗ =
√
q0q1√
p0 p1
(6.2)
where p1 is the probability of positive outcome for one action, p0 is the probability
of positive outcome for the other action, and q is the probability of negative outcome
for each action: qi = 1− pi.
We can see that, when both action yield close outcome probabilities (p1 → p0),
the optimal ratio betw en the positive over negative l arning rate tends t be the
ratio between p(negative reward) and p(positive reward). Therefore behavior is op-
timal when the positive (resp. negative) learning rate corresponds to the probability
of negative (resp. positive) outcome. Among oth r models, Cazé and van der Meer
(2013) have simulated a meta-learner, which adapts its learning rates accordingly to
125
STUDY III
the tasks’ underlying reward probabilities.
The authors first compared the rational, pessimistic and optimistic learners on
two “two-armed bandit” tasks:
• a “low-reward” task, in which the probabilities of positive outcome were 0.2
and 0.1 for the two possible actions, therefore outcomes were mostly negative.
• a “high-reward” task, with probabilities 0.9 and 0.8, thus yielding mainly pos-
itive outcomes.
The model with the greatest difference in Q-values in the previous figure outper-
formed the other models. Indeed, in the low-reward task, the optimistic agent learnt
to take the best action significantly more often than the rational agent, which in turn
performs better than the pessimistic agent. In contrast, for the high-reward task, the
pessimistic model outperformed the optimistic one. This decrease in performance
can be explained by excessive exploration, as the models with lower performance
also had high probabilities of switching actions.714 Biol Cybern (2013) 107:711–719
Fig. 2 Differential learning rates increase performance in specific
tasks. a Mean probability of choosing the best arm (averaged over 5,000
runs) for the three agents, “rational” (R,α+ = α−, blue line), “opti-
mist” (O,α+ > α−, green line), and “pessimist” (P,α+ < α−, red
line). The left plot shows performance on the low-reward task (0.1 and
0.2 probability of reward for the two choices), the right plot performance
on the high-reward task (0.8 and 0.9 probability). Note that in the low-
reward task the optimistic agent is the best performer and the pessimistic
agent the worst, but this pattern is reversed for the high-reward task. b
Probability of switching after 800 episodes for each agent. This proba-
bility depends on the task: in the low-reward task the optimistic agent is
the least likely to switch, with the pattern reversed for the high-reward
task
this difference between agents depends on the task. Higher
probabilities of switching (“exploring”) are associated with
lower performance (compare with Fig. 2a).
Why does this occur? As shown by Eq. 1 and illus-
trated in Fig. 1, differential learning rates result in biased
value estimates on probabilistic tasks such as the one simu-
lated here. To understand the implications of this for choice
situations, the dependence of this bias on the true mean
value is critical. In the low-reward task, mean values are
low, and therefore, the distortion of these values will be
high for the “optimistic” agent (see Fig. 1a). Conversely, in
this task, distortion will be low for the “pessimistic” agent
(Fig. 1b). The implication of this is that distortion of the
true values effectively increases the contrast between the
two choices, leading to (1) increased probability of choos-
ing the best option using a softmax rule, and (2) increased
robustness to random fluctuations in the outcomes; this lat-
ter effect does not rely on the softmax action selection rule
and can also occur for different action selection rules such as
ϵ-greedy.
More precisely, for the results in Fig. 2, the rational agent
tends to approach the true mean values, with a mean final
estimated after 800 trials approximatively equal to Q1 =
−0.63, Q0 = −0.84, and in the high reward approxima-
tively equal to Q1 = 0.78, Q0 = 0.51. These estimated
Q-values are close to the true Q-value for the state, and
thus, the ∆Q is close to the true value of 0.2. The estimated
∆Q at steady state for a biased agent due to the heteroge-
neous distortion observed in the first part is in excess of
0.5. It is this distortion (separation) which enables higher
steady-state performance for the biased agent. Likewise, dis-
tortion in the opposite direction (compression) is the reason
for impaired performance. Specifically, in the low-reward
task, the pessimistic agent will have a smaller ∆Q than the
rational agent, because the pessimistic bias causes saturation
as the Q-values approaches −1, making the two Q-values
closer than the true values, ∆Q < 0.06. For the same rea-
son, the opposite symmetric observation holds for an opti-
mistic agent in the high-reward task, where this agent has a
∆Q < 0.04.
In addition to this effect on performance in the steady
state, differential learning rates likely also impact the early
stages of learning, when the agent takes its first few choices.
This idea is illustrated by the following intuition: in the high-
reward task, an agent will have a tendency to over-exploit its
first choice, because it is likely that this first choice will be
rewarded. In the low-reward task, an agent will have the oppo-
site tendency, it will over-explore its environment because it
is likely that neither arm will provide a reward for the first
few trials. To the extent that this effect contributes to per-
formance, it may be mitigated by appropriately differential
learning rates.
These observations raise the obvious question: can we find
optimal learning rates which maximize ∆Q? Can we find an
agent which maximizes this ∆Q in both tasks? We explore
these issues in the following section.
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Figur 6.4: A. Performance for the three agents: “rational” (R, α+ = α−, blue lin ),
“optimistic” (O, α+ > α−, green line) and “pessimistic” (P, α+ < α−, red line) in the
low-reward (left panel) and high-reward (right panel) tasks. B. Proportion of action
switch after 8 0 trials for each agent, in the two different tasks. (Figure reproduced
from Cazé and van der Meer, 2013).
As differ t patterns of α+ and α− can only be advantageous i one of the two
tasks, a meta-learner who could outperform a rational learner on both tasks was
created. The meta-learner model had a ratio between the positive and negative
learning ra e that would optimally tend to the ratio between p( egative reward) and
p(positive reward). It outperformed a rational learner in both low- and high-reward
tasks, for a wide range of rational learning rate (α = 0.01, 0.1 or 0.4).
Fi ally the different odels were simu at d o a task whose probabilities of
positive outcome were 0.25 and 0.75, which is closer to the experiments in human
reinforcement-learning. This time, different learning rates for positive and negative
outcomes were not adv ntageous, as a rational learner (α+ = α−) out f rmed all
other models. But the authors’ previous findings did generalize well to the case of a
“three-armed bandit” task.
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Fig. 3 Meta-learning of differential learning rates results in optimal
performance by the same agent across tasks. As in Fig. 2, shown is
the probability of choosing the best option in the two different tasks
(left: low reward, right: high reward) for two different agents. In blue
(α = 0.1) is the performance of the “rational” agent R, in teal and
navy blue is the performance when α = 0.01 and α = 0.4, respec-
tively, and in violet is the agent with two plastic learning rates N . This
“meta-learning” agent outperforms the rational agent in both tasks by
finding appropriate, differential learning rates based on a running aver-
age of rewards received. This estimate started with a value of 0.5 for
both probabilities, and was updated by keeping track of the number
of rewarded and non-rewarded trials (i.e., an infinite window for the
running average, but similar results are obtained for any sufficiently
reliable estimation method)
4 Derivation of optimally differential learning rates
From Eq. 1, we can compute ∆Q∞ at steady state between
the two choices:
∆Q∞ =
2(p1q0 − p0q1)x
p1 p0x2 + (p1q0 + p0q1)x + q0q1
,
where the indices correspond to the different choices (bandit
arms); the index of the arm with the highest probability of
reward is 1, with 0 indicating the other arm. qi = 1 − pi is
the probability of no-reward for arm i . We can determine the
x for which this rational function is maximal and thus find
the ratio for which ∆Q is maximal:
x∗ =
√
q0q1√
p0 p1
.
In the limit where p0 → p1 the optimal x∗ tends to the
ratio between p(no-reward) and p(reward). The results in
the previous section indicate that the best steady-state per-
formance is achieved when ∆Q∞ is maximal; thus, we can
conclude that the best learning rates for positive (resp. nega-
tive) prediction error should be proportional to the rate of no-
reward (resp. rate of reward). Specifically, in the low-reward
task the optimal x∗ is equal to 6. In the high-reward task an
optimal x∗ = 16 . Thus, an optimal x∗ in a given task is also the
one which leads to the worst performance in the other task,
where the optimal x∗ is the inverse. To solve this issue we
introduce an agent with a plastic learning rate (meta-learner),
adaptable to tasks with different reward distributions.
5 Meta-learning of optimally differential learning rates
We have shown in the previous section that behavior is
optimal when the learning rate for positive (resp. negative)
prediction error corresponds to the probability of no-reward
(resp. reward) in a given task. Thus, here we study an agent
which adapts its learning rate for positive and negative pre-
diction errors. Given our results, we choose as a target
α+ → w × p(no-reward) and α− → w × p(reward), with
the reward and no-reward probabilities estimated by a run-
ning average of reward history. The parameter w (set to 0.1
in Fig. 3) replaces the standard learning rate parameter α and
captures the sensitivity of learning to the estimated reward
rate. Thus, we define a meta-learning agent which derives
separate learning rates for positive and negative prediction
errors from a running estimate of the task reward rate.
We compared the performance of this meta-learning agent
to the rational agent in both high- and low-reward tasks intro-
duced in the previous section. As shown in Fig. 3, the meta-
agent outperforms the rational agent in both tasks. In fact,
the meta-agent slightly outperforms the purely pessimistic
or optimistic agent, meaning that in the low-reward task this
meta-learning agent is optimistic whereas, in the high-reward
task, the agent is pessimistic. As expected the two learning
rates converge at steady state toward the mean probability of
reward or no-reward in one given task. For a large range of
α between 0.01 and 0.4 we obtained similar results (Fig. 3,
left). Thus, the meta-learning agent performed best in both
task settings by flexibly adapting its learning rate based on
reward history—it under- or overestimates the true expected
rewards to improve choice performance.
The results in Sect. 3 suggest that differential learning
rates are most useful in situations where competing choice
values are close together. This effect is illustrated for the
meta-learner in Fig. 4a for a task where the reward prob-
abilities are 0.75 and 0.25, i.e., where reward probabilities
are separated by 0.5 rather than 0.1, as explored previously,
and where no-reward and reward probabilities are equal. In
this scenario the advantage of differential learning rates is
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Figure 6.5: Performance of a meta-le rner (N, in pu ple) an rational agents (in tea
for α = 0.01, in royal blue for α = 0.1 and in navy blue for α = 0.4) in the low-reward
(left panel) and high-reward (right panel) tasks. (Figure reproduced from Cazé and
an der Meer, 2013).716 Biol Cybern (2013) 107:711–719
Fig. 4 The performance advantage of differential learning rate agents
depends on task structure. a We plot here the performance of the dif-
ferent agents (Meta-lea ner, Rational, Optimist, and Pessimi t) where
the probabilities of reward are 0.75 and 0.25 for the two choices. In
tasks with more than two choices, differential learning rates continue to
outperform the other agents. b Performance of agents in a “three-armed
bandit” ta k, with reward probabilities 0.1; 0.15; 0.2 in the low-reward
task and 0.8; 0.85; 0.9 in the high-reward task
negligible. A further setting of interest is the extension to
more than two choices: Fig. 4c shows the performance of the
meta-learner as compared to fixed learning rate agents for
two different three-armed bandits. In this setting the meta-
learner outperforms the rational agent by the same margin as
in the two-armed bandit case, demonstrating that the bene-
fits of differential learning rates are not restricted to binary
choice.
6 Discussion
We simulated agents that make decisions based on learned
expected values that systematically deviate from the true out-
come magnitudes. This bias, derived from differential learn-
ing rates for positive and negative reward prediction errors
(RPEs), distinguishes our approach from typical reinforce-
ment learning models with a single learning rate that attempt
to learn the true outcome magnitudes. In contrast, in eco-
nomics, divergence between objective values and subjective
utilities is foundational (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In
line with this idea, our agents can be said to learn something
akin to subjective utilities, in the sense that actions are based
on a distorted (subjective) representation of the true values.
Surprisingly, however, we show that subjective or biased
representations based on the biologically motivated idea
of differential processing of positive and negative pre-
diction errors can perform objectively better on simple
probabilistic learning tasks. This result suggests that the
presence of separate direct and indirect (or “Go”/“NoGo”,
“approach”/“avoid”) pathways in the nervous system enables
adaptive value derived from distinct learning rates in these
pathways. Behavioral evidence for differential learning rates
have been reported in a number of studies (Frank et al. 2004,
2007; Sharot 2011) but to our knowledge this work is the first
to explore the implications of these results from a normative
perspective. Similarly, a number of models have employed
separate parameters for learning from positive and negative
outcomes (e.g., Doll et al. 2009; Khamassi et al. 2011) but
these studies likewise did not explore the raisons d’etre for
such an architecture. We show here that differential learning
rates can result in increased separation between competing
action values, leading to a steady-state performance improve-
ment because of an interaction with probabilistic action selec-
tion and stochastic rewards.
We also implemented a meta-learning agent to achieve
optimal action value separation adaptively, based on an esti-
mate of the average reward rate. This agent always outper-
forms the unbiased agent at steady state, but it is slower than
the rational agent to reach this higher level of performance.
In situations where reward probabilities are changing, this
approach may delay the behavioral response to the change.
However, it is well known that “model-free” RL models in
general do not perform well in volatile situations such as ser-
ial reversal learning (Dayan and Niv 2008). Thus, we view the
current proposal as complementary to, and compatible with
(within a single RL system) meta-learning of other RL para-
meters (Doya 2002; Schweighofer and Doya 2003). Exam-
ples of such meta-learning include models that adaptively
regulate overall learning rate (Behrens et al. 2007), the explo-
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Figur 6.6: A. The performance of t e different gen s (Met -learn r, Optimistic,
Rational and Pessimistic) in a task where th probabilities of reward are 0.75 and
0.25 for the two choices. B. The performance of age s in a “three-armed bandit”
task, with reward probabilities 0.2, 0.15 and 0.1 in the low-reward task, and 0.9, 0.85
and 0.8 in the high-reward task. (Figure reproduced from Cazé and van der Meer,
2013).
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Introduction
Reinforcement learning represents a fundamental cognitive process: learning by trial
and error to maximize rewards and minimize punishments. Current and most in-
fluential theoretical models of reinforcement learning assume a unique learning rate
parameter, independently of the outcome valence (Sutton and Barto [14], O’Doherty
et al. [10], Behrens et al. [1]). However human participants were shown to integrate
differently positive and negative outcomes (Frank, Seeberger, and O’Reilly [3], Frank
et al. [4], Sharot, Korn, and Dolan [13]). This motivated the reference article to im-
plement a modified version of the reinforcement learning model, with two distinct
learning rates for positive and negative outcomes (Cazé and Meer [2]).
They have shown that although differential learning rates shifted reward predictions
and could thus be seen as a maladaptive bias, this model can outperform the classical
reinforcement learning model on tasks with specific outcome probabilities. Following
Cazé and Meer [2]’s predictions, a subsequent empirical article have modeled human
behavior on these specific tasks (Gershman [7]). The question is still an active research
area, as various articles have further investigated the difference learning rates bias
(Garrett and Sharot [5], Moutsiana et al. [9], Shah et al. [12], Garrett and Sharot [6],
Lefebvre et al. [8], Palminteri et al. [11]).
A link to the pdf version of the reference article was posted on the last author’s
laboratory website (http://www.vandermeerlab.org/publications.html), but the cor-
responding code was not available (https://github.com/vandermeerlab/papers/tree/
master/Caze_vanderMeer_2013). We believe that an openly available code reposi-
tory replicating the results of Cazé and Meer [2]’s paper can be helpful to the scientific
community. We therefore implemented the model and analysis scripts using Python,
with numpy, random and matplotlib libraries.
Methods
We first implemented our scripts on Matlab, as we were more familiar with this lan-
guage, and then adapted them on Python.
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We used the modeling description of the reference article to implement our repli-
cation. They used standard Q-learners with a softmax action selection rule (Sutton
and Barto [14]), and their precise description enabled us to implement them with low
difficulty. But we found four ambiguities in the simulation procedure.
First, the authors described their analytical results to be valid for “Q0 ̸= {−1, 1}”
in section 2, but did not specify what value of Q0 they used in all the following
simulations. We chose to use Q0 = 0, as this initial value is the middle point between
the two possible outcomes (i.e., -1 and 1). As we replicated all the original figures,
even the dynamics in the beginning of the learning curves (see Figures 2 A, 3 and 4
B), we believe the reference article must have used similar initial Q-values.
Second, regarding the parameter setting for Figure 1’s simulations, the ratio of α+
over α− was said to be either 0.25, 1 or 4, but they did not specify what were the exact
values of α+ and α− used. We thus set them according to the following description of
the pessimistic, rational and optimistic agents in section 3, i.e.,:
• α+ = 0.1 and α− = 0.4 for the ratio of 0.25
• α+ = 0.1 and α− = 0.1 for the ratio of 1
• α+ = 0.4 and α− = 0.1 for the ratio of 4
Third, the number of iterations made to generate Figures 3 and 4 were not
indicated, and we assumed the authors used the same number as in Figures 1 and 2
(i.e., 5,000 runs).
Finally, in the reinforcement learning framework, the probabilities to choose each
action are computed, then used to select an action through a pseudo-random generator.
In the reference article, it was sometimes unclear whether the analyses were performed
on the probabilities of choice, or rather the proportions of implemented choices. For
example Figure 2’s legend indicated: “Mean probability of choosing the best arm”,
suggesting that the probabilities themselves were used. However, when commenting
the figure in section 3, the authors appeared to say that the actual choices were rather
used: “the optimistic agent learns to take the best action significantly more than the
rational agent”. For our analyses, we started by using the probabilities of choice, as
this would lead to more clear, less noise-corrupted results. However we then obtained
very smooth learning curves, and were unable to reproduce the spikiness of the original
Figures 2, 3 and 4. We thus computed the proportions of implemented choices for all
our figures.
Results
We numbered our figures in the same way as the reference article.
All our figures reproduced the patterns of the original results. We were even able
to replicate the fine-grained details of the learning curves, like the early bumps in
performance in the high-reward task (Figures 2 A, 3 and 4 B, right panels, around
50-100 trials). In Figure 1, the mean and the variance of the Q-values were also very
similar as the ones in the original figure.
The only discrepancy we found was in Figure 4 A. Although the general pattern
was replicated, our learning curves appeared smoother than in the reference article.
As the number of simulations were not explicitly specified for this figure, we cannot
know if this is due to us running a higher number of simulations than the reference
article, or from another difference in model implementation.
Conclusion
All the figures in Cazé and Meer [2] have been successfully reproduced with high
fidelity, and we confirm the validity of their simulations. Overall the whole replication
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Figure 1: Average estimated Q-values after 800 trials averaged for different ratios of α+ and
α−. The dotted lines represent the underlying average reward: 0.8, 0.6, -0.6, -0.8. The error bars
represent the variance of the estimated Q-values.
Figure 2: A. Performance, i.e. proportion of choices for the best action, for the three agents:
Rational (R, α+ = α−, blue line), Optimistic (O, α+ > α−, green line) and Pessimistic (P,
α+ < α−, red line). In this figure and the following ones, the left (resp. right) panel corresponds
to the low-reward (resp. high-reward) task. B. Proportion of action switch after 800 trials for
each agent, in the two different tasks.
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Figure 3: The performances of the Meta-learner (N) are shown in purple and those of the Rational
agents (R) in different colors of blue (in teal for α = 0.01, in royal blue for α = 0.1 and in navy
blue for α = 0.4).
Figure 4: The performances of the Meta-learner, Optimistic, Rational and Pessimistic agents
A. in a task where the probabilities of reward are 0.75 and 0.25 for the two choices. B. in a
“three-armed bandit” task.
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procedure was smooth: the models were implemented with low difficulty, and the
simulations were quite straightforward apart from a few obscure details. We hope this
replication can foster future research in the domain.
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6.3.3 Further analyses of the Study II’s data
We will show here that this normative interpretation for positive and negative learn-
ing rates cannot explain our results in Study II. In this study, we used symmetrical
action-outcome contingencies (0.8 and 0.2), and we found the participants’ positive
learning rates to be higher than the negative ones.
We have simulated the optimistic, rational and pessimistic models described in
Cazé and van der Meer (2013) to see what performances these models would have
had in the two experiments published in the Quartely Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology. We only adapted these models by normalizing their Q-values. We ran 100
simulations on the design matrices used for each participant. We can see that the
model with the highest performance was the pessimistic learner, although our par-
ticipants’ best-fitting parameters showed they were optimistic.
Figure 6.7: The performance of the different agents (Optimistic, Rational and Pes-
simistic) in our two experiments published in the Quartely Journal of Experimental
Psychology (Study II). We have circled the performance corresponding to the partic-
ipants’ pattern of learning rates.
Cazé and van der Meer (2013) also tested their models on contingencies close
to the ones we used (.75 and 0.25, see Figure 6.6A), but they found that : “In this
scenario the advantage of differential learning rates is negligible”. An important
difference is that Cazé and van der Meer (2013) tested their models in stationary
settings, in which the action-outcome contingencies were stable during the whole
experiment, while we used a reversal-learning procedure in Study II.
Palminteri et al. (2017) did investigate the behavior of optimistic and rational
models when action-outcome contingencies reversed. They found that the opti-
mistic model was slower to inverse its values after a reversal, therefore displaying
worse performance. They also found the participants with a higher optimistic bias to
perform less well after a reversal than the participants having a lower or nonexistent
bias. This shows that being optimistic is not optimal in a reversal-learning setting
such as the one we used in Study II. A normative perspective thus cannot explain
why we found our participants to have a higher positive, than negative, learning
rate (α+ > α−).
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6.3.4 Further analyses of the Study III’s data
Cazé and van der Meer (2013)’s theory is that different learning rate patterns are
adaptive in low- and high-reward environment. As we have shown in the draft,
we could see in both experiments that optimistic models had indeed better perfor-
mances in the low-reward condition (0.4 and 0.1 contingencies), and that pessimistic
models were optimal in the high-reward condition (0.6 and 0.9 contingencies, see
Figure 5 of the draft).
We wanted to test if our participants were able to adapt their learning rates ac-
cording to which condition they were in, to increase their performance. When we
fitted the high- and low-reward conditions separately, we found no clear and repli-
cable differences in learning rates, although it seemed that participants were less
optimistic in the low- than high-reward condition. We have thus displayed in Study
III only pooled results (Figure 3 of the draft).
Figure 6.8: The differential learning rate pattern when we fitted separately the low-
and high-reward conditions in Study III.
6.3.5 Reanalyses of Gershman (2015)’s data
Gershman (2015) has also tested low- and high-reward contingencies on human par-
ticipants, and found no difference in learning rates between the conditions. We con-
tacted him, and he kindly sent us his data. We reanalyzed them, and ensured to
center the initial Q-values with respect to the outcome distribution (i.e., the Q-values
were initialized at 0.5 as the outcomes were either +1 or 0). One should note that here
only factual learning rates are fitted, as the participants only saw factual outcomes.
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Except in Experiment 1’s results, we found participants’ best-fitting learning
rates to be slightly different in low- and high reward contingencies: participants
appeared to be more pessimistic in low-reward conditions, and more optimistic in
high-reward conditions. This effect was small and non-existent in the first experi-
ment, and it was also not very clear in Study III. We thus think that further research
is needed before we can conclude whether participants adapt their learning rates in
low- and high-reward conditions.
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Fig. 2 (Top) Posterior mean parameter estimates for Model 5 (dual block-specific learning rate model). Error-bars represent within-subject
standard errors of the mean. (Bottom) Exceedance probabilities for Models 1–4
Table 2 Parameter estimates
(mean across participants) for
all models
Experiment Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1 β = 3.24 β = 4.03 β = 2.92 β = 2.95 β = 3.77
η = 0.47 η+ = 0.37 η+1 = 0.41 η+1 = 0.40 η+low = 0.39
η− = 0.57 η−1 = 0.49 η−1 = 0.48 η−low = 0.50
α = 0.3 α+ = 0.28 η+high = 0.45
α− = 0.42 η−high = 0.58
2 β = 2.82 β = 3.08 β = 2.08 β = 1.91 β = 2.61
η = 0.40 η+ = 0.37 η+1 = 0.43 η+1 = 0.44 η+low = 0.42
η− = 0.50 η−1 = 0.48 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.49
α = 0.37 α+ = 0.39 η+high = 0.43
α− = 0.44 η−high = 0.5
3 β = 4.32 β = 4.41 β = 3.45 β = 3.46 β = 4.27
η = 0.43 η+ = 0.42 η+1 = 0.42 η+1 = 0.41 η+low = 0.42
η− = 0.47 η−1 = 0.47 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.50
α = 0.31 α+ = 0.34 η+high = 0.47
α− = 0.42 η−high = 0.49
4 β = 3.04 β = 3.66 β = 2.49 β = 2.49 β = 3.18
η = 0.43 η+ = 0.35 η+1 = 0.41 η+1 = 0.40 η+low = 0.37
η− = 0.55 η−1 = 0.50 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.56
α = 0.34 α+ = 0.34 η+high = 0.45
α− = 0.47 η−high = 0.52
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Fig. 2 (Top) Posterior mean parameter estimates for Model 5 (dual block-specific learning rate model). Error-bars represent within-subject
standard errors of the mean. (Bottom) Exceedance probabilities for Models 1–4
Table 2 Parameter estimates
(mean across participants) for
all models
Experiment Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1 β = 3.24 β = 4.03 β = 2.92 β = 2.95 β = 3.77
η = 0.47 η+ = 0.37 η+1 = 0.41 η+1 = 0.40 η+low = 0.39
η− = 0.57 η−1 = 0.49 η−1 = 0.48 η−low = 0.50
α = 0.3 α+ = 0.28 η+high = 0.45
α− = 0.42 η−high = 0.58
2 β = 2.82 β = 3.08 β = 2.08 β = 1.91 β = 2.61
η = 0.40 η+ = 0.37 η+1 = 0.43 η+1 = 0.44 η+low = 0.42
η− = 0.50 η−1 = 0.48 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.49
α = 0.37 α+ = 0.39 η+high = 0.43
α− = 0.44 η−high = 0.5
3 β = 4.32 β = 4.41 β = 3.45 β = 3.46 β = 4.27
η = 0.43 η+ = 0.42 η+1 = 0.42 η+1 = 0.41 η+low = 0.42
η− = 0.47 η−1 = 0.47 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.50
α = 0.31 α+ = 0.34 η+high = 0.47
α− = 0.42 η−high = 0.49
4 β = 3.04 β = 3.66 β = 2.49 β = 2.49 β = 3.18
η = 0.43 η+ = 0.35 η+1 = 0.41 η+1 = 0.40 η+low = 0.37
η− = 0.55 η−1 = 0.50 η−1 = 0.49 η−low = 0.56
α = 0.34 α+ = 0.34 η+high = 0.45
α− = 0.47 η−high = 0.52
Figure 6.9: Our reanalysis of Gershman (2015)’s data.
It should be noted that this effect, if it is confirmed, goes in the opposite direc-
tion than what a normative approach would recommend. Indeed the optimal meta-
learner developed by Cazé and van der Meer (2013) was actually more optimistic
in low-rewar conditions, and more pessimistic in high-reward conditions. We can
thus interpret Gersh an (2015)’s participant as displaying a frequency ffect: peo-
ple appeared to integrate more outcomes that are frequently seen. By contrast the
optimal learning process is to learn more from rare outcomes, as they are the most
informative.
Differential learning rates for positive and negative outcomes can be advanta-
geous in some experimental settings. Indeed, Cazé and van der Meer (2013) found
that a higher positive than negative learning rate allowed for better performances in
a low-reward environment (i.e., when both actions had low probabilities of positive
outcomes) while the inverse pattern can be found in a high-reward environment.
Our replication article confirmed the validity of these results.
It should be noted that this normative perspective was in contrast with most of
our results. Indeed the optimistic learning rate pattern we found in Study II was
actually sub-optimal in a reversal-learning environment. By reanalyzing Study III’s
and Gershman (2015)’s data, we also found that people, if anything, seem to adapt
their learning rates in the opposite direction than what optimality would recom-
mend.
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General Discussion
In this PhD thesis, we have used cognitive modeling to investigate the relationship
between control, agency and reinforcement learning in human decision-making.
In Study I, a series of 3 experiments were built on a modified reversal-learning
procedure, in which there was some uncertainty about the identity of the causal
agent. There were different conditions in which the participant’s actual control over
the outcomes could be positive or null. Through model comparison, we found that
the model best able to fit and simulate participants’ behavior was not a model ex-
plicitly looking for control, but rather a model based on counterfactual emulation,
i.e., the model’s choice is assumed to always control the action outcome. Moreover,
this counterfactual emulation was hierarchically implemented at the different action
level, suggesting a hierarchical representation of the possible actions in the partici-
pants’ mind. This hierarchical counterfactual emulation was found in all conditions,
regardless of the actual instrumental control implemented.
In Study II, we also used a reversal-learning paradigm while measuring inten-
tional binding, a proxy to the implicit feeling of agency. We were interested in the
fluctuation of sense of agency that accompanies adaptive behavior. We observed in 3
experiments a post-error boost of action binding: action binding on the trial follow-
ing a non-rewarded outcome was stronger than following a rewarded outcome. In-
terestingly, we found participants’ best-fitting learning rates to be higher for positive
than negative outcomes (α+ > α−), and the post-error boost was inter-individually
correlated with the asymmetry in learning rates. Besides our classical ‘learning’ con-
dition, we also implemented a ‘random’ condition, in which participants were ex-
plicitly instructed that action-outcome mappings were entirely unpredictable. We
found the post-error boost of action binding to be specific to a learning context. It
should be noted that our best-fitting model was a normalized reinforcement learn-
ing model, equivalent to the counterfactual emulation model described in Study I,
with no hierarchy between the chosen and unchosen actions (“flat” counterfactual
emulation: αCF = α).
Finally, in Study III, we conducted two stationary instrumental conditioning
tasks to investigate reinforcement learning processes occurring when the partici-
pant’ choice was either free or forced. Previous experiments have shown that people
usually display a choice-confirmation bias, i.e., they preferentially take into account
information that confirms their current decision (α+F > α
−
F and α
+
CF < α
−
CF). We repli-
cated this result in free-choice trials, and found that, when participants were forced
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to match a preselected option, they integrated outcomes independently from their
valence (α+F = α
−
F and α
+
CF = α
−
CF). Interestingly, Cazé and van der Meer (2013)
have shown in silico that different learning rates can be advantageous in certain ex-
perimental contingencies. We replicated this article, and used similar simulations to
address the optimality of our different findings.
Counterfactual emulation
(by-default	control	assumption)
Flat Hierarchical
Counterfactual
learning
𝛼+ <	𝛼- 𝛼+ =	𝛼-
Factual
learning
𝛼+ =	𝛼- 𝛼+ >	𝛼-
Intentional
binding
Post-error
boost
No	post-
error boost
Reinforcement learning processes
Instrumental	conditioning task
(Study III)
With choice Without choice
Reversal-learning task
(Study II)
With control Without control
Reversal-learning task
(Study I)
With control Without control
Implicit feeling	of	control
Figure 7.1: A summary of our findings.
Our general conclusion is that control perception and reinforcement learning,
two fundamental fields of human psychology, are deeply intertwined. Indeed, ac-
tion binding, an implicit proxy for the feeling of agency is influenced by post-error
adaptive mechanisms. Furthermore, contrary to impartial machines, humans care
about being in control or about making the right choice, and this results in integrat-
ing information in a one-sided way.
In this discussion, we will now try to parallel these results with certain influen-
tial cognitive biases and psychological traits. Then we will see how our results can
help formalizing the notion of control, to characterize what is grounding people’s
perception of control.
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7.1 Cognitive biases and psychological traits
First, we will discuss our findings with respect to some cognitive biases and psycho-
logical traits that have been observed in behavior or explicit reports. We have seen
in the introduction that they was a gap between behavior and explicit reports so
it should be noted that generalizing our findings to phenomenological experiences
would be an extrapolation.
7.1.1 Valence-induced biases
One of the most salient attributes of information is valence: whether a piece of news
is good or bad. Most of the classic theories assume that agents gather and integrate
information in a manner that will result in a relatively accurate representation of
reality. But examining people’s beliefs about themselves and their future reveals
systematic biases. In approximately 80% of the population, desirable information is
integrated into prior beliefs more readily than undesirable information, resulting in
an optimism bias (Sharot and Garrett, 2016).
The optimism bias may be counterintuitive, as most people would say they re-
member more vividly negative than positive events. Indeed, a general negativity
bias was also found in different experiments, based on both innate predispositions
and experience to give greater weight to negative entities (e.g., events, objects, per-
sonal traits). In an influential review, Rozin and Royzman (2001) concluded that
there was a pervasive negativity bias, that could actually be meaningful and adap-
tive, in much of human and animal cognition and behavior.
In this PhD thesis, we found differences in learning rates for positive and neg-
ative outcomes. However we cannot conclude in favor of a general positivity or
negativity bias, as this difference in learning rates took various forms. Indeed we
found higher positive than negative learning rates for factual outcomes (Studies II
and III), but the reversed pattern for counterfactual outcomes (Study III), and no
valence-induced difference in forced-choice trials (Study III). Although the negativ-
ity bias can be useful to understand how humans process external information, we
would argue that human behavior in a reinforcement learning context is better ex-
plained by self-related biases, rather than a general valence-induced bias.
7.1.2 The cognitive dissonance theory
In Aesop’s Fable “The Fox and the Grapes”, a fox tries to get some grapes that are
hanging on a high, unreachable vine. After failing to reach them, the fox decides that
the grapes were probably sour anyway. An interesting aspect of this story is the idea
that making a choice (e.g., giving up on the grapes) can change one’s preferences.
In a seminal study, 225 female students rated a series of domestic appliances and
then were asked to choose among two equally preferred appliances as a gift. The
results of a second round of ratings indicated that the students increased their ratings
of the domestic appliance they had selected as a gift and decreased their ratings of
the appliances they had rejected (Brehm, 1956). Young children and non-human
primates were also shown to exhibit choice-induced preferences (Egan, Bloom, and
Santos, 2010).
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This paradigm was originally developed in order to study the phenomenon of
cognitive dissonance reduction. According to this theory, the action of deciding pro-
vokes a psychological dissonance consequent to choosing X instead of Y, despite
little difference between X and Y. Thus, the decision “I chose X” is dissonant with
the cognition that “There are some aspects of Y that I like.”. People would then arti-
ficially inflate their preference to X and decrease their preference for Y to reduce the
cognitive dissonance.
The dissonance theory has been generalized to also include inconsistency be-
tween two cognitions, and not only between cognition and action (Festinger, 1957).
Dissonance theory is more than simply a theory about consistency. It is essentially a
theory about sense-making: how people try to make sense out of their beliefs, their
environment, and their behavior – and thus try to lead lives that are (in their own
minds) reasonable, sensible, and meaningful (Aronson, 1997).
We found in Studies II and III that participants preferentially took into account
information that confirms their decision, except when their choice was not inten-
tional, but imposed by the “computer”, i.e., an external source. These results are
consistent with the cognitive dissonance theory, and more specifically with choice-
induced preference. Indeed if people integrated more information consistent with
their choice, this biased learning process would lead to a choice-induced preference
behavior. This was shown in silico by Lefebvre et al. (2017): after a series of choices,
a model with a higher positive than negative learning rate displayed a pronounced
preference for one option, although both options actually were equally rewarding.
By defining dissonance as a negative drive state, Leon Festinger combined mo-
tivation with cognition and formulated new predictions that could not be easily ex-
plained by other theories. For example, reinforcement theory would suggest that, if
you reward individuals for making a particular statement, they might come to like
and believe in the truth and beauty of that statement (through the mechanism of
secondary reinforcement). But Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) actually showed the
opposite result. Participants were subjected to a boring experience and then paid
either $1 or $20 to tell someone that the experience had been interesting and enjoy-
able. The participants who said that they found the task enjoyable in order to earn
$1 came to actually believe it was enjoyable to a far greater extent than those who
were paid $20 to lie.
Cognitive dissonance theory was often used to explain illogical, or even dis-
advantageous, behavior. Interestingly, in Study III, we found choice-confirmatory
models to outperform valence-neutral models. It was non trivial to see that a unique
learning model can both maximize rewards and minimize cognitive dissonance un-
der some experimental conditions.
It should be noted that another recent cognitive model is also compatible with
the cognitive dissonance theory: the self-consistent Bayesian observer model. This
model made for perceptual decision-making assumes that a subject will integrate
sensory evidence in a manner that is consistent with the subject’s preceding choice
(Luu and Stocker, 2018). We hope further cognitive modeling approaches will soon
be able to explain the fine-grained details of cognitive dissonance mechanisms.
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accounts for subjects’ behavior in both the discrimination and the estimation task. However, a closer
comparison between the predicted (Figure 2b) and the measured distribution of the estimates
(Figure 1d) reveals that this basic formulation does not capture all details of the data.
We formulated the self-consistent observer model as a two-step inference process over the
extended hierarchical generative model shown in Figure 3a: Based on a noisy sensory signal m, the
observer first infers the category C 2 f0cw0;0 ccw0g by performing the discrimination task and then
infers the stimulus orientation ! in the estimation task. Because the stimulus has long disappeared by
the time the observer performs the estimation task, we assume that estimation of ! must rely on a
noisy memory recall mm of the sensory signal m. Inference on ! is then conditioned on the preceding
discrimination judgment (e.g., Ĉ ¼ 0cw0), which results in the characteristic repulsive estimation
biases. Finally, we also took into account that subjects’ report of their perceived stimulus orientation
is corrupted by motor noise. We measured motor noise for every subject in a control experiment
(see Figure 3—figure supplement 1) and subsequently used these measured values for all model
fits and comparisons. The self-consistent observer model provides a full account of both the observ-
er’s discrimination judgment and orientation estimate in each trial, and is thus jointly predicting a
subject’s psychometric function as well as the distribution of their orientation estimates.
Figure 3b shows the model fit to the data from Experiment 1 for the combined subject. The stim-
ulus noise level determines both the slope of the psychometric curves in the discrimination task and,
in combination with the memory noise level, the magnitude of the bias in the estimation task, which
is well predicted by the model. A comparison between the distributions of subjects’ estimates and
model estimates fully reveals the extent to which the model accurately accounts for the observed
Figure 2. Bayesian observer models for the perceptual task sequence. (a) The discrimination judgment does not affect the estimated stimulus
orientation for an observer who considers both tasks independently. (b) In contrast, the self-consistent observer imposes a causal dependency such that
the judgment in the discrimination task (e.g., ’cw’) conditions the estimation process in form of a choice-dependent prior. It effectively sets the
posterior probability to zero for any orientation value that is inconsistent with the preceding discrimination judgment. The truncated posterior
distribution, together with a loss function that penalizes larger estimation errors stronger than smaller ones, leads to the characteristic bimodal
distribution pattern. Note, however, that this basic formulation is not quite sufficient to explain some details of the estimation data (Figure 1d).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.33334.004
Luu and Stocker. eLife 2018;7:e33334. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.33334 4 of 24
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Figure 7.2: The self-consistent Bayesian model (shown on the right panel) is used to
explain why two successive choices made by participants were more consistent than
what is predicted by a normative model making two independent decisions (shown
on the left panel). (Figure reproduced from Luu and Stocker, 2018).
7.1.3 The self-serving bias
Most people rate their abilities as better than ‘average’ even though it is statistically
impossible for most people to have better-than-median abilities. In a survey of fac-
ulty at the Univers ty of Nebraska-Li col , 68% of professors rated themselves i
the top 25% for teaching ability, and more than 90% rated themselves as above av-
erage (Cross, 1977). High school students ascribed higher levels of h n sty, persis-
tence and originality to themselves than to the average student, and also described
themselves as less hostile, less vain and less unreasonable than average. The relative
over-evaluation of one’s own attributes has be n shown in such diverse domains as
personality traits, abilities and satisfaction with relationships (Hoorens, 1993).
This ‘above-average’ bias, conjug with cog itive dis onance, may explain
the self-serving bias, occurring when people make internal attributions for desired
outcomes and external attributions for undesired outcomes. This bias is evident
in workers who attribute receiving promotions t hard work and exceptional skill,
yet attribute denial of promotions to unfair bosses, and in drivers who attribute
accidents to the weather or other drivers, yet attribute the narrow avoidance of an
accident to their alertness and fin ly honed driving skills (Shepperd, Malone, and
Sweeny, 2008).
Interestingly, the self-s ving bias is i contradiction with the post-error boost of
action binding we found in Study II. Because people tend to attribute more negative
outcomes to external factors, they should feel less agent after a negative outcome.
Yet we found higher action binding f llowing a non-rewarding tone, than foll wing
a rewarding tone. As action binding is supposed to reflect an implicit, maybe pre-
or non-conscious, form of agency, it is possible that action binding is not subjected
to the self-serving bias. However, Takahata et al. (2012) found intentional binding
to be attenuated by negative monetary outcome, consistently with the self-serving
bias.
A crucial detail in Takahata et al. (2012) experiment is that only one key could
be pressed by the participant, excluding any possibility for adaptive behavior to
emerge. In Study II tasks, two possible actions could be chosen, and negative out-
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result from changes in mean estimate errors in the operant
condition, demonstrating the valences of outcome modified action
binding. The second analysis was performed to investigate the
influence of the valence of outcome on tone binding. Repeated-
measures ANOVA of tone binding with valence (positive, neutral
and negative) as within-subject variable showed a significant main
effect of valence (F = 8.500, df = 2,21, p = 0.0008). Multiple
comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that negative
outcome elicited smaller temporal binding than positive (t = 3.576,
p,0.001) and neutral outcome (t = 3.567, p,0.001). In contrast to
action binding, tone binding could arise from changes in mean
estimate errors in the baseline or operant conditions. We therefore
performed two additional ANOVA analyses to examine judgments
errors in the baseline and operant tone conditions separately. A
163 (valence: positive, neutral or negative) repeated-measures
ANOVA of mean estimate errors for tone in the operant tone
condition revealed significant main effects by valence (F = 6.416,
df = 2,21, p = 0.0037). In contrast, A 163 (valence: positive,
neutral or negative) repeated-measures ANOVA of mean estimate
error for tone in the baseline tone condition revealed no significant
main effect by valence (F = 0.886, df = 2,21, p,0.4200). Thus, the
difference in tone binding was mediated by the difference in mean
estimate error in the operant tone condition. These analyses
indicated that the valence of outcome modulated both action and
tone binding.
Relation between tone-reward conditioning and
intentional binding. The link between tone-reward condition-
ing and intentional binding was further examined. When change
in reaction times and change in preference ratings in the
acquisition phase were simultaneously entered as predictors for
differences in intentional binding between positive and negative
outcomes, a multiple regression equation revealed that prediction
of intentional binding by reaction times b= 0.433 (t = 1.999,
P = 0.06), but not preference ratingsb= 0.055 (t = 0.254,
p = 0.802), was nearly significant. This result implies that
modification of action-effect binding is linked to implicit rather
than explicit attitude towards sensory outcomes.
Precision of timing judgment. It was reported that emotion
affects time perception and precision of timing judgment. [21]. To
exclude the possibility that difference in intentional binding was
due to erratic reports of timing, we assessed standard deviation
across trials of timing judgment in each condition. As reported
previously, standard deviation of timing judgment provides a
general measure of judgment precision [14,22]. The data are
presented in Table 1. For baseline trials, multiple A 163 (valence:
positive, neutral or negative) repeated-measures ANOVA of
standard deviation revealed no significant differences among
positive, neutral and negative outcomes (F = 0.359, df = 2,21,
p = 0.7003). For operant trials, there were no significant differences
in standard deviations among positive, neutral and negative
conditions (action: F = 0.882, df = 2,21, p = 0.4216; tone:
F = 1.033, df = 2,21, p = 0.3648). These results suggest that
precision of timing judgment was not affected by valences of
action outcomes. Therefore, it is unlikely that modification of
intentional binding is the result of poor attention to spatial
memory of the clock hand during the retention interval.
Discussion
The main purpose of the present study was to investigate
whether sense of agency can be modified in a postdictive manner
by affective valences of action outcomes. To examine this issue, we
combined intentional binding paradigm with classical conditioning
procedures, and thus manipulated monetary outcomes triggered
by voluntary actions. Our data showed that intentional binding
was attenuated when negative outcomes were caused by subjects’
voluntary actions. The difference in overall binding was mediated
by both action binding and tone binding. Note that we varied only
Figure 3. Overall binding for positive, neutral and negative
outcomes. Bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053421.g003
Figure 4. Physical and perceived onset timings of events. From top row, figure shows physical timing of action and tone, perceived timing for
positive, neutral and negative outcomes, respectively. Small and large circles show mean perceived timing of action in the baseline (action) condition
and the operant (action) condition, respectively. Small and large rectangles show mean perceived timing of tone in the baseline (tone) condition and
the operant (tone) condition, respectively. Bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053421.g004
Monetary Loss Reduces Intentional Binding
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Figure 7.3: Action and outcome binding for auditory stimuli paired with positive,
neutral or negative monetary outcomes and following a key press. (Figure repro-
duced from Takahata et al., 2012).
comes are known to be motivationally salient events triggering the necessity of
adaptation (Wessel et al., 2014). We would thus postulate that the self-serving bias
does not arise in adaptive behavior tasks, in which error processing is crucial to in-
crease performance.
People were found to show post-error adaptations, potentially to improve their
performance in the near future. At least three types of behavioral post-error adjust-
ments have been observed: post-error slowing, post-error reduction of interference,
and post-error improvement in accuracy, as well as neuronal activity increase in
task-relevant brain areas, and activity decrease in distracter-encoding brain areas
(Danielmeier and Ullsperger, 2011).
The general increase in attention and vigilance following an error may be the
cause for an increase in the feeling of agency. An interesting perspective to Study II
would then be to study the relationship of the post-error boost of action binding, task
performance, and error awareness, as it is still unclear which post-error adjustments
actually depend on error awareness or even ‘task difficulty awareness’ (Ullsperger
et al., 2010).
7.1.4 The need for control hypothesis
Superstitious and paranormal beliefs are widespread in the population and thus
have attracted a great deal of attention from research. An acute state of anxiety cor-
relates with paranormal beliefs (Keinan, 2002). Moreover, Dudley (1999) assessed
the level of superstitious belief both before and after working on a solvable or un-
solvable puzzle. Reported level of superstitious belief increased following exposure
to unsolvable, but not solvable problems. It suggests that participants invoke super-
stitious beliefs during instances of uncontrollability. Paranormal believers also tend
to be perceived by independent judges as trying to control others’ actions.
Given that paranormal belief is related to fantasy proneness, its origins may be
found in one of the antecedent factor of fantasy proneness, namely a history of abuse
in childhood. Irwin (1992) has found a link between paranormal belief and child-
hood trauma, particularly physical abuse by family members. Traumatic events pose
a potential threat to a state of assurance, in essence because they can be taken to im-
ply that the world is uncertain and chaotic. By incorporating a system of personal
beliefs, the individual has a cognitive framework for effectively structuring events
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and experiences in life, so that they can be mastered, at least intellectually (Irwin
and Watt, 2007).
Belief in the Paranorm
al
29
Fig. Amodel of origins and functions of paranormal belief.
Figure 7.4: A model of origins and functions of paranormal beliefs. (Figure repro-
duced from Irwin, 1993).
Empirical research offers support for this view. Blackmore and Trościanko (1985)
have shown that a group of paranormal believers had a greater sense of control
over a computer task that did a group of nonbelievers, yet the two groups did not
differ in their achieved control of the task. Rudski (2004) found that questionnaire
measures of illusion of control were associated with paranormal belief, particularly
superstitious and precognition beliefs, again suggesting that such beliefs might give
a sense of control over otherwise unpredictable events. It should be stressed that the
particular form of paranormal belief endorsed by the individual will depend greatly
on the cultural and social environment.
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) have shown that increased pattern perception had
a motivational basis by measuring the need for structure directly. They found that
people experiencing a loss of control were more likely to develop superstitions, but
also to perceive conspiracies, to see images in noise and to form illusory correla-
tions. Many of these distortions are typically discussed as separate phenomena, but
they can actually be regarded as specific cases of a more general misperception of
randomness.
Scheibehenne, Wilke, and Todd (2011) found that most of their participants pre-
ferred to predict purely random sequences over those with moderate negative au-
tocorrelation and thus missed the opportunity for above-chance payoff. However,
there exist important individual differences with regard to how strongly people are
prone to that misperception, and with regard to how much they give into that mis-
perception and bet on it (Scheibehenne and Studer, 2014). For example, gamblers
appeared to be more impulsive than community members, and it could explain why
they are more willing to bet impulsively on perceived illusory patterns (Gaissmaier
et al., 2016).
In practice, field studies using control interventions have shown that new per-
ceived control could be particularly beneficial for people who believed they had little
control. For instance, elderly people often experience an overall loss of actual con-
trol, due to reduced mobility, retirement from work and increasing health problems.
When they were given new control opportunities, even minor ones such as being
asked to take care of themselves or water a plant, they show renewed resilience in
psychological and physical well-being (Langer and Rodin, 1976), and these positive
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effects were shown to last as long as 18 months later (Rodin and Langer, 1977).
All in all, it might be better to err on the side of too much perceived control. Be-
liefs are thought to be held because they serve significant psychodynamical needs of
the individual, and they can achieve this function whether they are grounded in ob-
jective reality or are intrinsically illusory (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Many instances
have been found in which it seems to be better to think you have control than not,
even in the case of dire circumstances (Taylor, Wayment, and Collins, 1993). Our
results in Study I suggest that people do rely on a by-default control hypothesis,
although it can make them unable to determine clearly which of their actions were
actually instrumental.
7.1.5 Free Will and cognitive traits
In a series of experiments, Alquist et al. (2015) have manipulated and measured
belief in free will. They also measured participants’ counterfactual thinking by ask-
ing them to reflect on a time they had hurt someone and counting the number of
thoughts in which they imagined what could have gone differently. Belief in free
will was associated with more counterfactual thinking, and particularly with an
an increase in the generation of self and upward counterfactuals, which have been
shown to be particularly useful for learning.
272 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41(2)
Counterfactuals for learning: Upward, additive, and self. As 
predicted, a one-way ANOVA showed that there was sig-
nificant variation among conditions in the number of upward 
counterfactual thoughts participants generated, F(2, 81) = 
3.88, p = .03, η2 = .09, 90% CI = [0.006, 0.18] (see Figure 1). 
Participants in the free will condition (M = 4.61, SD = 2.36) 
generated significantly more upward counterfactuals than par-
ticipants in the control condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.61), F(1, 
81) = 5.98, p = .02, η2 = .07, d = .62, 95% CI = [0.13, 2.25], 
and likewise more than participants in the anti–free will condi-
tion (M = 3.42, SD = 1.33), F(1, 81) = 5.66, p = .02, η2 = .07, 
d = .58, 95% CI = [0.12, 2.24].
Using a one-way ANOVA, we also found that there was 
also significant variation among conditions in the number of 
additive counterfactuals participants generated, F(2, 81) = 
5.05, p < .01, η2 = .11, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.21]. Participants in 
the free will condition (M = 2.93, SD = 1.61) generated sig-
nificantly more counterfactuals in which a thing or action 
was added to the situation than participants in the control 
condition (M = 1.73, SD = 1.23), F(1, 81) = 9.49, p < .01, η2 
= .11, d = .82, 95% CI = [0.40, 1.99], or anti–free will condi-
tion (M = 2.04, SD = 1.54), F(1, 81) = 4.90, p = .03, η2 = .06, 
d = .56, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.75].
Another one-way ANOVA confirmed that there was sig-
nificant variation among conditions on the number of coun-
terfactuals participants generated about themselves, F(2, 
81) = 5.07, p < .01, η2 = .11, 90% CI = [0.02, 0.21]. 
Participants in the free will condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.52) 
generated significantly more counterfactuals about them-
selves than participants in the control condition (M = 2.30, 
SD = 1.26), F(1, 81) = 9.51, p < .01, η2 = .11, d = .78, CI = 
[0.36, 1.82], or anti–free will condition (M = 2.58, SD = 
1.24), F(1, 81) = 4.94, p = .03, η2 = .06, d = .58, CI = [0.05, 
1.57]. Participants who had their belief in free will bolstered 
generated a greater number of upward, additive, and self-
counterfactuals than participants in the anti–free will belief 
and control conditions.
Downward, subtractive, and other person counterfactuals.  
Using a one-way ANOVA, we found that there were no 
significant differences among conditions on subtractive 
counterfactuals, F(2, 81) = 0.26, p = .77, or the number of 
counterfactuals generated about the person who had been 
hurt, F(2, 81) = .02, p = .98. There were too few downward 
counterfactuals (1) to analyze.
Mood. Composite variables for pleasantness and arousal 
were created following Mayer and Gaschke’s (1988) 
instructions. Using a one-way ANOVA, we found that par-
ticipants did not differ across conditions on the pleasant-
ness–unpleasantness of their emotions, F(2, 81) = 0.87, p = 
.42. Using a one-way ANOVA, we also found no significant 
differences among conditions on the Arousal–Calm sub-
scale of the BMIS, F(2, 81) = 2.44, p = .09, η2 = .06, 90% 
CI = [0.00, 0.14].
Discussion
In Study 1, we found that participants who were assigned to 
re-write statements supporting a belief in free will generated 
a greater number of counterfactuals than participants who 
were asked to re-write anti–free will or control sentences. 
Participants in the free will condition generated a greater 
total number of counterfactuals, and those differences were 
concentrated in certain types of counterfactual thoughts.
Specifically, participants in the free will condition gener-
ated more upward, additive, and self-related counterfactuals 
than participants in the anti–free will and control conditions. 
This suggests that free will belief may not simply haphaz-
ardly increase people’s likelihood of imagining things being 
different. Rather, belief in free will may primarily increase 
people’s willingness to think in ways that may facilitate 
learning and thereby improve future performance.
We did not expect mood to play a role in the effect of free 
will belief on counterfactual thinking, and we found no 
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Figure 1. Study 1. Average number of counterfactuals by structure and free will condition.
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Figure 7.5: Average number of counterfactual thoughts by structure and free will
condition. (Figure reproduced from Alquist et al., 2015).
These results parallel ou findings in Study I, in which instrumental c tr l i
implemented as counterfactual power by participants. As Alquist et al. (2015), we
also hypothesize that a belief in control can be beneficial for action-outcome learning,
by triggering a counterfact emul tion mechanism.
In the introduction, we have seen how artificially decreasing belief in free will
led to cheating and agressive behavior. However level of belief is stable in many
cases, and personality psychologists had developed tools to quantify individual dif-
ferences. To measure free will belief, researchers tend to rely on either the Free Will
and Deter i ism Plus Scale (FAD+; Paulhus and Carey, 2011) or the Free Will and
Determinism Scale (FWDS; Rakos et al., 2008). Other measures, including one-item
or two-item questions about whether one believes in free will, are also sometimes
used. One adva tage of the FAD+ is that it measures free will belief and determinis-
tic beliefs with separate scales. In contrast, the FWDS treats determinism as the polar
opposite of free will, such that increases in one belief necessarily reflect decreases in
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the other (Baumeister and Brewer, 2012).
Questionnaire results were consistent with free will manipulation experiments.
For example, students with higher dispositional belief in free will reported greater
expectations of future professional success. This significant prediction was specific
to free will and remained intact after controlling for intelligence (SAT score), Big Five
personality traits, and locus of control. Moreover belief in free will was positively
correlated with three of the Big Five traits, namely Conscientiousness, Emotional
Stability, and Openness to Experience. A field study also measured variations in free
will beliefs among mostly poor, low educated, non-white day laborers. Individuals
who believed more in free will performed better in these actual jobs, as indicated by
ratings by their supervisors (Stillman et al., 2010).
These inter-individual differences in the belief in free will make us wonder if the
same variability can be seen in our model comparison and our best-fitting parame-
ter values in Study I. So far, we have analyzed how the inter-individual variability
in the reference point parameter can be related to the computed divergence between
chosen and unchosen reward. An interesting perspective would be to correlate ques-
tionnaires of free will or of locus of control with the best-fitting learning rate values
of the counterfactual (CF) model.
7.1.6 A historical perspective
In the introduction, we have showed that the reported locus of control was found to
be a stable trait, used in personality psychology to predict people’s behavior. Over
the past 40 years, locus of control has become one of the most widely studied indi-
vidual differences in psychology, with most studies using Rotter (1966)’s I-E Scale.
In a Psychology Today article, Rotter (1971) reported that his samples from the late
1960s and early 1970s were considerably more external than those collected in the
early 1960s.
To explore change over time in locus of control, Twenge, Zhang, and Im (2004)
examined responses of participants of the same age collected during different years,
gathered from the literature. They studied two samples, one of college students and
one of children, and found that young Americans increasingly believed their lives
were controlled by outside forces rather than their own efforts.
LOCUS OF CONTROL OVER TIME
lection. As in previous cross-temporal meta-analyses,
the correlations will be weighted by the sample size of
each study to provide better estimates of the population
mean. We also report analyses weighted by the inverse
of the variance (called w), a technique that includes the
within-study standard deviation as well as sample size;
w is the usual weight applied in meta-analyses. Shadish
and Haddock (1994, pp. 272-273) provided weights
for aggregated data, and we modified this technique for
means to compute the variance: the within-study stan-
dard deviation squared, x l/n of the individual study.
We then inverted the variance (l/v) to make the weight-
ing variable (w). (See also Lipsey & Wilson, 2001.)
This technique was also used in Twenge and Campbell
(2001). However, we relied on analyses weighted by
sample size for the majority of calculations, as these in-
clude the largest amount of data (w requires a sample
standard deviation, which some of the sources did not
report).
Results and Discussion
Correlations With Year
College students have become more external over
time, as shown by the positive correlation between I-E
scores and year (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The increase
is very linear (r= .70 in the analyses weighted by sample
size, .67 in those weighted by w). Samples of men only
or women only show similar results. The increase is
fairly steady over time; the correlation is still significant
if the analysis (weighted by sample size) is limited to
samples collected after 1980 (r = .43, p < .01, k = 44) or
even to samples collected after 1990 (r= .47,p < .03, k=
21). Thus scores continued to grow more external
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These results are con-
sistent with the alienation model, which hypothesized
that locus-of-control scores would become more exter-
Table 1. Correlations Between College Students 'and
Children's Locus of Control Scores and Year
r With Year
r With Year Weighted by
Weighted by Inverse
Sample Sample Size Variance (w)
College students (Rotter I-E)
Mixed-sex samples .70*** (85) .67*** (75)
Male samples .62*** (30) .66*** (26)
Female samples .68*** (32) .65*** (29)
Children (CNSIE)
Grades 4-8, combined .49*** (41) .51** (34)
Grades 4-5 .70*** (14) .65* (12)
Grades 6-8 .47* (27) .50* (22)
Note: Number of samples are in parenthesis. There are fewer sam-
ples weighted by w because some samples did not report standard de-
viations.
* p <.05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Figure 1. College students' locus of control over time.
nal over time. From 1960 to 2002, college students in-
creasingly believed that their lives were controlled by
outside forces rather than their own efforts.
Magnitude of Change
College students' I-E scores became steadily more
external over time. But how large was this increase? To
calculate the magnitude of change in locus of control,
we used the regression equations and the average stan-
dard deviation (SD) of the individual samples. We re-
lied on the regression equations weighted by sample
size, as these include the largest amount of data. To
compute the mean scores for certain years (e.g., 1960
or 2002), we used the regression equation from the sta-
tistical output (used to draw the regression line). The
regression equation follows the algebraic formula y =
Bx + C, with B = the unstandardized beta, x = the year,
C = the constant, and y = the mean score. This formula
yielded the position of the regression line (the I-E
score, on the Y axis) for a particular year. We obtained
the average SD by averaging the within-sample SDs re-
ported in the data sources; thus this reflects the average
variance of the measure in a sample of individuals.
It is important to note that this method avoids the
ecological fallacy (which Rosenthal, Rosnow, and Ru-
bin, 2000, call "alerting correlations"). The ecological
fallacy occurs when the magnitude of change is calcu-
lated using the variation in mean scores rather than the
variation within a population of individuals (e.g., using
the correlation between mean scores and year to calcu-
late the magnitude of an effect). This exaggerates the
magnitude, because mean scores do not differ as much
as individual scores. The method used here, in contrast,
uses the standard deviation of the individual studies to
capture the variance of the scale among a population of
individuals. This technique probably still results in
313
Figure 7.6: College students’s locus of control, as measured by the I-E scale, over
time. High scores on the scale correspond to a more external locus of control. (Figure
reproduced from Twenge, Zhang, and Im, 2004).
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The found change was large: the average 2002 student was more external than
80% of college students in the early 1960s, and birth cohort/time period explained
14% of the variance in locus of control. Unfortunately, the implications of increasing
externality are almost uniformly negative. A meta-analysis found the self-serving
bias to be significantly stronger in individuals with an external locus of control
(Campbell and Sedikides, 1999), and this bias is evident in the victim mentality,
which was found more common in recent years: Sykes (1992) has thus argued that
America has become ‘a nation of victims’ that blames outrageous behavior on out-
side sources.
When we interpret our results in Study I, II and III, we should keep in mind that
we are studying participants living in a particular culture. As we have seen with
this historical perspective on the locus of control, we could imagine that different
behavioral trends might have arisen in different periods or from participants from
different cultures.
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7.2 Formalizing the notion of control
We will now discuss how our results can help formalizing the notion of control. Here
we will focus on formalizing people’s perception of control, rather than a mathemat-
ical or statistical definition of control (see Pearl, 2000 for a review on this subject). We
already discussed in the Study I draft how control can be formalized as a difference-
making process. The effects of control on behavior and verbal reports have been
studied in various areas of psychology, and other mechanisms of control perception
have been proposed.
7.2.1 Control as a match between predicted and observed consequences
The notion of control was widely studied in the sensorimotor framework, as an ac-
tion effectuated via a motor command will always lead to sensory outcomes. Every
time our brain sends a motor command, there is evidence that a copy of this com-
mand is also generated, called the efference copy (Sperry, 1950). According to a very
influential model of sensorimotor control, the predictive forward model, this effer-
ence copy will be used to predict the sensory consequences of the action, in order to
compare them to the actual perceived consequences. When there is a match between
predicted and perceived consequences, a sense of control arises (Frith, Blakemore,
and Wolpert, 2000).
external effects. This process therefore Ælters incoming
sensory information for perhaps the more relevant com-
ponent of information.
Forward models in schizophrenia: Frith [6] proposed that
a defect in this kind of central 'self-monitoring' mechanism
might underlie auditory hallucinations and passivity phe-
nomena, which are 'Ærst rank' features in schizophrenia
[13]. Auditory hallucinations normally consist of hearing
spoken voices [14,15]. The essence of passivity experiences
(or delusions of control) is that the subject experiences his
or her will as replaced by that of some other force or
agency [16]: 'My Ængers pick up the pen, but I don't
control them. What they do is nothing to do with me... The
force moved my lips. I began to speak. The words were
made for me' [17].
Frith has suggested that these abnormal experiences
arise through a lack of awareness of intended actions.
Such an impairment might cause thoughts or actions to
become isolated from the sense of will normally associated
with them. This would result in the interpretation of
internally generated voices or thoughts as external voices
(auditory hallucinations and thought insertion) and of
one's own movements and speech as externally caused
(passivity of experiences). We have suggested that the
experience of passivity arises from a lack of awareness of
the predicted limb position based on the forward model
[18,19]. Thus the patient is aware of the intention to move
and of the movement having occurred, but is not aware of
having initiated the movement. It is as if the movement,
although intended, has been initiated by some external
force. In a variation on this theme, Spence [20] has
suggested that the problem is to do with the timing of
awareness.
The perception of the sensory consequences of actions:
Evidence suggests that the sensory consequences of some
self-generated movements are perceived differently from
an identical sensory input that is externally generated. An
example of such differential perception is the phenomenon
that people cannot tickle themselves [21,22]. In Weiskrantz
et al.'s psychophysical study, a tactile stimulus that trans-
versed the sole of the subject's foot was administered either
by the experimenter or the by the subject. Subjects rated
the self-administered tactile stimulus as less tickly than the
externally administered tactile stimulus. When the experi-
menter moved the subject's hand to tickle their foot, the
tickle strength was reduced, but not to the level of the self-
administered tactile stimulus. The differences in response
were attributed to the mode of delivery: self-administered
tactile stimulation produces both efference copy, in accor-
dance with the motor command, and re-afference pro-
duced by the arm movement; passive arm movement
produces only re-afference, and externally administered
tactile stimulation produces neither efference copy nor re-
afference. The authors therefore concluded that although
re-afference plays a role, the signal used for attenuation is
based mainly on the efference copy signal produced in
concordance with a self-generated movement.
One explanation of these results is that there is a general
gating of all incoming sensory stimulation during self-
generated movement. Indeed, this kind of sensory gating
during movement has been documented in humans [23±
26]. For example, detection thresholds for an electrically
induced twitch of the arm muscle are attenuated by
voluntary movements of the stimulated arm [25]. Such
Ændings suggest that the perception of sensory stimulation
might be attenuated simply if self-generated movement
occurs simultaneously with the stimulus: the movement
might not necessarily have to produce the sensory stimulus
in order for it to be attenuated. This, however, is incon-
sistent with the theoretical approach of forward models we
have outlined, which posits that in order for sensory
attenuation to occur, the speciÆc sensory consequences of
the movement must be predicted accurately. According to
our hypothesis, the sensory stimulation would have to
correspond to the movement producing it in order for
perceptual attenuation to occur. If this hypothesis is true,
there are two further possibilities. First, the sensory stimu-
lation might have to correspond exactly to the movement
producing it for any perceptual attenuation to occur.
Alternatively, the amount of perceptual attenuation might
be proportional to the accuracy of the sensory prediction.
To investigate this, in an experiment that was based on
Weiskrantz and colleagues' study, we asked subjects to
rate the sensation of a tactile stimulus on the palm of their
hand, and examined the perceptual effects of altering the
correspondence between self-generated movement and its
sensory (tactile) consequences. This was achieved by intro-
ducing parametrically varied degrees of delay or trajectory
rotation between the subject's movement and the resultant
tactile stimulation. The result of increasing the delay or
trajectory rotation is that the sensory stimulus no longer
corresponds to that normally expected based on the
efference copy produced in parallel with the motor com-
mand. Therefore as the delay or trajectory rotation in-
creases, the sensory prediction becomes less accurate. This
Predictor
Efference
copy
Motor
command
Sensory
discrepancy
("tickliness")
Predicted sensory feedback
(Corollary discharge)
Actual sensory feedback
External
influences
(e.g. delay)
Sensorimotor
system
Fig. 1. A model for determining the sensory consequences of a move-
ment. An internal forward model makes predictions of the sensory
feedback based on the motor command. These predictions are then
compared with the actual sensory feedback. Self-produced sensations can
be correctly predicted on the basis of the motor command and are
associated with little or no sensory discrepancy resulting from the
comparison between predicted and actual sensory feedback. As the
sensory discrepancy from this comparison increases (for example by
increasing the delay or trajectory rotation between the movement and
its sensory consequences) so does the likelihood that the sensation is
externally produced. By using such a system it is possible to cancel out
the effects on sensation induced by self-motion and thereby distinguish
sensory events due to self-produced motion from the sensory feedback
caused by the environment, such as contact with objects.
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Figure 7.7: A model for determining the sensory consequences of a movement. An
internal forward model makes predictions of the sensory feedback based on the mo-
tor command. These predictions are then compared with the actual sensory feed-
back. A mi match induces a pe ceived lack of control over the action. (Figure repro-
duced from Bl kemor , Wolpe t, and Frith, 2000).
This model was used to explain why you cannot tickle yourself. When a move-
ment is s lf-produced, its sensory consequences can be accurately predicted, and
this prediction can be used to attenuate the sensory effects of the movement. Func-
tional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that this sensory attenuation might
be mediated by somatosensory cortex and anterior cingulate cortex: these areas are
activated less by a self-produced tactile stimulus than by the same stimulus when it
is externally produced (Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith, 2000).
Intere ti gly we have seen in the int oduction that the notion of prediction error
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is also central in the TD(0) algorithm, used to model people’s reinforcement learning
processes. It was therefore hypothesized, although without providing experimental
evidence, that the prediction error as described in the predictive forward model can
be linked to the reward prediction error used in a reinforcement learning model (Den
Ouden et al., 2008). Therefore one could use the success of the predictive forward
model to give support to the ‘associative view of causality’ that we have developed
in Study I, although we rather found evidence for the ‘counterfactual view of causal-
ity’.
As we said, the formalization of control as a match between predicted and ob-
served consequences was developed in the sensorimotor field, and the efference
copy mechanism cannot be generalized to long-term, non sensory outcomes of an
action. For example, when one pass an exam, one will feel responsible for the ob-
tained grade, independently of the grade being known one minute or one month
after the exam. We would therefore argue that the predictive forward model cannot
be generalized outside the sensorimotor framework, and we will now review the
other control models that have been developed.
7.2.2 Control as a continuity in the prediction-action-effect chain
According to the predictive forward model, sense of agency arises when external
events that follow our action are consistent with predictions of action effects made
while we perform or simply intend to perform an action. Thus, agency is inferred
retrospectively, after an action has been performed and its consequences are known.
In contrast, a more integrative framework has suggested that internal processes
involved in the selection of actions also influence subjective sense of control, in ad-
vance of the action itself, and irrespective of effect predictability. Indeed there is
evidence that earlier processes, linked to fluency of action selection, prospectively
contribute to sense of agency (Chambon, Sidarus, and Haggard, 2014).
Chambon et al. A prospective account of agency
FIGURE 1 | (A) Intention-Action-Effect chain. The action-selection
processes operate between the formation of the initial intention and
action execution. Dysfluency of action selection signals a break in the
intention-action link, that occurs prior to the action and its sensory
consequences. After the action has been selected, predicted and
perceived consequences of this action are compared. On the comparator
account (in bold), sense of agency is strong when there is a match
between predicted and actually experienced consequences of an action,
and is reduced in the case of a mismatch. (B) Example trial from the
prime-target incompatible condition, adapted from Chambon et al. (2013).
Participants were instructed to respond to the target stimulus, and were
not informed of the presence of the arrow primes. Action effects
consisted of colored circles that appeared on the screen after a varying
delay. In this condition, sense of agency decreases relative to the
compatible condition, even though predicted and perceived action effects
are the same (yellow circles).
the mismatch induced. In one typical task, participants received
distorted visual feedback of their hand moving a joystick. When
the movement of the virtual hand did not correspond to the
subjects’ movement (Farrer and Frith, 2002), or when an angular
bias was introduced between the subject’s and the virtual hand’s
movement, participants more readily attributed it to another
agent (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer et al., 2003; Synofzik
et al., 2006; David et al., 2007). Note that manipulating tempo-
ral relations between actions and outcomes had similar effects
(Franck et al., 2001; Leube et al., 2003; MacDonald and Paus,
2003; David et al., 2007, 2011; Farrer et al., 2008). The so-called
“intentional binding” effect provides another line of evidence for
the role of temporal contiguity between action and outcome in
the building of agency. The intentional binding effect has been
first reported by Haggard et al. (2002): it refers to the subjective
compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action
and its external sensory consequences. Thus, actions are perceived
as shifted in time towards the outcomes that they cause, while
outcomes are perceived as shifted back in time towards the actions
that cause them (see Moore and Obhi, 2012, for a review). This
temporal attraction is absent in cases of involuntary or passive
movement. Equally, when participants simply judge the interval
between action and effect, their judgments show a perceptual
compression absent for equivalent passive movements (Engbert
et al., 2008). The intentional binding effect would constitute an
implicit, but reliable, measure of agency, as it only occurs when
events in the external environment are precisely recognized as the
consequences of one’s action.
On comparator accounts, a positive sense of agency is the
default operation when no mismatch between predicted and
current states occurs (see Synofzik et al., 2008). It is the experi-
ential output of sub-personal processes that mostly run outside
consciousness. Crucially, although sense of agency relies on real-
time motor signals, it can only be computed after those signals
are compared with reafferent feedback. Thus, a reliable, explicit
sense of agency may only be formed when reafferent (visual,
motor, or proprioceptive) signals become available for matching
with intentions. Thus, one cannot feel agency over any event
until that event has been registered and processed in the brain.
As a consequence, agency can only be retrospectively attributed,
although it is informed by on-line signals about motor guidance
and control (Chambon and Haggard, 2013).
Note the retrospective account on agency has several
advantages. First, it is grounded on several classes of converging
behavioral and neuroimaging evidence. Second, it primarily relies
on a computational model that provides a convincing explana-
tion for the link between action and effect: action effects are
sensory events that can be predicted from one’s action plans.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 320 | 2
Figure 7.8: The intention-action-effect chain. The action-selection processes oper-
ate between the formation of the initial intention and action execution. Dysfluency
of action selection signals a break in the intention-action link, and was linked to a
decreased perception of control. (Figure reproduced from Chambon, Sidarus, and
Haggard, 2014).
More specifically, people feel a stronger sense of control when they choose flu-
ntly and easily wha to do (We ke, Fleming, nd Haggard, 2010). This result is
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reminiscent of Lau, Hiemisch, and Baumeister (2015)’s results, mentioned in the
introduction: when participants had to choose between three, six or nine housing
advertisements, the more options they had, the less free they felt.
At the other end of the spectrum, free-choice, compared to instructed-choice, is
known to enhance an induced sense of control. Corah and Boffa (1970) told their
subjects that there were two conditions in the experiment, each of which would be
signaled by a different light. In one condition they were given a choice of whether or
not to press a button to escape from an aversive noise, and in the other one they were
not given an opportunity to escape the noise. They found that the choice instructions
decreased the aversiveness of the threatening stimulus, apparently by increasing
perceived control.
The protocol of Study III was built based on this chain model of control from
intention to action. Indeed in Study III, we made the assumption that giving partic-
ipants the possibility of a choice would enhance their sense of agency, so we could
study the link between agency and valence biases in reinforcement learning pro-
cesses. By forcing participants to match a preselected stimulus, we have thus broken
the link between intention and action, and as a consequence we found no choice-
confirmatory bias in the participants’ learning rates.
A perspective of this work would be to determine whether the selection of a
motor action is actually crucial for the choice-confirmation bias to emerge. A future
task could be developed in which not pressing a key would lead to the automatic
selection of a preselected stimulus. Such protocol could disentangle the importance
of action planification and action selection in the choice-confirmation bias. Indeed
when a stimulus is preselected and the participant would not press a key, she would
still have the intention to choose this stimulus, but without having to generate a
motor command.
Our hypothesis would be that in this scenario, not pressing a key would be sim-
ilar to a choice for participants, and thus a choice-confirmation bias would still ap-
pear in these ’passive choice’ trials. A parallel can be made with Go/NoGo task,
in which inhibiting a Go response is perceived to be a costly and voluntary process
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003).
7.2.3 Control as instrumental contingency
In the introduction we have seen how control has been defined by the notion of the
instrumental contingency(Maier and Seligman, 1976; Hammond, 1980). In most ex-
perimental conditions, people’s perception of control does correlate with the differ-
ence between the probabilities of a consequence knowing the action was performed
or not:
∆p = p(R|A)− p(R|A) (7.1)
This ∆p or contingency model has been very influential to predict animal behav-
ior and human verbal reports (Cheng, 1997), and had inspired many variations of
this rule. For example, as the ∆p can only be used for binary outcomes, Liljeholm
et al. (2013) used a more general metric, the Jensen-Shannon divergence, to com-
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pute the difference between probability distributions accounting for more than two
possible outcomes.
We also used this notion of contingency when we investigated the effect of a
lack of instrumental control on participants’ learning strategy in Study II. We imple-
mented a lack of control as a null instrumental contingency (∆p = 0). Importantly,
we explicitly said to participants when they were in control of the action outcomes,
and when they were not. We found a significant effect of explicit control on the
learning rate parameters, with higher learning rates in the explicit control than lack
of control condition (see the additional analyses, Figure 5.4).
Another experiment tested the effect of instrumental control on the learning rate
asymmetry (Lefebvre et al., 2016). Although their protocol was slightly different,
they also had conditions with control, that they called asymmetric (as the reward
probabilities were 25% and 75%) and lack-of-control conditions, called symmetric
as the probabilities were the same for both actions (either 25%/25%, or 75%/75%).
Their instructions were the same in both conditions, making the lack of control im-
plicit.
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p<0.001, paired t-test). It might be argued that the learning rate asymmetry we observed was driven by an 
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In order to verify that the asymmetry of the learning rate was not only expressed in the symmetric 
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asymmetric conditions independently (Fig. S3B). A two-way ANOVA devised with condition type 
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conditions, but importantly no significant interaction between valence and condition type (F(1,84)=0.124, 
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F gure 7.9: H s gra s show the le rning r es f llowing pos tive prediction errors
(α+) and negative prediction errors (α−), obtained from parameters optimization
involving only the ‘symmetric’ (implicit lack of control) or the ‘asymmetric’ (implicit
control) conditions. (Reproduced from Lefebvre et al., 2016, figure S3B)
Th y also found a significant main eff ct of condition, but in th opposite di-
rection, as their learning rates were generally higher for ‘symmetric’ conditions (im-
plicit lack of control) than for ‘asymmetric’ conditions (implicit control). It is striking
to ee t a explici nd implicit lack of co trol c n have opposite effects, s this is in
contradiction with people being able to reliably monitor the implemented contin-
gencies (Liljeholm et al., 2013).
But Matute (1996) has previously sho that humans are able to accurately re-
port their own control only when they are asked to do so at the beginning of the
experiment. When participants were not instructed to onit r their action effects
(∆p), they actually tended to verestimate their control. Our results in Study I simi-
larly showed that people seemed to rely on a by-default control assumption.
I (Lefebvre et al., 2016)’s implicit lack f control conditions, we interpret partici-
pants’ behavior as following the local patterns of rewards and adapt their responses
to them. Because local patterns are by essence fast-changing, participants must
imagine they are in a highly-changing environment to explain the brutal changes
i th obse ved patte ns (Yu a d Coh n, 2009). They th refore increase their learn-
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ing rates to adapt to this perceived volatility (Behrens et al., 2007).
But when participants are explicitly told to have no control as in Study II, they
don’t try to monitor anymore action-outcome associations, thus displaying small
learning rates. The by-default control assumption described in Study I can thus
explain the differences of effects between implicit and explicit lack of control, found
when comparing Study II results to the literature.
7.2.4 Control as cognitive control
Cognitive control, the ability to coordinate thoughts and actions in relation with
internal goals, is often required in our everyday life and subserves higher cognition
processes such as planning and reasoning (Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher, 2003).
Cognitive control enables one to inhibit a habitual or automatic response in order
to reach a goal in a certain context. For example, imagine you are standing at the
corner of a street. Your natural reaction is to look left before crossing, and this is the
correct thing to do in most of the world. However, if you are in England, you should
repress your ‘instinct’, and look right. This is a classic example of a circumstance
requiring cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Cognitive control and people’s perception of control have been mostly studied
separately, but our results make us wonder whether a link between the two is pos-
sible. Indeed in Study II we found evidence that the post-error boost of implicit
agency may be linked to a error-triggered rise in cognitive control. Interestingly in
Study I, we found that participants seemed to rely on a by-default control mode. We
can thus wonder whether the variations found in the reported sense of agency could
be due to the different levels of cognitive control exerted during a task, rather than
to the participants’ actual monitoring of instrumental control.
A similar link has been made between self-control and the belief in free will,
which is closely correlated with the locus of control trait (Baumeister and Brewer,
2012). Believing in free will is apparently tied to a broad sense of wanting to exert
control over one’s life and believing that one can. That is, believers in free will claim
to have better self-control and to be more motivated to exert and maintain control
over themselves, as compared to disbelievers in free will.
By contrast, other researchers have focused on the distinction between perceived
control either in terms of cognitive control or behavioral control. This parallels the
common distinction between cognitive coping ability and behavioral coping abil-
ity, frequently applied in the literature on coping with stress (Pearlin and Schooler,
1978). In some situations, people may feel competent to regulate themselves by
reappraising the demands or by controlling their emotions, whereas in other situ-
ations they may feel competent to change the stressful encounters instrumentally.
McCarthy and Newcomb (1992) found that issues such as purpose in life or loss of
control were only related to the cognitive control dimension, whereas social stress
issues such as assertiveness, leadership, and dating were only related to the behav-
ioral control dimension.
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7.2.5 The importance of formalizing control
A fundamental experience of everyday life is the feeling that we control our own ac-
tions. When these actions produce effects in the environment, we feel that we cause
those too. Contingency awareness, the recognition that components of a future ob-
servation can be affected by one’s choice of action, is considered a crucial step in the
intellectual development of children (Watson and Ramey, 1972). Without this cog-
nitive capacity, it is hard to see how the astonishing range and efficiency of human
functional instrumental action could occur. For example, agriculture, material cul-
ture and technology all depend on a core cognitive capacity to link one’s actions to
subsequent effects.
Formalizing the perception of control is an important project not only for psy-
chology, but also for machine learning. Bellemare, Veness, and Bowling (2012) said
in a recent article: “While it is not yet clear what mechanisms produce contingency
awareness in humans, it seems plausible that some form of contingency awareness
could play an important role in the construction of artificially intelligent agents.” In-
deed, when using popular model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, it is well
known that good performance hinges on having access to an appropriate set of ba-
sis functions or features (Sutton, 1996). Bellemare, Veness, and Bowling (2012) have
proposed a mechanism to identify contingent regions, i.e., the parts of an observa-
tion whose immediate future value depends on the the agent’s choice. Their results
showed that contingency awareness can significantly improve the performance on
Atari 2600 games of existing feature construction methods by adding contingency-
specific features.
used by a reinforcement learning agent to abstract the game
state. Their empirical results show increased performance
when using the reduced feature set.
The methods discussed above all require significant hu-
man intervention, either in designing the first-order logic
predicates and model or in obtaining expert human trajec-
tories. The need for human intervention makes it difficult
to apply algorithms from scratch to new problems. One of
the aims of this paper is to show that contingency awareness
can be used to automatically augment a feature set. Further-
more, the technique is effective for a broad range of Atari
2600 games, with no additional human knowledge needed
for new games.
Lastly, Naddaf (2010) studied how one could develop
game-independent AI agents for the Atari 2600. These
agents were designed to perform well across a broad set
of games. He studied search-based methods, using the
Atari simulator as a forward model, and explored the perfor-
mance of different handcrafted feature sets for linear func-
tion approximation in the reinforcement learning setting.
His work illustrated the challenges involved in developing
game-independent agents in both search and reinforcement
learning settings.
3 Black Box RL
For this work, we adopt a discrete action, finite hori-
zon, bounded reward, deterministic black-box reinforcement
learning setup. This involves two entities, an agent and
an environment, which communicate over a fixed number
N 2 N of discrete time cycles. Interaction begins with the
agent selecting an action from the action space, a finite set
A. The environment then responds with a percept, which is
an observation-reward pair. Each observation is an element
from a set O known as the observation space. Each reward is
a scalar value from a compact set R ⇢ R, the reward space.
We denote the percept space by X := O⇥R. A history is an
alternating string of action-percepts from the history space,
which is defined as H := [Ni=0(A⇥X )i[ (A⇥X )i⇥A. A
history contains all of the information available to an agent
at a particular point in time.
The goal of the agent is to act in such a way as to max-
imize its accumulated reward over the N cycles. The be-
haviour of an agent is summarized by a policy: a set of prob-
ability distributions ⇡(·|h) over the action space A, one for
each distinct history h 2 H that ends in a percept. The
only additional property of our black box environments we
require is that they have the option to be reset to a starting
configuration. This allows us to meaningfully evaluate the
performance of a given policy by averaging across multiple
runs of N cycles for any given environment.
4 Contingency Awareness
Broadly speaking, contingency awareness is the recognition
that a future observation is under an agent’s control and not
solely determined by the environment. From an AI perspec-
tive, one of the main challenges faced when attempting to
exploit this natural idea comes from having to translate the
abstract notion of contingency into mathematical terms. In
Figure 1: The contingent regions, shown by a transparent
overlay, for Freeway (left) and Beam Rider (right).
this section we describe a notion of contingency awareness
for the Atari 2600 platform.
4.1 Contingency within Atari 2600
Intuitively, the contingent regions of an observation are the
components whose value is dependent on the most recent
choice of action. In the context of the Atari domain, this
corresponds to a set of pixel locations. This set changes over
time and depends on the exact sequence of actions made by
the agent. We now formalize this intuition by introducing
some notation to describe the Atari 2600 observation space.
Each observation represents an image structured as a two-
dimensional array of pixels. We use Dx ⇢ N and Dy ⇢ N to
denote the set of row and column indices respectively, and
D := Dx ⇥ Dy to denote the joint index space. The color
space C is a finite set of possible pixel colors. A pixel is a tu-
ple (x, y, c) 2 Dx⇥Dy⇥C, where x and y denote the pixel’s
row and column location and c denotes the color of this lo-
cation. Each observation is therefore a set of |D| pixels; the
observation space O is the set of all possible observations.
We can now define the notion of contingent regions in the
black-box Atari 2600 reinforcement learning setup.
Definition 1 8n 2 N, given a history h 2 (A ⇥ X )n, the
contingent regions C(h) of history h is defined as
C(h) :=
n
(x, y) 2 D : 9a, a0 2 A, oax,y(h) 6= oa
0
x,y(h)
o
,
where oax,y(h) denotes the color of the pixel at location
(x, y) within the observation that follows history ha 2
(A⇥ X )n ⇥A.
Thus the contingent regions of history h is the set of pix-
els within the next observation whose value is dependent on
the action that follows h. Figure 1 depicts examples of con-
tingent regions in Freeway and Beam Rider. Because of the
discrete and highly non-linear nature of Atari games, con-
tingent regions are not necessarily connected: for example,
bullets and missiles are separate from the region surrounding
the player’s avatar.
4.2 Learning the Contingent Regions
We now discuss some general approaches for learning a clas-
sifier that can predict whether or not a pixel belongs to the
contingent regions within an arbitrary Atari 2600 game.
The most direct approach is to construct a training set
and employ supervised learning methods. We can exploit
865
Figure 7.10: Contingency learning by an artificial agent. The contingent regions in
Beam Rider (shown in grey) correspond to the avatar’s possible next position and
missile. (Reproduced from Bellemare, Veness, and Bowling, 2012)
In this PhD thesis, reinforcement learning models were used for the first time to
study the relationship between instrumental control, sense of agency and adaptive
behavior. Although this work was exploratory, we found this relationship to be rich
and diverse, leaving us with new questions to answer. We hope our results can foster
future research in this direction.
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Résumé
Le sentiment d’agentivité est défini
comme le sentiment de contrôler nos
actions, et à travers elles, les évène-
ments du monde extérieur. Cet en-
semble phénoménologique dépend
de notre capacité d’apprendre les
contingences entre nos actions et
leurs résultats, et un algorithme
classique pour modéliser cela vient
du domaine de l’apprentissage par
renforcement. Dans cette thèse,
nous avons utilisé l’approche de
modélisation cognitive pour étudier
l’interaction entre agentivité et ap-
prentissage par renforcement.
Tout d’abord, les participants réal-
isant une tâche d’apprentissage par
renforcement tendent à avoir plus
d’agentivité. Cet effet est logique,
étant donné que l’apprentissage par
renforcement consiste à associer une
action volontaire et sa conséquence.
Mais nous avons aussi découvert que
l’agentivité influence l’apprentissage
de deux manières. Le mode par
défaut pour apprendre des contin-
gences action-conséquence est que
nos actions ont toujours un pouvoir
causal. De plus, simplement choisir
une action change l’apprentissage de
sa conséquence.
En conclusion, l’agentivité et
l’apprentissage par renforcement,
deux piliers de la psychologie
humaine, sont fortement liés. Con-
trairement à des ordinateurs, les
humains veulent être en contrôle, et
faire les bons choix, ce qui biaise
notre aquisition d’information.
Mots Clés
Agentivité, Contrôle instrumental, In-
férence causale, Prise de déci-
sion basée sur des valeurs, Mod-
èles d’apprentissage par renforce-
ment, Modèles bayésien
Abstract
Sense of agency or subjective con-
trol can be defined by the feeling that
we control our actions, and through
them effects in the outside world.
This cluster of experiences depend
on the ability to learn action-outcome
contingencies and a more classical
algorithm to model this originates
in the field of human reinforcement-
learning. In this PhD thesis, we used
the cognitive modeling approach to
investigate further the interaction be-
tween perceived control and rein-
forcement learning.
First, we saw that participants under-
going a reinforcement-learning task
experienced higher agency; this in-
fluence of reinforcement learning on
agency comes as no surprise, be-
cause reinforcement learning relies
on linking a voluntary action and
its outcome. But our results also
suggest that agency influences re-
inforcement learning in two ways.
We found that people learn action-
outcome contingencies based on a
default assumption: their actions
make a difference to the world. Fi-
nally, we also found that the mere fact
of choosing freely shapes the learn-
ing processes following that decision.
Our general conclusion is that
agency and reinforcement learning,
two fundamental fields of human
psychology, are deeply intertwined.
Contrary to machines, humans do
care about being in control, or about
making the right choice, and this
results in integrating information in a
one-sided way.
Keywords
Agency, Instrumental control, Causal
inference, Value-based Decision-
Making, Reinforcement Learning
models, Bayesian models
